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DE RUEHKO #0558/01 0382327
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 072327Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0490

UNCLAS TOKYO 000558 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: SENV JA
SUBJECT: FEBRUARY 25-26, 2007 ASTOP IV MEETING 
 
 
 ¶1. SUMMARY: On February 25-26, 2007, the Japanese Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs hosted the Fourth Asian Senior-Level Talks 
on Non-Proliferation (ASTOP IV) in Tokyo. Senior-level 
government officials in charge of non-proliferation policies 
from the ASEAN member countries, Australia, Brunei 
Darussalam, Cambodia, Canada, China, Indonesia, Laos, 
Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Singapore, 
Thailand, Vietnam, the United States and Japan attended the 
meeting.  In addition, ASTOP IV marks the initial 
participation of both New Zealand and Canada. The first day 
of meetings focused on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons (NPT), IAEA's Additional Protocol, United 
Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) concerning North 
Korea and Iran, the Six-Party Talks, nuclear fuel supply 
assurances, and export control systems. The second day was 
devoted to a discussion on the Proliferation Security 
Initiative (PSI) and a thought-provoking PSI mock table-top 
exercise. China did not attend the PSI portion of the 
meeting. END SUMMARY. 
 
OPENING SESSION 
---------------- 
 
¶2. Senior Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs Katsuhito Asano's 
opening speech urged ASTOP member countries to act in concert 
and implement UNSCR 1718. Asano felt strongly that last 
year's missile launch by North Korea not only put peace and 
security in the Asia region in jeopardy but the entire world. 
Therefore he called on all countries to collectively work 
together to strengthen the non-proliferation regime. Asano 
expressed his hope that the Six-Party Talks will resume soon 
in an effort to get North Korea to abandon its nuclear 
weapons and existing nuclear programs. He also stated that 
humanitarian concerns must be addressed, namely the abduction 
issue. In Asano's final comments, he expressed gratitude to 
United Nations Under-Secretary for Disarmament Nobuaki Tanaka 
for his role in helping to realize UNSCR 1718.  In MOFA's 
Disarmament, Non-Proliferation and Science Director-General 
Takeshi Nakane's opening remarks, he stated that the ASTOP's 
purpose is to strengthen the non-proliferation regime and 
promote better understanding of each country's 
responsibilities to achieve security. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
Universalization of the Additional Protocol 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. After opening remarks, the conference took up the first 
agenda item universalization of the Additional Protocol (AP). 
Having recently signed the AP, Thailand and Singapore 
presented first. Thailand reviewed its long and still 
continuing process toward AP ratification, which requires 
revision of relevant legislation prior to AP accession. 
Thailand highlighted the difficulties of educating GOT 
agencies on the meaning of the AP and of assessing and 
adjusting its internal procedures to carry out AP 
obligations. Singapore stated that it is now putting in place 
the necessary measures to ratify the AP and drew attention to 
the successful December 2006 visit of an IAEA team to advise 
GOS agencies on AP implementation. Vietnam noted that its 
president had decided in November 2006 to sign the AP and the 
GOV is now negotiating complete WMD disarmament. Echoing 
Vietnam, Malaysia noted it views non-proliferation in the 
context of disarmament and expressed its disappointment in 
the lack of disarmament progress. 
 
