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DE RUEHTC #0313/01 0511414
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 201414Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8236
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY

UNCLAS THE HAGUE 000313 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S 
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP 
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC 
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN) 
NSC FOR LEDDY 
WINPAC FOR WALTER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP-UP FOR THE 
WEEK ENDING FEBRUARY 16 
 
This is CWC-16-07. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
UNIVERSALITY - P-5 AMBASSADORS MEETING 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶1.  (SBU) On February 12, the P-5 Ambassadors met to discuss 
universality efforts.  Following welcoming remarks by Amb. 
Javits, DG Pfirter provided an update on universality 
efforts.  On the three Caribbean non-SPs, the DG said he had 
specifically mentioned the Bahamas, Barbados and the 
Dominican Republic in UN discussions last year.  Barbados and 
Bahamas provided a written response indicating that they are 
moving forward.  Barbados said the decision to accede is 
completed, and they need an assessment on implementation 
requirements.  The DG noted that the Technical Secretariat 
has offered to send a technical assistance team.  A TS team 
would also be sent to the Bahamas. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) As for the Dominican Republic, the DG noted that 
they have signed the CWC, and Amb. Javits has been contacting 
senior individuals to get them to complete the accession 
process.  The DG indicated he would make a personal approach 
if that were needed, however, he thought action by the DR 
might not be until the second half of the year.  Pfirter 
noted that he has also used the OAS meeting in Washington 
last December to press these non-SPs, and the OAS Secretary 
General had committed to assist in pressing these states. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) On Africa, the DG noted that Somalia clearly is not 
in a position to take any decisions.  On Guinea-Bissau, 
France has helped apply pressure, and Portugal has also said 
it will provide help.  The DG then noted that Angola may be 
the least promising non-SP in this region, and they have sent 
mixed signals on their willingness to accede.  On the Middle 
East, the DG noted that he was in Jerusalem in 2006 and was 
not ready to say that there are no prospects for progress 
concerning Israel.  Pressure and contacts should be 
maintained on all states in the region.  The CWC should not 
be held up by other unsolved regional issues, not should it 
be held in abeyance until all WMD issues are resolved (as has 
been argued by Egypt). 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Lebanon has taken the legislative step and is now 
waiting for a Foreign Minister to send the instruments of 
accession.  The DG noted that it was critical that all 
parties in Lebanon supported this action.  The DG noted that 
Egypt had sent observers to the December Conference of States 
Parties, and that he will be visiting Egypt in April under an 
invitation from a foreign policy council.  He will also have 
meetings at the Egyptian MFA, which hopefully indicates Egypt 
has made the decision to continue contacts.  On Syria, the DG 
saw no glimmer of hope.  There had been a meeting in New 
York, at which Syria merely restated its old position, 
linking all WMD issues.  And while Syria sent someone to the 
Rome universality workshop, it did not send an observer to 
the CSP. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) On the Rome event, the DG noted that it was a 
success, and there should be similar meetings in the future 
to press non-SPs, and to show the OPCW commitment to 
universality.  The next workshop would be in the second half 
of 2007 and planning is under way.  Possible venues would be 
France, Spain or Turkey.  The DG broached the idea of 
possibly organizing it in a North African state, but the 
question is whether one could be found that would invite 
Israel.  The DG added that whatever the venue, he would be 
looking for the P-5 to provide support in pressing non-SPs to 
attend.  The DG concluded his statement by addressing North 
Korea, commenting that while the UNSC resolution addressed 
all WMD programs in the DPRK, he recognized that the nuclear 
issue would have to be resolved before any other issues could 
be addressed. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) The discussion then turned to the universality 
action plan, which technically ends at the November CSP.  UK 
Amb. Parker noted that it would be "sterile" to roll over the 
action plan.  Returning to the DG's comments, the UK thought 
 
it might be optimal to work out a lobbying strategy from the 
TS, or address the Directors General of relevant regional and 
 
SIPDIS 
other organizations.  The UK suggested that after Lebanon 
completes accession, it might be best to focus on Egypt, as 
it may be necessary to further isolate Syria.  More 
generally, the UK noted that one possibility is somehow 
connecting and utilizing the 10th anniversary commemorations, 
the CSP and the 2008 Review Conference together to rededicate 
SPs to the goal of achieving universality. 
 
