VZCZCXRO2021
RR RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMA RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV
DE RUCNDT #0107/01 0391519
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 081519Z FEB 07
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1294
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHZO/OAU COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 1121
RUEHBZ/AMEMBASSY BRAZZAVILLE
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0540
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 1048
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 0577
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA 0224
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 000107 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: CD PGOV PHUM PREL SU UNSC KPKO
SUBJECT: SYG BAN DOES LITTLE TO EASE COUNCIL FRUSTRATION ON 
DARFUR 
 
REF: SECSTATE 14650 
 
USUN NEW Y 00000107  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY. In his first appearance at a closed 
Security Council (SC) consultation, United Nations (UN) 
Secretary-General (SYG) Ban Ki-moon on February 6 said little 
 
SIPDIS 
to assuage Members' frustration with the slow pace of 
progress on Darfur.  He reported that African Union (AU) 
Commission Chair Konare would visit New York in the coming 
weeks, a visit designed to address outstanding issues on the 
eventual hybrid force in Darfur, including appointment of a 
joint UN-AU Special Representative, Deputy Special 
Representative and Force Commander (FC).  Ban was hopeful 
that a February 11-17 visit of UN Special Envoy Eliasson and 
AU Special Envoy Salim to Sudan would spark political 
progress between the Government of National Unity (GNU) and 
the non-signatories to the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA).  On 
peacekeeping in Chad and Central African Republic (CAR), Ban 
reported that both President Deby and President Bozize had 
requested immediate deployment of a UN peacekeeping operation 
to stabilize the border regions with Sudan.  At a P-5 meeting 
following Ban's briefing, UKUN reiterated its push for 
sanctions against the GNU as a way for the Council to gird 
against charges of inactivity in the face of a deteriorating 
security situation in Darfur.  END SUMMARY. 
 
BAN'S "DIFFICULT" MEETINGS WITH BASHIR, KONARE 
--------------------------------------------- - 
¶2. (SBU)  In his first appearance at SC consultations, UN SYG 
Ban Ki-moon on February 6 detailed his participation in the 
January 29-30 AU Summit in Addis Ababa.  The majority of his 
briefing focused on the situation in Darfur, which Ban said 
was experiencing "critical developments" in need of a strong 
political response.  Ban said his meeting with Sudanese 
President Bashir had been "difficult," with Bashir taking the 
defensive when Ban pushed him for clarity on humanitarian 
access, cessation of aerial bombardments and adherence to the 
ceasefire, and deployment of the hybrid force.  Ban warned 
Bashir that without resolution of these issues, no SC funding 
would be forthcoming.  Ban was reassured that Bashir agreed 
to continue consultations on political reconciliation and on 
hybrid modalities, culminating in Bashir's acceptance of the 
February 11-17 visit of Special Envoys Eliasson and Salim to 
Khartoum and Darfur, where they planned to meet with GNU 
officials and with DPA non-signatories.  Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations Under-SYG Guehenno added that the 
Envoys' visit and peacekeeping plans were "mutually 
reinforcing" and needed to happen concurrently for there to 
be progress in Darfur. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Ban reported that Bashir downplayed the gravity of 
the security situation on the ground in Darfur and asserted 
his right to classify National Redemption Front (NRF) rebels 
as "legitimate military targets," despite Bashir's stated 
"commitment" to the ceasefire.  According to Ban, Bashir was 
annoyed that the international community had not addressed 
the NRF and its aspirations of regime change in Khartoum; 
Bashir told Ban he had no plans to sign a ceasefire with that 
group.  Regarding UN involvement in Darfur peacekeeping, Ban 
said that Bashir still insists on referring to the eventual 
hybrid as an "operation," vice a "force"; on appointing only 
African leadership for the hybrid (to be done only by the 
AU); on authorizing the hybrid under a new SC resolution 
based on Chapter VIII of the UN Charter; and on relegating UN 
involvement in the hybrid to only provision of technical 
expertise and financing.  Ban said the UN would consider 
appointment of an African FC but warned that non-African 
troops were a likely reality given the constraints on force 
generation, but said his arguments fell on deaf ears. 
 
¶4. (SBU) On the heavy support package (HSP), Bashir told Ban 
he had received the SYG's letter about the HSP only days 
before the opening of the AU Summit and had not had time to 
study it.  Clear GNU agreement on the HSP would pave the way 
for hybrid deployment and for commitments by troops 
contributors, explained Ban.  Ban announced that the HSP 
price tag would be approximately $194 million.  Ban reported 
that AU Commission Chair Konare would visit New York in the 
coming weeks, a visit designed to address outstanding issues 
on the hybrid force in Darfur, including appointment of a 
joint UN-AU Special Representative, Deputy Special 
 
USUN NEW Y 00000107  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
Representative and FC.  Ban noted that he and Konare had 
"different ideas" regarding the appointment of a Special 
Representative; Konare had apparently refused names proposed 
by Ban, and Konare's proposed candidate would require 
"further consultation."  Once hybrid modalities were 
finalized, Ban said a follow-up letter would be sent to 
Bashir for his confirmation. 
 
