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DE RUEHKO #0617/01 0440641
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R 130641Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0604

UNCLAS TOKYO 000617 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM JA ENRG
SUBJECT: JANUARY 25-26, 2007 ASTOP IV MEETING 
 
 
¶1. SUMMARY: On January 25-26, 2007, the Japanese Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs hosted the Fourth Asian Senior-Level Talks on 
Non-Proliferation (ASTOP IV) in Tokyo. Senior-level 
government officials in charge of non-proliferation policies 
from the ASEAN member countries (Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, 
Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Burma, Philippines, Singapore, 
Thailand, Vietnam), Australia, China, Republic of Korea, the 
United States and Japan attended the meeting. In addition, 
ASTOP IV marked the initial participation of both New Zealand 
and Canada. The first day of meetings focused on the IAEA 
Additional Protocol, United Nations Security Council 
Resolutions (UNSCR) concerning North Korea and Iran, the 
Six-Party Talks, nuclear fuel supply assurances, and export 
control systems. The second day was devoted to a discussion 
on the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and a mock 
table-top exercise. China did not attend the PSI portion of 
the meeting.  END SUMMARY. 
 
--------------- 
OPENING SESSION 
--------------- 
 
¶2. Senior Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs Katsuhito Asano's 
opening speech urged ASTOP member countries to act in concert 
and implement UNSCR 1718. Asano felt strongly that last 
year's missile launch and nuclear test by North Korea not 
only put peace and security in the Asia region in jeopardy 
but also threatened the entire world. Therefore he called on 
all countries to collectively work together to strengthen the 
non-proliferation regime. Asano expressed his hope that the 
Six-Party Talks will resume soon in an effort to get North 
Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons and existing nuclear 
programs. He also stated that humanitarian concerns must be 
addressed, namely the abduction issue. In Asano's final 
comments, he expressed gratitude to United Nations 
Under-Secretary for Disarmament Nobuaki Tanaka for his role 
in helping to realize UNSCR 1718. In MOFA's Disarmament, 
Non-Proliferation and Science Director-General Takeshi 
Nakane's opening remarks, he stated that the ASTOP's purpose 
is to strengthen the non-proliferation regime and promote 
better understanding of each country's responsibilities to 
achieve security. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
Universalization of the Additional Protocol 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. After opening remarks, the conference took up the first 
agenda item on universalization of the Additional Protocol 
(AP). Having signed the AP in 2005 and currently undergoing 
the process of ratification, Thailand and Singapore presented 
first. Thailand reviewed its long and still continuing 
process toward AP accession, which requires revision of 
relevant domestic legislation prior to AP accession. 
Thailand highlighted the difficulties of educating GOT 
agencies on the meaning of the AP and of assessing and 
adjusting its internal procedures to carry out AP 
obligations. It also noted that it was amending its 1961 
Atomic Energy for Peace Act so that penalties are in line 
with international standards. Currently a violator would be 
fined only $100. Thailand expects a draft revision to be 
completed by next month. Singapore stated that it is now 
putting in place the necessary measures to ratify the AP and 
drew attention to the successful November 2006 visit of an 
IAEA team to advise GOS agencies on AP implementation. 
Vietnam noted that its president had decided in November 2006 
to sign the AP and that the GOV is currently drafting 
legislation on civilian uses of nuclear energy. Vietnam 
requested support in training officials, preparing 
legislation, and capacity-building for enforcement of WMD 
measures. Malaysia noted it views non-proliferation in the 
context of disarmament and expressed its disappointment in 
the lack of disarmament progress. It also noted that it was 
still in the process of drafting export control legislation. 
 