¶7. (SBU) The DG then noted that in October, there will be an 
item in the First Committee on the 10th anniversary.  Poland 
and the Netherlands will lead this effort, and there is 
consideration of a two-hour high-level meeting to highlight 
universality.  There might be a symbolic statement in which 
the UN Secretary General might assist, and the DG noted that 
the SYG had been invited to the 10th anniversary events. 
Pfirter went on to state that UNSCR 1540 might be another 
hook that could be utilized as well as resolutions condemning 
terrorism. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) The UK asked whether the UN resolution, 
traditionally submitted by Poland, could be sharpened. 
Russian Amb. Gevorgian commented that it is difficult to 
change the text that has been passed routinely for many 
years.  French Amb. Gaussot and Chinese Amb. Xue agreed with 
Russia on the difficulty of getting new, sharper text.  The 
French then noted that it really does not seem possible to do 
anything on Syria right now.  The Chinese commented that 
bilateral or regional efforts would be most productive to 
continue dialogue and engagement, and supported TS workshops. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Pfirter opined that setting a target of 4-5 new SPs 
in 2007 might be reasonable.  The target was six in 2006, and 
that had been met.  Amb. Javits noted that a general 
statement can be made at the CSP and possibly commentary on 
some specific countries.  For the RevCon, the decision has to 
be taken on whether a target should be named. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Finally, Russia asked that the P-5 return to the 
issue of a joint demarche, which had last been discussed 
quite a while ago.  It would be necessary to assess if the 
timing is right and if the format is acceptable.  The UK 
noted that everyone agreed in 2006 that the timing was not 
right.  China flatly said that it doubts the wisdom of a 
common demarche.  They specifically questioned the 
desirability of such an approach regarding Syria, Israel and 
North Korea.  Instead, China is pleased with the way the DG 
is handling this matter.  France also said that it doubted 
that this is the right time for a common demarche in the 
Middle East.  This would not be as efficient as bilateral 
discussions.  Amb. Javits added that it is important to have 
complete agreement before proceeding with something as 
weighty as a common demarche.  As such, it might be best to 
be patient and be sure it is appropriate for such action. 
 
¶11.  (SBU) Russia responded that the Chinese comments show 
why P-5 meetings are needed.  The UK offered to hold the next 
meeting, and there was consensus to try to schedule it around 
April 16, before the DG makes his trip to Egypt. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
INDUSTRY CLUSTER - OCPF SITE SELECTION METHODOLOGY 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶12. (U) Facilitator Luis Garcia (Spain) held consultations on 
February 13 and 14 to further discuss his proposal and draft 
decision documents.  First, Garcia summarized the 
developments in the consultations under his leadership. 
Next, the Technical Secretariat presented the results of its 
latest round of computations, done at the request of India. 
Using the total number of 118 OCPF inspections from the 
approved 2007 budget and the OCPF database as of January 2007 
(73 states declared a total of 4957 OCPFs), the TS computed 
the results for four scenarios (e-mailed to ISN/CB) and 
interpreted the four outcomes. 
 
¶13.  (U) Delegations reacted strongly to the presentation, 
 
noticing for the first time the significant impact the high 
A14 values of their facilities had on their expected 
inspection numbers.  For example, South Africa had the same 
expected number of inspections (about two) as did another SP 
with 150 facilities, purely a result of the differing A14 
values.  China began by protesting the latest round of 
calculations, noting a number of problems: the expected 
number of Schedule 3 inspections was not included, the 
treaty-mandated cap on Schedule 3 and OCPF inspections was 
not included, and the latest OCPF numbers were not used 
(Note: China privately told del rep that the number of 
Chinese OCPFs was about 400 facilities too high). 
 
¶14.  (U) Some delegations began to publicly question the 
proposed methodology.  Austria noted that because three of 
its six facilities were PSF pesticide plants, its expected 
number of inspections jumped significantly, consistent with 
the expected numbers of a number of states with much larger 
OCPF industries.  Finally, China, Mexico and New Zealand 
stressed the urgency of completing our work as soon as 
possible, to ease the disproportionate burden on states with 
smaller industries. 
 