¶4. Indonesia updated the assembly on its efforts to bring the 
AP into force and note it is in the process of establishing a 
first nuclear reactor in 2011. Indonesia pointed out that 
only 78 states had ratified the AP and urged the United 
States and Russia to ratify as a clear example to others. 
(Note: Foley later responded to the comments by Indonesia and 
Japan on AP ratification by apprising the group that the U.S. 
had signed the AP in 1998, the Senate provided its advice and 
consent in March 2004, and the Congress passed necessary 
legislation in December 2006. USG is one step closer, but 
work remains to be done, Foley summarized. End note.) 
Australia presented a detailed paper on its experience in 
signing and ratifying the AP. Australia also highlighted its 
May 2005 announcement that it would make the AP a 
pre-condition for supply of uranium to non-nuclear weapon 
states. South Korea, noting its accession to the AP and its 
position as a leader in the peaceful use of nuclear energy, 
added that it has also made AP adoption a pre-condition for 
nuclear supply.  The Philippines regretted that although it 
had signed the AP in 1997, the AP is one of over 30 
international treaties or agreements awaiting ratification. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
U.S. Statement on Nuclear Fuel Supply Assurance 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶5. Opening the next agenda item on assurance of nuclear fuel 
supply, Foley called attention to President Bush's February 
2004 speech urging suppliers to provide reliable access to 
nuclear fuel at reasonable cosIo the sensitivity of the subject, which could be 
perceived as restricting access of NPT-compliant states to 
peaceful nuclear technology or limiting access to the full 
fuel cycle to a handful of states, Foley stressed the need 
for vigilance regarding transfers of sensitive enrichment and 
reprocessing technology. Since the existing commercial 
nuclear fuel market is working well, the objective in 
developing fuel supply assurance is not to solve an existing 
supply problem; rather, it is to provide a mechanism to 
address possible future supply problems with sufficient 
certainty that recipient states can avoid devoting 
substantial resources to the indigenous development of 
enrichment and reprocessing capabilities, Foley underscored. 
Such a mechanism would thus promote the benefits of expanded 
nuclear energy use while the creation of this back-up 
mechanism, including establishment of a multilateral 
mechanism at the IAEA, coordination among enriched uranium 
commercial suppliers to back each other up, establishment of 
enriched uranium reserves, and foundation of an international 
center or centers to provide uranium enrichment services. 
 
¶6. In response to the USG presentation, Japan took the 
opportunity to circulate again its "IAEA Standby Arrangements 
System" proposal, previously distributed at the September 
19-21, 2006 50th IAEA General Conference Special Event, which 
supports the IAEA multilateral mechanism but seeks to broaden 
it by taking into account not only uranium enrichment, but 
all major front-end fuel cycle activities: uranium supply, 
storage, conversion, enrichment, and fuel fabrication. 
Australia (Note: Holder of 40 percent of the world's low-cost 
uranium reserves and the world's second largest uranium 
producer. End Note.) stated its position that the 
international nuclear fuel market has worked and continues to 
work efficiently, but that GOA supports international 
examination of proposals to strengthen nuclear fuel supply 
assurance. Australia expressed its hope that the IAEA 
Secretariat analysis now in progress will address as-yet 
 
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unexplored fundamental questions, such as any new mechanism's 
impact on national supply policies, the existing uranium 
market, and legitimate national fuel cycle choices. Canada, 
the world's largest supplier of uranium, noted that its 
position was broadly consistent with Australia's, that it was 
open-minded with respect to a new mechanism, and that it 
recognized the central role of the IAEA in reviewing the 
merits of current proposals. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
Japan's Efforts for Strengthening Nuclear Security 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶7. Japan provided a brief overview on its approach to nuclear 
security and counter-terrorism mechanisms. In an effort to 
enhance national counterterrorism measures, Japan asserted 
that it has become party to all twelve counter-terrorism 
conventions and protocols. Currently, it is working to 
implement additional international instruments, such as, the 
International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of 
Nuclear Terrorism and the Amendment on the Convention on the 
Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. Japan is also 
enhancing counterterrorism through promotion of 
international cooperation, such as actively contributing to 
the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. On the 
nuclear security front, sustained and comprehensive efforts 
to expand the framework includes the introduction of the 
Design Basis Threat. Government officials are in close 
cooperation with National Security Authorities to provide 
nuclear installations with round-the-clock security guards by 
the Riot Police Unit (anti-firearms squads) and by Japan 
Coast Guard patrol boats. Customs is also playing a major 
role by actively installing sophisticated equipment to detect 
nuclear and other radioactive materials. In May 2005, Japan 
amended its law for "regulation of nuclear source material, 
nuclear fuel material and reactors." The changes in the law 
mainly focused on physical protection inspection and physical 
protection information confidentiality and penalties. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
China's Summary of the Status of the Six-Party Talks 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶8. Moving to regional non-proliferation issues, China 
presented a paper on the current status of the Six-Party 
Talks on North Korea. China asserted that the second phase of 
the fifth round of the Talks, held in Beijing in December 
2006, proved useful, with all sides reaffirming the spirit of 
the Joint Statement on September 19, 2005 through dialogue. 
Acknowledging the wide differences still exist between North 
Korea and the USG, China suggested that the most important 
events of the December meetings were the frequent contacts 
between the DPRK and U.S., including the two discussions 
between financial experts from the two sides, which had never 
occurred in previous rounds of the Talks. China disputed the 
view that the sanctions regulated by UNSCR 1718 would alone 
be sufficient to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue, 
arguing that the resolution should be implemented in a 
comprehensive way. Finally, China hailed that the January 
16-18, 2007 bilateral talks in Berlin between North Korea and 
the USG has a positive development and expressed the hope 
that they would lead to the early resumption of, and 
substantive progress in, the Six-Party Talks. 
 