¶4. Indonesia noted it is developing a master plan for its 
first nuclear reactor, scheduled for completion in 2011. 
Indonesia argued that as the AP is voluntary, it should not 
be used as a precondition for IAEA cooperation on civilian 
uses of nuclear energy. Indonesia pointed out that only 78 
states had ratified the AP and urged the United States and 
Russia to ratify as a clear example to others. The U.S. side 
apprised the group that the U.S. had signed the AP in 1998; 
the Senate provided its advice and consent in March 2004; and 
the Congress passed necessary legislation in December 2006. 
The USG is currently developing the regulations necessary to 
implement the legislation. Australia presented a detailed 
paper on its experience in signing and ratifying the AP. 
Australia also highlighted its May 2005 announcement that it 
would make the AP a pre-condition for supply of uranium to 
non-nuclear weapon states. South Korea, noting its accession 
to the AP and its position as a leader in the peaceful use of 
nuclear energy, added that it has also made AP adoption a 
pre-condition for nuclear supply. The Philippines regretted 
that although it had signed the AP in 1997, the AP is one of 
over 30 international treaties or agreements awaiting 
ratification due to disagreement between its executive and 
legislative branches. Cambodia noted that the biggest 
obstacle to adoption of the AP is the lack of awareness and 
understanding among domestic agencies, and requested 
assistance in capacity-building. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
U.S. Statement on Nuclear Fuel Supply Assurances 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶5. Opening the next agenda item on assurance of nuclear fuel 
supply, the U.S. side called attention to President Bush's 
February 2004 speech urging suppliers to provide reliable 
access to nuclear fuel at reasonable cost for civilian 
reactors in States renouncing interest in enrichment and 
reprocessing. Recognizing the sensitivity of the subject, 
which could be perceived as restricting access of 
NPT-compliant states to peaceful nuclear technology or 
limiting access to the full fuel cycle to a handful of 
states, the U.S. stressed the need for vigilance regarding 
transfers of sensitive enrichment and reprocessing 
technology. Since the existing commercial nuclear fuel market 
is working well, the objective in developing fuel supply 
assurances is not to solve an existing supply problem; 
rather, it is to provide a mechanism to address possible 
future supply problems with sufficient certainty that 
recipient states can avoid devoting substantial resources to 
the indigenous development of enrichment and reprocessing 
capabilities, the U.S. side underscored. This back-up 
mechanism could include the establishment of a multilateral 
mechanism at the IAEA, coordination among enriched uranium 
commercial suppliers to back each other up, establishment of 
enriched uranium reserves, and creation of an international 
center or centers to provide uranium enrichment services. 
 
¶6. In response to the USG presentation, Japan took the 
opportunity to circulate again its "IAEA Standby Arrangements 
System" proposal, previously distributed at the September 
19-21, 2006 50th IAEA General Conference Special Event, which 
supports the IAEA multilateral mechanism but seeks to broaden 
it by taking into account not only uranium enrichment, but 
all major front-end fuel cycle activities: uranium supply, 
storage, conversion, enrichment, and fuel fabrication. 
Australia (Note: Holder of 40 percent of the world's low-cost 
uranium reserves and the world's second largest uranium 
producer. End note.) stated its policy of making the supply 
of uranium contingent upon completion of bilateral agreements 
stipulating nonproliferation guarantees. Australia expressed 
its hope that the IAEA Secretariat analysis now in progress 
will address as-yet unexplored fundamental questions, such as 
any new mechanism's impact on national supply policies, the 
existing uranium market, and legitimate national fuel cycle 
choices. Canada, the world's largest supplier of uranium, 
noted that its position was broadly consistent with 
Australia's, that it was open-minded with respect to a new 
mechanism, and that it recognized the central role of the 
IAEA in reviewing the merits of current proposals.  However, 
Canada noted that a business case would have to be made as to 
why there is a need for the nuclear fuel assurances system. 
 
-------------------------- 
Global Initiative Briefing 
-------------------------- 
 
¶7. The U.S. side provided a briefing on the Global Initiative 
to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. The briefing described the 
genesis of the initiative from the joint announcement by 
President Bush and President Putin on July 15, 2006, traced 
its development through the adoption of its Statement of 
Principles and Terms of Reference adopted in Morocco in 
October 2006. The U.S. side reviewed the Statement of 
Principles upon which the initiative is based: improved 
accounting and control of nuclear materials, enhancement of 
security at civilian facilities, detection of illicit 
trafficking, improving confiscation and safe control 
capabilities for illegally possessed materials, prevention of 
safe havens for terrorists and their resources, ensuring 
adequate regulatory frameworks with criminal and civil 
penalties, improved capabilities for consequence management 
following terrorist nuclear attack, and promotion of 
information sharing. The U.S. side urged attendees which are 
partners to provide leadership in gaining additional partners 
and urged non-partner attendees to consider the benefits of 
becoming partners. Such partnership will provide the 
opportunity to participate in expert-level activities planned 
for 2007-2008. 
 
