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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 08 TOKYO 000807 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA 
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION; 
TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; 
SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN, 
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA 
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR; 
CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA. 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 02/26/07 
 
INDEX: 
 
(1) Japan to legislate against nuclear terrorism during current Diet 
session in order to cooperate with the international treaty to 
punish possession and production of radioactive materials 
 
(2) China approaches Japanese companies for technical support for 
high-speed railway project 
 
(3) Jiryu jiron (Opinion) column by Hitoshi Tanaka: The beginning of 
the end of North Korea problem? 
 
(4) Editorial: How will Japan, US respond to new Armitage report 
calling for cooperation with China? 
 
(5) Editorial: US force realignment legislation unfair to Okinawa 
 
(6) Editorial: Japan should make efforts to resolve the Iran nuclear 
issue 
 
ARTICLES: 
 
(1) Japan to legislate against nuclear terrorism during current Diet 
session in order to cooperate with the international treaty to 
punish possession and production of radioactive materials 
 
YOMIURI (Page 1) (Full) 
Eve., February 26, 2007 
 
The government this morning decided to present to the current Diet 
session a "bill to punish acts releasing radiation" (tentative 
name), a domestic law needed in order for Japan to ratify the 
International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear 
Terrorism -- which is intended to prevent nuclear terrorism. The 
government intends to enact the bill during the current session. 
Possession of radioactive materials and production of radioactive 
devices to be used for acts of terror, including the stage prior to 
carrying out the terrorist act, would be for the first time subject 
to criminal punishment. The bill will also tighten the penalties to 
be imposed on the act of releasing radioactive substances. 
 
There are no laws at present other than the Law on the Control of 
Nuclear Reactors, Etc., and the Law on Prevention of Radiation 
Damage that provide for punishments against acts of releasing 
radioactive substances. But these two laws are essentially aimed at 
forcing electric power companies with nuclear power plants and 
medical service workers to carefully handle radioactive materials. 
The laws do not assume cases of terrorism using radioactive 
materials. 
 
The bills will newly regulate the possession of radioactive 
materials, as well as the manufacturing and possession of devices to 
produce radioactive substances. The bill will make subject to 
punishment acts of blackmailing by pretending to possess nuclear 
materials. 
 
The current maximum prison term of 10 years or less applicable to 
acts of releasing radioactive materials will be extended to life 
imprisonment similar to the Chemical Weapons Ban Law and the Sarin 
Gas Prevention Law. 
 
Russia introduced in 1998 the International Convention for the 
Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism out of concern for the 
 
TOKYO 00000807  002 OF 008 
 
 
outflow of nuclear weapons and nuclear materials. The convention was 
unanimously adopted at the United Nations General Assembly in April 
¶2005. Prime Minister Koizumi signed the convention in September of 
that year. However, the number of countries that have ratified the 
convention as of Feb. 1 of this year only totals 13, short of the 22 
countries necessary for the convention to come into effect. Of the 
eight major industrialized democracies (G-8), only Russia has 
ratified it. 
 
The above convention is the 13th international treaty regulating 
acts of terrorism. Japan has ratified 12 other treaties that have 
already gone into effect. 
 
(2) China approaches Japanese companies for technical support for 
high-speed railway project 
 
NIHON KEIZAI (Top Play) (Slightly abridged) 
February 26, 2007 
 
The Chinese government has unofficially asked Japanese railroad 
coach manufacturers and railway companies for technical support for 
a project to construct a high-speed train route between Harbin and 
Dalian in Heilungkiang Province in northeastern China. In Harbin and 
Dalian, the temperature in the winter drops to minus 40 degrees. 
Given this, China needs to acquire technical know-how from overseas 
to ensure high-speed driving safety even in freezing temperatures. 
The companies approached by China have begun to look into the 
possibility of technical development. China appears to be focusing 
on Japan's Shinkansen or bullet train technology. Japanese 
companies, if they are able to prove the superiority of their 
technologies, might be able to receive orders for a large-scale 
railway project for the first time in China. 
 