¶9. In response during the later open floor session, Australia 
admonished the group not to forget that North Korea had 
exploded a nuclear weapon on October 9, clearly showing the 
threat of WMD to the Asian region. The North Korean return to 
the Six-Party Talks was "nice, but insufficient." Australia 
encouraged all to look carefully at the cargo inspection 
provision of UNSCR 1718, consistent with international law. 
South Korea took notice of the positive development in Berlin 
in exasperation that 90 days have already passed since 
adoption of UNSCR 1718 but the 1718 Committee is still 
discussing the matter in New York. 
 
------------------------ 
USG Presentation on Iran 
------------------------ 
 
¶10. Mr. Foley began the USG presentation of recent 
developments with respect to Iran by noting that Iran has 
refused to suspend its uranium enrichment, reprocessing, and 
heavy-water related activities and has failed to comply with 
UNSCR 1696 and 1737. Pointing out that in December 2006 the 
UNSCR had unanimously adopted Resolution 1737, imposing 
sanctions on Iran as a result of Iran's refusal to comply 
with UNSCR 1696 and of long-standing IAEA safeguards 
noncompliance, Foley reviewed the specific UNSCR 1737 
measures intended to prevent Iran from moving forward with 
its proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities and nuclear 
weapons-capable delivery systems. Foley highlighted steps the 
USG has taken to implement its obligations under UNSCR 1737 
and called on all member states to follow through on their 
obligations under the Chapter 7 UN Resolutions. 
 
¶11. In response, Indonesia encouraged the P5 1 to take 
measures to try to engage Iran and queried the U.S. whether 
any steps pursuant to UNSCR 1737 Paragraph 21 had been taken 
on engagement of Iran. Foley responded by reiterating 
Secretary Rice's recent assertion that the USG remains open 
 
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to the P5 1 diplomatic approach but stressed that Iran must 
cease enrichment efforts as a precondition. South Korea 
expressed its wishes that Iran not take any further 
aggravating measures and that Iran fully implement UNSCR 1737. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
UN U/S Tanaka Report on Implementation of UNSCRs 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶12. UN Under-Secretary for Disarmament Affairs Nobuaki Tanaka 
presented on the next agenda item of UNSCR implementation. 
Opening with the declaration of 2006 as a year of milestone 
UNSCR resolutions to curb WMD proliferation, Tanaka focused 
his remarks on resolutions 1540 and 1673 aimed at the 
long-term goals of strengthening national capacities and 
enhancing international cooperation to combat proliferation. 
Tanaka offered the view that the adoption of all recent 
non-proliferation resolutions by the UNSC, rather than by the 
UN General Assembly, reflected the preference of might 
nations to persuade only 15 nations instead of 192 and then 
make the deacons mandatory under Chapter 7. Tanaka pointed 
out that while certainly the easier path, this approach might 
leave UN member states outside the UNSC less inclined to 
implement vigorously the UNSCR resolutions. 
 