¶8. Canada stated that GI is intended to help countries 
collectively implement their obligations under a variety of 
multilateral agreements combating terrorism. Stressing the 
voluntary nature of the program and the ability to tailor 
participation to individual needs, Canada urged all countries 
to consider joining.  Australia noted that it would be 
holding a seminar on GI on May 17-18, 2007, and invited all 
countries to attend in order to deepen understanding of GI 
before committing. Indonesia questioned the need for GI in 
light of the 13 UN conventions and protocols on 
counter-terrorism and United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 1540, and expressed concern over the proliferation 
of initiatives. Indonesia argued with work yet not completed 
on implementation of UNSCR 1540, GI is an added burden. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
Japan's Efforts for Strengthening Nuclear Security 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶9. Japan provided a brief overview on its approach to nuclear 
security and counter-terrorism mechanisms. In an effort to 
enhance national counterterrorism measures, Japan asserted 
that it has become party to all 12 counter-terrorism 
conventions and protocols. Currently, it is working to 
implement additional international instruments, such as, the 
International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of 
Nuclear Terrorism and the Amendment on the Convention on the 
Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. Japan is also 
enhancing counterterrorism through promotion of international 
cooperation, such as actively contributing to the Global 
Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. On the nuclear 
security front, sustained and comprehensive efforts to expand 
the framework includes the introduction of the Design Basis 
Threat. Government officials are in close cooperation with 
National Security Authorities to provide nuclear 
installations with round-the-clock security guards by the 
Riot Police Unit (anti-firearms squads) and by Japan Coast 
Guard patrol boats. Customs is also playing a major role by 
actively installing sophisticated equipment to detect nuclear 
and other radioactive materials. In May 2005, Japan amended 
its law for "regulation of nuclear source material, nuclear 
fuel material and reactors." The changes in the law mainly 
focused on physical protection inspection and physical 
protection information confidentiality and penalties. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
China's Summary of the Status of the Six-Party Talks 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶10. Moving to regional non-proliferation issues, China's 
representative Ambassador Hu Xiaodi of the Arms Control and 
Disarmament Department, presented a paper on the current 
status of the Six-Party Talks on North Korea. China asserted 
that the second phase of the fifth round of the Talks, held 
in Beijing in December 2006, proved useful, with all sides 
reaffirming the spirit of the Joint Statement on September 
19, 2005 through dialogue. Acknowledging that wide 
differences still exist between North Korea and the USG, 
China suggested that the most important events of the 
December meetings were the frequent contacts between the DPRK 
and U.S., including the two discussions between financial 
experts from the two sides, which had never occurred in 
previous rounds of the Talks. China disputed the view that 
the sanctions required by UNSCR 1718 would alone be 
sufficient to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue. 
Ambassador Hu argued that the resolution should be part of a 
comprehensive solution that included the Six-Party Talks. 
Finally, China hailed the January 16-18, 2007 bilateral talks 
in Berlin between North Korea and the USG as a positive 
development and expressed the hope that they would lead to 
the early resumption of, and substantive progress in, the 
Six-Party Talks. 
 
¶11. In response during the later open floor session, South 
Korea took notice of the positive developments in Berlin and 
expressed hope for continued momentum for the implementation 
of the September 19 Joint Statement. South Korea noted that 
it submitted its national report to the 1718 Committee and on 
January 12, 2007 submitted a report on domestic measures to 
prevent the export of luxury goods to North Korea. Indonesia 
noted its agreement with China that sanctions are not the 
main point of 1718 and called on all parties to find a 
diplomatic solution.  Australia urged the group not to forget 
that North Korea had exploded a nuclear weapon on October 9, 
clearly showing the threat of WMD to the Asian region. The 
North Korean return to the Six-Party Talks was "nice, but 
insufficient" and full and effective implementation of UNSCR 
1718 must continue. Australia encouraged focused attention on 
the cargo inspection provision of UNSCR 1718, consistent with 
international law, and called for targeted inspections of 
suspect shipments. Burma stated its belief that the actions 
of North Korea have undermined the NPT, but noted the need to 
address nonproliferation and disarmament with the same 
urgency. Burma,s representative stated that the Foreign 
Minister was heading an interagency committee in drafting a 
report to the 1718 Committee. Burma noted that all Government 
ministries and the central bank were involved in the drafting 
process. 
------------------------ 
USG Presentation on Iran 
------------------------ 
 
¶12. The U.S. side presented an update on recent developments 
with respect to Iran by noting that Iran has refused to 
suspend its uranium enrichment, reprocessing, and heavy-water 
related activities and has failed to comply with UNSCRs 1696 
and 1737. Pointing out that in December 2006 the UN Security 
Council had unanimously adopted Resolution 1737, imposing 
sanctions on Iran as a result of Iran's refusal to comply 
with UNSCR 1696 and of long-standing IAEA safeguards 
noncompliance, the U.S. side reviewed the specific UNSCR 1737 
measures intended to prevent Iran from moving forward with 
its proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities and nuclear 
weapons-capable delivery systems. The U.S. side highlighted 
steps the USG has taken to implement its obligations under 
UNSCR 1737 and called on all member states to follow through 
on their obligations under the Chapter 7 UN Resolutions. 
 