According to informed sources, the Chinese Ministry of Railways has 
sounded out Japanese manufacturers, such as Kawasaki Heavy 
Industries and Hitachi, as well as East Japan Railway Company, for 
technical assistance. Beijing has revealed that it plans to develop 
such key routes as one between Beijing and Shanghai on its own, but 
it has yet to develop enough technology to operate high-speed trains 
in extremely cold temperatures. Beijing reportedly has also made 
similar approaches to European and American companies. 
 
The about 950-kilometer route between Harbin and Dalian will be 
newly established, but the South Manchuria Railway Company had also 
offered services on the same route. China plans to operate trains at 
a speed of 300 kilometers an hour, the same speed as the Shinkansen 
bullet train. In northeastern China, technologies are necessary to 
operate trains even in minus 50-degree temperatures. Japan has 
already established technology for bullet trains to be able to run 
in up to minus 25-degree temperatures. 
 
The Chinese government plans to build a high-speed passenger railway 
network covering 7,000 kilometers by 2010 or so. It intends to 
construct new routes, including one between Beijing and Shanghai 
(about 1,300 kilometers) and another between Beijing and Guangzhou 
(about 2,000 kilometers). China is also pushing ahead with a plan to 
operate on existing lines high-speed vehicles capable of running at 
a speed of more than 200 kilometers an hour. In China, a high-speed 
train modeled after the Japanese Tohoku Shinkansen bullet train 
"Hayate" initiated commercial service in January. 
 
The Japanese companies concerned had initially anticipated several 
trillion yen worth of a project in China to transfer Shinkansen 
 
TOKYO 00000807  003 OF 008 
 
 
technology, similar to the project carried out in Taiwan. 
 
China, though, has announced it would independently develop 
technologies and vehicles for the key routes between Beijing and 
Shanghai and between Beijing and Guangzhou. For these routes, China 
is expected to order about 200 cars (eight cars for one train) to 
foreign companies, including six Japanese companies such as Kawasaki 
and Hitachi, Siemens of Germany, Alstom of France, and Bombardier of 
Canada. For these routes, local companies are likely to be in charge 
of production, based on foreign companies' technologies. Japanese 
companies expect to receive orders worth several tens of billions of 
yen mainly for the transfer of technologies. 
 
Due to technical difficulties, contracts for a project to construct 
the route between Harbin and Dalian may go to Japanese companies 
should China finds independent technology development difficult. 
 
(3) Jiryu jiron (Opinion) column by Hitoshi Tanaka: The beginning of 
the end of North Korea problem? 
 
ASAHI (Page 9) (Almost full) 
February 26, 2007 
 
Around the time when the six-party talks in Beijing reached 
agreement on Feb. 13 on North Korea's nuclear programs, I was 
traveling first to London and then to San Francisco. I attended as a 
speaker international symposiums on the North Korea issue held in 
the two cities, one hosted by the International Institute for 
Strategic Studies in London and the other by the Asia Society in San 
Francisco. 
 
I told audiences at both symposiums that the recent six-party accord 
reached in Beijing should be taken as an important step in the right 
direction, but that we also must properly reaffirm what the 
fundamental principles are in order to resolve the North Korean 
problem. 
 
First, we must not repeat the same mistake we made in the past. As 
early as 1989, signs of nuclear activities by the North came to 
light, but the international community in the end failed to prevent 
Pyongyang from conducting a nuclear test. The reason is because the 
United States, Japan, and other concerned countries lacked 
consistency in their policies toward North Korea, allowing it to 
take advantage of them, even though no doubt the fault ultimately 
lies with North Korea. Moreover, there was a lack of cooperation 
among the countries concerned. The countries involved needed to have 
policy consistency and firm unity if they were to succeed. 
 
Second, the nuclear deterrent theory that the use of nuclear weapons 
would only invite massive nuclear retaliation cannot be applied to 
North Korea's nuclear ambitions. Given past behavior by that 
country, it is unlikely that North Korea would make the appropriate 
decision during a highly tense situation. I conclude thus that 
getting the North to scrap all of its nuclear weapons and programs 
enabling it to manufacture nuclear weapons is absolutely essential. 
 
Third, the issues must be resolved comprehensively. In order to get 
Pyongyang to eliminate all of its nuclear programs, it will be 
necessary to provide it with such incentives as economic cooperation 
and security assurances. The premise for such would be the 
normalization of relations and the resolution of such pending issues 
as abductions. 
 