¶13. Tanaka stated that UNSCRs 1540 and 1673 obligated all 
states to take legislative and administrative action to put 
in place national regulatory measures on non-proliferation, 
but implementation remains a national responsibility. Some 
countries are facing difficulties in addressing the initial 
requirements of 1540 due to a lack of administrative and 
technical ability. To underscore this point, Tanaka cited the 
widely varying regional rates at which member states have 
submitted first national reports to the 1540 Committee. In 
particular, the Pacific Islands are facing the greatest 
challenges, with only 25% of states having submitted first 
reports. Tanaka stressed that states lacking the necessary 
legal and regulatory infrastructure, or capacity and 
resources, may require assistance in implementing the 
provisions of UNSCR 1540. 
 
¶14. In response, Foley picked up on the statement that 
several nations need assistance in implementing 1540 to 
advertise the USG-hosted ASEAN Regional Forum Workshop on 
UNSCR 1540 Implementation on February 13-15, 2007 in San 
Francisco and encouraged all interested parties to attend. 
New Zealand responded that the Pacific Island under-reporting 
was not due to a distaste for the process, but rather to a 
lack of capacity for performance. Vietnam noted its own 
shortage of human and technical resources to fulfill its 1540 
obligations and appealed to the UN to look carefully at these 
issues. 
 
----------------- 
PSI Mock Exercise 
----------------- 
 
¶15. On the last day of the ASTOP meeting, MOFA put together a 
stimulating PSI mock table-top exercise for participants. 
The purpose of the exercise was to increase the understanding 
about what types of operations are needed and what elements 
need to be considered in dealing with proliferation cases, 
with particular emphasis on: (1) relevant government 
agencies, their roles, relevant domestic laws and 
regulations; (2) relevant international law/norms; (3) types 
of coordination/cooperation with other countries and (4) 
applicable domestic legislation. China was the only country 
not to participate in the PSI portion at ASTOP. 
 
¶16. Please contact Tokyo ESToffs Ayanna Hobbs on 
HobbsA@state.gov or Daniel Walter on WalterDK@state.gov for 
full text versions of the presentations. 
 
------------ 
Participants 
------------ 
 
Australia 
--------- 
--Mr. John Sullivan, Assistant Secretary, Arms Control and 
Counter-Proliferation Branch, International Security 
Division, DFAT 
--Mr. Murray Perks, Assistant Secretary, Security Policy and 
Programs, Department of Defence 
--Mr. Greg Manning, Assistant Secretary, International 
Security and Human Rights Branch, Office of International 
Law, Attorney General's Department 
--Ms. Sophia McIntyre, Executive Officer, Arms Control and 
Counter-Proliferation Branch, International Security 
Division, DFAT 
--Dr. Jerry Edward, Director, Counter Proliferation, 
Scientific and Technical Analysis Branch, Defence 
Intelligence Organisation 
--LDCR Letecia van Stralen, Deputy Fleet Legal Officer, Royal 
Australian Navy 
--Mr. Paul Power, Deputy Director, Counter-Proliferation and 
Arms Control, International and Domestic Security Branch, 
Department and Defence 
--Mr. Robert Matthews, Manager, Nuclear, Biological, Chemical 
Arms Control, Defence Science and Technology Organisation, 
Department of Defence 
--Mr. Christopher White, Director, Maritime Strategy, 
Australian Customs Service 
--GRPCPT Matthew Dudley, Defence and Armed Services Attache, 
Australian Embassy, Tokyo 
--Ms. Jenny Bloomfield, Counsellor (Political), Australian 
Embassy, Tokyo 
--Mr. Robert Rushby, Counsellor (Customs), Australian 
Embassy, Tokyo 
--Ms. Pauline Lee, First Secretary, Australian Embassy, Tokyo 
--Mr. Shane Flanagan, Second Secretary, Australian Embassy, 
Tokyo 
 
Brunei Darussalam 
----------------- 
--Ms. Datin Paduka Hjh Maimunah Dato Paduka Hj Elias, Deputy 
Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
--Ms. Roslizawati Hj Ibrahim, Second Secretary, Department of 
International Organisations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade 
--Mr. Mahadi Maidin, Minister Counsellor, Negara Brunei 
Darussalam Embassy 
 