¶13. In response, Indonesia encouraged the P5 1 to take 
measures to try to engage Iran and queried the U.S. whether 
any steps pursuant to UNSCR 1737 Paragraph 21 had been taken 
on engagement of Iran. The U.S. side responded by reiterating 
Secretary Rice's statement that the USG remains open to the 
 
SIPDIS 
P5 1 diplomatic approach but stressed that Iran must cease 
enrichment efforts as a precondition. South Korea expressed 
its wishes that Iran not take any further aggravating 
measures and stated that the ROK will fully implement UNSCR 
¶1737. In preparation, South Korea will hold an interagency 
meeting next week in order to prepare the 1737 report. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
UN U/S Tanaka Report on Implementation of UNSCRs 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶14. UN Under-Secretary for Disarmament Affairs Nobuaki Tanaka 
presented on the next agenda item of UNSCR implementation. 
Opening with the declaration that 2006 was a year of 
 
milestone UNSCR resolutions to curb WMD proliferation, Tanaka 
focused his remarks on resolutions 1540 and 1673 aimed at the 
long-term goals of strengthening national capacities and 
enhancing international cooperation to combat proliferation. 
Tanaka offered the view that the adoption of all recent 
non-proliferation resolutions by the UNSC, rather than by the 
UN General Assembly, reflected the preference of the Security 
Council nations to persuade only 15 nations instead of 192 
and then make the decisions mandatory under Chapter 7 for all 
member states. Tanaka pointed out that while certainly the 
easier path, this approach might leave UN Member States 
outside the UNSC "less inclined to implement vigorously and 
aggressively the measures adopted by the Council." 
 
¶15. Tanaka stated that UNSCRs 1540 and 1673 obligated all 
states to take legislative and administrative action to put 
in place national regulatory measures on non-proliferation, 
but implementation remains a national responsibility. Some 
countries are facing difficulties in addressing the initial 
requirements of 1540 due to a lack of administrative and 
technical ability. To underscore this point, Tanaka cited the 
widely varying regional rates at which member states have 
submitted first national reports to the 1540 Committee. In 
particular, the Pacific Islands are facing the greatest 
challenges, with only 25% of states having submitted first 
reports. Tanaka stressed that states lacking the necessary 
legal and regulatory infrastructure, or capacity and 
resources, may require assistance in implementing the 
provisions of UNSCR 1540. 
 
¶16. The U.S. side stated that the USG, Singapore and Canada 
are co-hosting an ASEAN Regional Forum Workshop on UNSCR 1540 
Implementation on February 13-15, 2007 in San Francisco and 
encouraged all interested parties to attend. New Zealand 
noted that the Pacific Island under-reporting was not due to 
a distaste for the process, but rather to a lack of capacity 
for performance. As a result, New Zealand was engaged in an 
18-month program to reach out to South Pacific nations and 
offer to write or help to write the 1540 and other UNSCR 
reports. New Zealand argued that model lists of proscribed 
items and technologies would be useful for smaller countries 
with capacity limitations.  Vietnam, though having completed 
the 1540 and 1718 reports, noted its own shortage of human 
and technical resources and appealed to the UN to look 
carefully at these issues. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
Mechanism for Strengthened Domestic Implementation 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶17. Singapore, Canada, New Zealand, Australia, Philippines, 
Cambodia, and Japan provided brief outlines of their domestic 
export control systems and nonproliferation measures, as well 
as outreach efforts. Singapore described its 3-Tier licensing 
scheme, set to take effect in January 2008. Philippines 
outlined its efforts at drafting comprehensive harmonized 
export control legislation and requested capacity building 
assistance for model legislation and training of key officers 
in the export control process. Cambodia noted that 
ratification of international commitments was easy, but 
implementation was the most important aspect of 
nonproliferation. Cambodia is currently developing a draft 
counter-terrorism law and working on standing a national 
authority for export controls. Australia noted it had gaps in 
its export controls, for example on intangible technology 
transfers and brokering for conventional weapons. Australia 
announced it was planning on co-hosting with South Korea a 
seminar on brokering controls in late March/early April and 
asked for technical experts to present. South Korea noted 
that it was testing software for use by small and medium 
sized enterprises (SMEs) for regulation of strategic trade. 
Currently 100 SMEs are involved, and if successful, the ROK 
will share the software with other countries. 
 