RELATIVELY BETTER NEWS ON CHAD/CAR 
---------------------------------- 
¶5. (SBU) On peacekeeping in Chad and CAR, Ban reported that 
both Chadian President Deby and CAR President Bozize had 
welcomed the resumed work of the UN Technical Assessment 
Mission and had requested immediate deployment of a UN 
peacekeeping operation to stabilize the border regions with 
Sudan.  Both Presidents accused Sudan of supporting rebels in 
their respective territories, with Deby blaming the UN for 
"too much talk and no action" on this subject. Ban pointed 
out that Deby made no mention of a need for political 
dialogue in Chad, and Guehenno added such dialogue was 
necessary for the success of an eventual peacekeeping 
operation there.  Speaking on behalf of the new AU 
Presidency, the Ghanaian representative acknowledged the 
gravity of deteriorating Chad-Sudan relations and said the AU 
Peace and Security Council was preparing recommendations to 
President Kufuor on this topic. 
 
MEMBERS FRUSTRATED WITH SLOW PACE OF DARFUR PROGRESS 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
¶6. (SBU) All Members sought from SYG Ban a timetable for 
deployment of peacekeeping forces in Darfur and demanded to 
know what the SC could do in the near future to expedite the 
process.  Congolese PermRep Ikouebe reiterated his warning 
that the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) forces would withdraw 
from Darfur June 30 and that the SC needed to plan 
accordingly.  Drawing from reftel points, Ambassador Wolff 
urged concerted international pressure on President Bashir to 
implement the Addis Ababa and Abuja Agreements and increased 
AU-UN cooperation.  Wolff argued that Bashir's December 23 
letter to former SYG Annan indicated his support for the HSP 
and that time should not be wasted in waiting for his 
response to Ban's and Konare's January 24 letter.  Finally, 
Wolff expressed U.S. willingness to assist in encouraging 
troop contributor commitments.  The UK representative warned 
that sanctions would have to be considered if hybrid and 
funding arrangements could not be expeditiously agreed. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Chinese PermRep Wang described Chinese President 
Hu's recent trip to Sudan during which Hu reportedly 
admonished Bashir to embrace the "positive elements" of 
Annan's three-phase peacekeeping plan, to honor GNU 
commitments in achieving a viable ceasefire and expediting 
discussions with DPA non-signatories, and to improve the 
humanitarian situation in Darfur and repair relations with 
Sudan's neighbors.  Wang asserted that Bashir had agreed, at 
least "in principle," to uphold these commitments.  Wang 
confirmed that China had given Sudan 40 million RMB 
(approximately $5 million USD) in assistance as announced 
during Hu's trip. 
 
P-5 COORDINATORS MEETING AFTER CONSULTATIONS 
-------------------------------------------- 
¶8. (SBU) At a meeting following Ban's briefing, P5 political 
coordinators discussed the SYG's downbeat assessment of his 
talks with President Bashir.  USUN PolMinCouns made the point 
that Ban's difficult meeting in Addis raised renewed concern 
because patience for further accommodating Bashir had all but 
run out in several of our capitals.  The U.S. Congress, the 
Administration, and a wide variety of pressure groups wanted 
to see an immediate improvement of the humanitarian situation 
on the ground, which would require swift action to deploy an 
effective AU-UN force.  The international community seemed to 
be entering yet another round of explaining and justifying 
the three-phase plan for a UN-AU deployment in Darfur with a 
government that inspired no confidence in its own commitment 
to protect civilians or put an end to conflict. 
 
¶9. (SBU) UKUN Coordinator thanked the Chinese for their 
detailed briefing on meetings between Presidents Hu and 
Bashir, but he added that the tenor of Sudanese responses to 
 
USUN NEW Y 00000107  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
repeated demarches on Darfur, including those of Hu, 
suggested continued deep - and unjustified - suspicion of the 
UN and the international community.  Some analysts even 
believed that the current conflict and chaos in Darfur 
actually served to reinforce the position of the regime 
against its internal rivals.  This did not suggest that quick 
action on deployment would be forthcoming, declared the UK 
representative.  If faced with continued Sudanese 
stonewalling and intransigence, the Council had to be ready 
to consider the tools at its disposal, including targeted 
sanctions. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Chinese Coordinator Li refused to see the situation 
in such dark terms, although he admitted that deployment had 
been unduly delayed because the Sudanese were faced with 
internal divisions on Darfur and because Bashir had to 
accommodate political rivals regarding the AU-UN force.  Li 
insisted that there were also differences of opinion about 
how dire the humanitarian situation in Darfur was, with the 
GNU expressing a view at variance with that of humanitarian 
groups.  The French Coordinator pointed out that even the 
polite SYG Ban did not hesitate to firmly contradict the 
spurious claims of humanitarian improvements in Darfur made 
by Bashir.  The Chinese Coordinator expressed understanding 
for the frustration heard around the table but counseled 
patience in dealing with the Sudanese, who were "difficult by 
nature."  All P5 agreed that the time had come to move 
forward with the phase two HSP and that this staged 
deployment would test the sincerity of Sudanese claims that 
they fully supported the first two phases of the Annan plan. 
Chinese Coordinator Li pleaded for the rest of the P5 to 
focus on phase two deployment for the moment so as not to 
delay it with "theological discussions" about the phase three 
hybrid AU-UN force. 
WOLFF