 
TOKYO 00000807  004 OF 008 
 
 
Fourth, I must stress that the abduction issue, regrettably, cannot 
be resolved overnight. A rocky road toward resolution will likely 
continue in the future, but I think the important factor is for 
six-party talks to serve as a framework to monitor the 
implementation of the agreement by using a variety of leverages. 
 
These views that I presented at the conferences were met with 
arguments both for and against them. For example, one participant 
argued that the nuclear deterrent theory would function. Another 
person said a second and third nuclear blast by North Korea would be 
useless and meaningless. Others stressed the importance of halting 
further nuclear development and preventing nuclear proliferation to 
third parties. There were a few who stated that Japan, having 
over-emphasized the abduction issue, might be isolated or ignored by 
the other parties. There also was deep-rooted skepticism that the 
latest Beijing accord was no more than a rehash of the 1994 Agreed 
Framework between the US and North Korea, and so was of little 
significance. 
 
I said in my speech that the abduction issue was unlikely to be 
resolved without resolving the nuclear issue or vice versa. I said 
the North's nuclear programs and abductions of Japanese nationals 
stemmed from the same policy. So, what is needed is the North's 
strategic determination to resolve the abduction issue. What is 
simply needed is a system to closely monitor implementation of the 
agreement. The 1994 Agreed Framework did not have such a system, but 
the six-party talks could serve as such an arrangement. 
 
Also at the symposium in San Francisco was former US Secretary of 
Defense William Perry, who has lengthy experience in North Korean 
affairs, and my friend South Korean Ambassador to the US Lee Tae 
Sik. I think all of us shared the view of how difficult it would be 
to resolve the North Korea problem and how large the cost would be 
if the effort ended in failure. Perry in particular stressed the 
need for the US government to seriously tackle the problem, openly 
revealing his irritation at the response Washington response had 
taken prior to the recent Beijing accord. 
 
I think we are seeing the beginning of the end of the North Korea 
problem. Given the international community's deep distrust of that 
country, it will not be easy to resolve the issues. But should the 
North violate the recent six-party accord, the international 
community would unite and take tough measures against it. With 
regional security, nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 
and the stability of the international community in mind, Japan, 
too, must settle down to addressing the issue writ large. 
 
Hitoshi Tanaka: Born in 1947; after serving in such posts as the 
director-general of the Ministry of Foreign Affair's Asian and 
Oceanian Affairs Bureau and the deputy foreign minister, works as a 
senior fellow at the Japan Center for International Exchange (JCIE) 
and also as a guest professor at the University of Tokyo. 
 
(4) Editorial: How will Japan, US respond to new Armitage report 
calling for cooperation with China? 
 
MAINICHI (Page 5) (Full) 
February 26, 2007 
 
An American bipartisan group who include former Deputy Secretary of 
State Richard Armitage and former Assistant Secretary of Defense 
Joseph Nye has just released a report titled, "The US-Japan 
Alliance: Getting Asia right Through 2020." The report offers advice 
 
TOKYO 00000807  005 OF 008 
 
 
on how to meld a rising China and India into the cooperative 
framework of Asia, centering on the Japan-US alliance. 
 
In 2000, the same group of experts produced the so-called Armitage 
Report, which served as the blueprint for the Japan and Asia 
strategy of the Bush administration that was launched in 2001. The 
new report can be identified as the revised edition of the Armitage 
Report. 
 
The new report identifies close cooperation between Japan and the 
United States as the cornerstone of an Asia strategy, as was the 
case with the first Armitage Report. The overall tone toward China 
has subtly changed, however. 
 
The latest report lists three scenarios Japan and the United States 
must avoid: (1) unilateral control of Asia by the United States; (2) 
a US-China joint control concept; and (3) conflict between the 
Japan-US alliance and China. 
 
It is no longer possible for the United States alone to be the sole 
policeman in Asia where major powers are rising and energy security 
and nationalism are emerging as issues. Joint control by the United 
States and China also seems impossible, given the huge gap between 
the two countries over such values as democracy, freedom, and human 
rights. Any clash between the Japan-US alliance and China or the 
road toward rivalry would only force other countries in Asia to make 
foolish choices. That would not help China head in a positive 
direction, either. 
 