----------------- 
PSI Mock Exercise 
----------------- 
 
¶18. On the last day of the ASTOP meeting, MOFA put together a 
PSI mock table-top exercise for participants. The purpose of 
the exercise was to increase understanding about what types 
of operations are needed and what elements need to be 
considered in dealing with proliferation cases, with 
particular emphasis on: (1) relevant government agencies, 
their roles, relevant domestic laws and regulations; (2) 
relevant international law/norms; (3) types of 
coordination/cooperation with other countries and (4) 
applicable domestic legislation. China was the only country 
not to participate in the PSI portion of ASTOP. The exercise 
scenario attempted to draw out responses from states about 
how their individual governments might react to a real time 
interdiction scenario. The more experienced PSI states 
provided insight into their interagency processes as a means 
for stimulating thought and openness for those states less 
experienced in reacting to potential interdiction scenarios. 
The exercise was useful in creating an awareness of the need 
for each state to communicate with its various agencies, 
including law enforcement, to ensure effective coordination 
of interdiction actions. 
 
¶19. In discussions before the exercise, participating nations 
raised a number of questions and issues.  The Philippines 
noted domestic legal concerns over interdiction in 
territorial or high seas, and the lack of a clearly defined 
international norm for interdiction. The Philippines, Brunei, 
Cambodia, and Burma all expressed support in principle of 
PSI, but raised concerns over capacity to perform operations 
and difficulties in harmonizing national authorities in order 
to implement.  (Comment: On the margins, Foley inquired of 
Brunei,s representative whether they understood the 
condition that their attendance at the Warsaw PSI High Level 
Political Meeting in June 2006 would be considered as 
endorsement of the Statement of Interdiction Principles. 
Replying in the affirmative, she stated that her leadership 
had reconsidered their position and were not yet ready to 
fully endorse the principles. End comment.) The Philippines 
stressed the importance of protecting shipfarer rights. 
South Korea reiterated its support in purpose and principle, 
but that the scope of its participation was discretionary. 
During the exercise, participants discussed a number of 
issues, including the legal authorities used for enforcement 
activities; who is liable for delays due to inspections or 
boardings; whether a country is obligated to act upon 
information or requests from foreign partners; what are the 
intergovernmental and interagency processes and channels used 
to communicate information and requests; and how PSI 
activities can comply with domestic legislation and 
international law. 
 
¶20. Please contact Tokyo ESToffs Ayanna Hobbs on 
HobbsA@state.gov or Daniel Walter on WalterDK@state.gov for 
full text versions of the presentations. 
 
------------ 
Participants 
------------ 
 
Australia 
--------- 
--Mr. John Sullivan, Assistant Secretary, Arms Control and 
Counter-Proliferation Branch, International Security 
Division, DFAT 
--Mr. Murray Perks, Assistant Secretary, Security Policy and 
Programs, Department of Defence 
--Mr. Greg Manning, Assistant Secretary, International 
Security and Human Rights Branch, Office of International 
Law, Attorney General's Department 
--Ms. Sophia McIntyre, Executive Officer, Arms Control and 
Counter-Proliferation Branch, International Security 
Division, DFAT 
--Dr. Jerry Edward, Director, Counter Proliferation, 
Scientific and Technical Analysis Branch, Defence 
Intelligence Organisation 
--LDCR Letecia van Stralen, Deputy Fleet Legal Officer, Royal 
Australian Navy 
--Mr. Paul Power, Deputy Director, Counter-Proliferation and 
Arms Control, International and Domestic Security Branch, 
Department and Defence 
--Mr. Robert Matthews, Manager, Nuclear, Biological, Chemical 
Arms Control, Defence Science and Technology Organisation, 
Department of Defence 
--Mr. Christopher White, Director, Maritime Strategy, 
Australian Customs Service 
--GRPCPT Matthew Dudley, Defence and Armed Services Attache, 
Australian Embassy, Tokyo 
--Ms. Jenny Bloomfield, Counsellor (Political), Australian 
Embassy, Tokyo 
--Mr. Robert Rushby, Counsellor (Customs), Australian 
Embassy, Tokyo 
--Ms. Pauline Lee, First Secretary, Australian Embassy, Tokyo 
--Mr. Shane Flanagan, Second Secretary, Australian Embassy, 
Tokyo 
 