Cambodia 
-------- 
--Mr. Sun Suon, Director, International Organizations 
Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International 
Cooperation 
--Ms. Sun Malen, Third Secretary, Cambodia Embassy 
 
Canada 
------ 
--Mr. Mark Gwozdecky, Director, Nuclear Non-Proliferation and 
Disarmament Division 
--Mr. Philippe Tremblay, Second Secretary, Embassy of Canada 
in Japan 
--Ms. Michelle Slade, Deputy Head of Mission at the Canadian 
Embassy of Tokyo 
 
China 
----- 
--Mr. Hu Xiaodi, Ambassador, Arms Control and Disarmament 
Department, MFA 
--Ms. Chen Zhiwen, First Secretary, Chinese Embassy 
 
Indonesia 
--------- 
--Mr. Andy Rachmianto, Deputy Director, Directorate of 
International Security and Disarmament, Department of Foreign 
Affairs 
--Mr. Edwin Suchranudin, Second Secretary, Indonesian Embassy 
--Ms. Dewi J. Meidiwaty, Third Secretary, Indonesian Embassy 
 
Laos 
---- 
--Ms. Kanika Phommachanh, Director General, Department of 
International Organizations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
--Mr. Virasac Somphong, First Secretary, Embassy of Lao PDR 
Tokyo 
 
Malaysia 
-------- 
--Mr. Shahrul Ikram, Undersecretary, Multilateral Political 
Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
 
Myanmar 
------- 
--Mr. Htin Lynn, Deputy Director, International Organizations 
Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
 
New Zealand 
----------- 
--Ms. Dell Higgie, Director, Security Policy Division, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Ambassador for 
Counter-Terrorism) 
--Mr. Mike Pointer, First Secretary, New Zealand Embassy 
 
Philippines 
----------- 
--Mr. Aladin G. Villacorte, Assistant Secretary, Office of 
United Nations & Other Int'l Organizations, DFA 
--Mr. Sulpicio M. Confiado, First Secretary, Philippines 
Embassy 
 
Republic of Korea 
----------------- 
--Mr. Choi, Sung-joo, Deputy Director-General, International 
Organizations, MOFAT 
--Mr. Kang, Young-hoon, First Secretary, Korean Embassy, Tokyo 
--Mr. Oh, Jae-Soon, Deputy Director, Export Control Division, 
Ministry of Commerce, Industry & Energy 
--Mr. Kim, Jae-woo, Second Secretary, Disarmament and 
Non-Proliferation Division, MOFAT 
 
Singapore 
--------- 
--Ms. Yvonne Ow, Assistant Director, International 
Organizations Directorate, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
--Mr. Eng Chuan Ong, Deputy Chief of Mission, Singapore 
Embassy, Tokyo 
 
Thailand 
-------- 
--Mr. Kittichaisaree Kriangsak, Director-General, Department 
of International Organizations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
 
United States 
------------- 
--Mr. Tony Foley, Director, Office of Counterproliferation 
Initiative, Bureau of International Security and 
Nonproliferation, Department of State 
--Mr. Steven Schleien, Director for Transnational Threats 
Policy, OSD 
--Ms. Elizabeth Phu, Assistant for Transnational Threats 
Policy, OSD 
--Mr. Eric DeSautels, Senior Advisor, ISN, State Department 
--Mr. Randall Beisecker, Regional Affairs, ISN, State 
Department 
--Ms. Ayanna Hobbs, Scientific and Technical Affairs Officer, 
Embassy Tokyo 
--Mr. Daniel Walter, Advanced Technologies Officer, Embassy 
Tokyo 
 
Vietnam 
------- 
--Mr. Pham Vinh Quang, Assistant Director-General, 
International Organizations Department, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 
 
Japan 
----- 
--Mr. Takeshi Nakane (Chair), Director-General, Disarmament, 
Non-Proliferation and Science, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
--Ms. Tomoko Ichikawa (Head of Delegation), Director, 
Non-Proliferation, Science and Nuclear Energy Division, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
SCHIEFFER