The best option would be for Japan and the United States to guide 
China toward a desirable direction, while making efforts to spread 
democratic values across the region. To that end, it is essential 
for Japan, the United States, and China to forge friendly and 
cooperative relations. 
 
The international environment surrounding Asia has significantly 
changed over the last seven years. When the first Armitage Report 
first came out, Japan, the United States, and China were tense over 
the issues of Taiwan and sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands. 
Moving then to deepen the Japan-US alliance could have been taken as 
an attempt to tighten the noose around China. 
 
China today is accepting the role of a "responsible stakeholder" 
through the six-party talks and other venues. Japan also has decided 
to aim at a strategic relationship with China. 
 
China's future remains unclear, and its defense spending and 
national policy lack transparency, as well. Still, Japan is urged to 
expand areas of cooperation with China for the common cause of 
stability and prosperity in Asia. 
 
If Japan and the United States wish to avoid being isolated in the 
region, they must not excessively adhere to the bilateral nature of 
the alliance. The two countries must seek cooperation with India, 
Australia, Vietnam, and other countries through talks, while 
endeavoring to engage China in their efforts. The new edition of the 
Armitage Report paints such a vision. 
 
The report aims at depicting an unwavering strategy toward Japan and 
policy toward Asia regardless of which candidate, Republican or 
Democratic, wins the US presidential race in 2008. How will Japan 
respond to the proposals by the bipartisan American group? Japan 
needs to broaden its perspective and boost its policymaking 
 
TOKYO 00000807  006 OF 008 
 
 
capability. 
 
(5) Editorial: US force realignment legislation unfair to Okinawa 
 
ASAHI (Page 3) (Full) 
February 26, 2007 
 
A bill has been submitted to the Diet to extend subsidies to local 
governments depending on haw far they have cooperated with 
realignment plans for the US military. 
 
The aim is to advance the US force realignment plan, as was agreed 
upon by the Japanese and US governments. The legislation 
particularly seems to reflect the government's determination to win 
over strongly resisting Okinawa municipalities to its side. 
 
But will the incentive-award system work? It might end up rubbing 
the sentiments of Okinawa residents the wrong way. 
 
What worries us is not the high-handed approach alone. Extending 
hefty financial assistance only to base-accepting municipalities is 
unfair to other areas. 
 
The government's packages of economic incentives have aimed at 
reducing economic disparities between mainland Japan and all of 
Okinawa. The government is about to make changes to such a system. 
 
The incentive award system resulted from the government's bitter 
lesson from a plan to relocated Futenma Air Station to waters off 
Nago. Although the government has provided Okinawa, centering on 
Nago, with generous packages of economic incentives, the relocation 
plan has not moved forward. 
 
The relocation site has shifted from offshore to the coastal area. 
The government is apparently determined not to allow any local 
municipalities to "eat and run." Under the proposed legislation, the 
subsidies will be provided to host municipalities in four stages of 
the realignment work: acceptance of a government plan; the start of 
an environmental assessment; the start of construction work; and the 
completion of the project. 
 
There are factors other than the local circumstances that can 
explain why the plan to relocate the Futenma airfield to waters off 
Nago has not advanced. For example, the government has acted as if 
relocating Futenma Air Station to a site within Okinawa was a done 
deal, and that has revived the anti-base movement. 
 
Another unique feature of the envisaged legislation is that the 
Defense Ministry would be allowed to determine economic incentives. 
Under the new system, the acceptance to bases would be directly 
linked to economic incentives. It would be distinct from the 
existing system to extend subsidies to municipalities already 
hosting bases. 
 
After Okinawa was returned to Japan, the now defunct Okinawa 
Development Agency was responsible for mapping out economic packages 
to the prefecture under the Okinawa Promotion and Development 
Special Measures Law. An office in the Cabinet Office is now 
responsible for the job. Given the government's tight financial 
situation, it would be natural to think that force realignment 
subsidies would take a toll on traditional packages of economic 
incentives. 
 
 
TOKYO 00000807  007 OF 008 
 
 
The law is scheduled to expire on March 31, 2012. If the law ceased 
to exist, Japan would be armed itself only with the US force 
realignment legislation that would be good until March 31, 2017. 
 