Brunei Darussalam 
----------------- 
--Ms. Datin Paduka Hjh Maimunah Dato Paduka Hj Elias, Deputy 
Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
--Ms. Roslizawati Hj Ibrahim, Second Secretary, Department of 
International Organisations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade 
--Mr. Mahadi Maidin, Minister Counsellor, Negara Brunei 
Darussalam Embassy 
 
Cambodia 
-------- 
--Mr. Sun Suon, Director, International Organizations 
Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International 
Cooperation 
--Ms. Sun Malen, Third Secretary, Cambodia Embassy 
 
Canada 
------ 
--Mr. Mark Gwozdecky, Director, Nuclear Non-Proliferation and 
Disarmament Division 
--Mr. Philippe Tremblay, Second Secretary, Embassy of Canada 
in Japan 
--Ms. Michelle Slade, Deputy Head of Mission at the Canadian 
Embassy of Tokyo 
 
China 
----- 
--Mr. Hu Xiaodi, Ambassador, Arms Control and Disarmament 
Department, MFA 
--Ms. Chen Zhiwen, First Secretary, Chinese Embassy 
 
Indonesia 
--------- 
--Mr. Andy Rachmianto, Deputy Director, Directorate of 
International Security and Disarmament, Department of Foreign 
Affairs 
--Mr. Edwin Suchranudin, Second Secretary, Indonesian Embassy 
--Ms. Dewi J. Meidiwaty, Third Secretary, Indonesian Embassy 
 
Laos 
---- 
--Ms. Kanika Phommachanh, Director General, Department of 
International Organizations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
--Mr. Virasac Somphong, First Secretary, Embassy of Lao PDR 
Tokyo 
 
Malaysia 
-------- 
--Mr. Shahrul Ikram, Undersecretary, Multilateral Political 
Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
 
Myanmar 
------- 
--Mr. Htin Lynn, Deputy Director, International Organizations 
Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
 
New Zealand 
----------- 
--Ms. Dell Higgie, Director, Security Policy Division, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Ambassador for 
Counter-Terrorism) 
--Mr. Mike Pointer, First Secretary, New Zealand Embassy 
 
Philippines 
----------- 
--Mr. Aladin G. Villacorte, Assistant Secretary, Office of 
United Nations & Other Int'l Organizations, DFA 
--Mr. Sulpicio M. Confiado, First Secretary, Philippines 
Embassy 
 
Republic of Korea 
----------------- 
--Mr. Choi, Sung-joo, Deputy Director-General, International 
Organizations, MOFAT 
--Mr. Kang, Young-hoon, First Secretary, Korean Embassy, Tokyo 
--Mr. Oh, Jae-Soon, Deputy Director, Export Control Division, 
Ministry of Commerce, Industry & Energy 
--Mr. Kim, Jae-woo, Second Secretary, Disarmament and 
Non-Proliferation Division, MOFAT 
 
Singapore 
--------- 
--Ms. Yvonne Ow, Assistant Director, International 
Organizations Directorate, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
--Mr. Eng Chuan Ong, Deputy Chief of Mission, Singapore 
Embassy, Tokyo 
 
Thailand 
-------- 
--Mr. Kittichaisaree Kriangsak, Director-General, Department 
of International Organizations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
 
United States 
------------- 
--Mr. Tony Foley, Director, Office of Counterproliferation 
Initiative, Bureau of International Security and 
Nonproliferation, Department of State 
--Mr. Steven Schleien, Director for Transnational Threats 
Policy, OSD 
--Ms. Elizabeth Phu, Assistant for Transnational Threats 
Policy, OSD 
--Mr. Eric DeSautels, Senior Advisor, ISN, State Department 
--Mr. Randall Beisecker, Regional Affairs, ISN, State 
Department 
--Ms. Ayanna Hobbs, Scientific and Technical Affairs Officer, 
Embassy Tokyo 
--Mr. Daniel Walter, Advanced Technologies Officer, Embassy 
Tokyo 
 
Vietnam 
------- 
--Mr. Pham Vinh Quang, Assistant Director-General, 
International Organizations Department, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 
 
Japan 
----- 
--Mr. Takeshi Nakane (Chair), Director-General, Disarmament, 
Non-Proliferation and Science, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
--Ms. Tomoko Ichikawa (Head of Delegation), Director, 
Non-Proliferation, Science and Nuclear Energy Division, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
SCHIEFFER