The envisaged US force realignment legislation has incorporated a 
special system allowing the government to provide municipalities 
shouldering a substantial burden from an additional base with 
greater subsidies for public works projects. 
 
In the eyes of Okinawa, there are many areas that merit government 
assistance. Regardless of such local circumstances, the government 
is planning a system to extend inappropriate subsidies only to those 
municipalities that would accept bases. The system might prompt the 
coffers of some municipalities to run dry, while those of some other 
municipalities to become bloated. 
 
It has been 35 years since Okinawa was returned to Japan. The 
government's packages of incentives to Okinawa, along with US force 
realignment, are at a crossroads. We are worried where they are 
headed. 
 
(6) Editorial: Japan should make efforts to resolve the Iran nuclear 
issue 
 
MAINICHI (Page 5) (Full) 
February 24, 2007 
 
With Iran repeatedly conducting large-scale military exercises, the 
US and European media are reporting that the US military is now 
drafting a plan to strike that country. Amid signs looming of future 
US air strikes, the deadline for Iran to halt its uranium enrichment 
activity, which the United Nations Security Council set, has 
expired. On Dec. 23 last year, the UNSC adopted unanimously a 
resolution calling on Iran to suspend its nuclear enrichment program 
within 60 days. It is regrettable that Iran did not comply with that 
dictum. 
 
According to a report that the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) submitted to the UNSC, Iran has expanded its nuclear 
enrichment activity instead of stopping it. The report notes that 
Iran has activated two cascades linked to 164 centrifugal 
separators, and that it will increase the number of centrifugal 
machines to 3,000 by May. 
 
The UNSC, therefore, has no choice but to consider additional 
sanction measures against Teheran. The present UN sanctions on Iran 
adopted based on Article 41 of the UN Chapter 7 are only ritual 
measures such as vigilance against overseas travel by individuals 
and organizations involved in nuclear weapons development, as well 
as a freeze on financial assets overseas. The United States and 
Britain, which have taken a hard-line stance against Iran, and 
China, which is cautious about the further strengthening of UN 
sanctions, will likely engage in a tug-of-war at the UNSC over the 
issue of where to go next on Iran. 
 
We ask the countries concerned to refrain from words and actions 
that would unnecessarily inflame tensions. According to media 
reports, should Iran's nuclear weapons development be confirmed or 
should Iran's direct involvement in attacks on US forces in Iraq be 
discovered, US forces would launch attacks on Iran's military and 
nuclear facilities. Israel, a US ally, is rumored to be readying to 
launch air strikes on Iran. There is precedent for in 1981, Israel 
bombed a nuclear plant in Iraq. 
 
TOKYO 00000807  008 OF 008 
 
 
 
Of course, concerned parties have yet to confirm their conjectures. 
This might be either a threat or a constraint. The Iranian nuclear 
issue should be resolved in the UNSC. Otherwise the issue will 
become overly complicated. Iran should stop its provocative 
activities, including military exercises. Both sides must avoid 
foolish actions that would pit them against each other in a battle 
of wills. 
 
To that end, not only self-restraint by the concerned parties but 
also extra efforts by countries involved are necessary. As one US 
research group on Iraq advocated, it is essential for Washington and 
Teheran to hold a dialogue. Negotiations with Iran under the 
framework of the five UNSC members and Germany should be continued. 
 
It is also important for Japan to contribute to the international 
framework. China has played the leading role in the six-party talks 
on North Korea's nuclear programs. The focus will be on how China 
and Russia will deal with the Iran issue. Since Japan has long had 
friendly relations with Iran, there must be a scenario in which the 
Japanese government can actively participate in helping find a 
peaceful solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. 
 
The ultimate goal is not to allow either North Korea or Iran to 
possess nuclear weapons. It is not science fiction that the North 
might be able to miniaturize nuclear bombs and load them into 
missiles targeted at Japan. Considering the actual situation where 
the North Korean and Iraqi nuclear issues delicately affect each 
other, Japan could aim at becoming the key player calling for 
denuclearization in both regions. Such an idea might meet Prime 
Minister Shinzo Abe's advocate "assertive diplomacy" aimed to 
contribute to Asia and the world. 
 
DONOVAN