¶15. (U) Next, the facilitator led a discussion of the 
operative section of his draft decision document. 
Delegations generally cleaned up the text, eliminating 
duplications (OP1 and OP3) and considering how best to 
clarify a confusing paragraph instructing SPs how to make 
their proposals.  Finally, delegations discussed potential 
deadlines and how best to ensure a consensus decision would 
be implemented as soon as possible. 
 
¶16. (U) Delegations only made it to the second item on the 
agenda for the February 14 consultation: what elements should 
be included in the anonymous list of plant sites.  Garcia 
began by stating that, in his personal opinion, the list 
should not contain anything not mandated by the CWC, i.e., no 
A14 values and no production range codes.  The TS supported 
this view.  Germany also supported the facilitator, stating 
that the alleged anonymity was just that - alleged.  If the 
A14 were provided, National Authorities soon could determine 
which facilities were in which countries.  France asked if 
the TS planned to randomize the facility identification codes 
every year, in order to protect their identities.  Other 
delegations protested, wondering what this might mean for the 
element which allowed states' proposals to remain in effect 
until modified.  Brazil, India, Iran, France and South Africa 
supported the view that additional information could not be 
provided. 
 
¶17. (U) Canada, supported by Australia, China, Italy, Mexico, 
The Netherlands, and Pakistan, noted that Verification Annex 
Section 9, paragraph 8 did not exclude distribution to SPs of 
a plant's declared production range or whether the plant used 
PSF.  These variables should be provided as a basis for SPs 
proposals.  Finally, the UK noted that if variables were not 
on the anonymous list, they could not be used to make 
proposals, making the entire process silly.  Switzerland made 
an impassioned intervention, noting that it did not know 
where the consultation was going.  Were delegations working 
to ensure that the most relevant sites would be inspected? 
Or, were we working to remove, step-by-step, the very tools 
needed to do so?  The route at hand if approved would render 
the entire exercise meaningless. 
 
¶18. (U) Australia jumped in, noting that we are deadlocked, 
and that the methodology at this juncture is at most 
marginally better than the current system.  Australia, 
supported by Cuba, Iran, and the U.S., recommended that the 
consultation "pause" for a time.  Canada, supported by Iran, 
reminded delegations that our mandate is to consider how to 
implement paragraph 11(c), not the entire selection 
methodology.  Because delegations have expanded the mandate, 
the consultation is getting bogged down.  The facilitator, 
supported by Mexico, noted that in his opinion, the 
consultations should not take a break.  We have a lot of work 
remaining.  The issue at hand is the anonymous list, and, 
perhaps as a compromise, the A14 value should be provided. 
 
 
¶19. (U) In response, New Zealand recommended that the TS 
institute a temporary fix while the debate of how states 
would make contributions to the selections continues.  For 
instance, New Zealand recommended that the first step be 
modified to selection of OCPFs for each SP with probability 
proportional to 1   1/2 sqrt (OCPFs) and the second step be 
modified to selection of the facilities within the country 
with probability proportional to 1   1/2 sqrt (A14). 
 
¶20. (U) Germany reentered the fray by stating that all states 
had agreed to the facilitator's proposal, and that the issue 
at hand is the anonymous list.  The U.S. responded that it 
had agreed to discuss and consider the proposal, but the del 
reps had never indicated that the U.S. supported the 
proposal.  Instead, the U.S. is becoming more convinced that 
the facilitator's proposal is going down an unacceptable 
path, making a pause to reflect on the goal of this exercise 
critical. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
INDUSTRY CLUSTER - TRANSFER DISCREPANCIES 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶21. (U) The February 13 consultation on this topic centered 
on the definitions of import and export, as laid out in the 
most recent co-facilitators' non-paper, dated 29 January 
¶2007.  One of the facilitators presented the details of the 
non-paper, along with the various scenarios that were 
presented therein. 
 
¶22. (U) The discussion that followed highlighted the 
complexity of the issue.  There was considerable confusion 
about the fact that this is intended to only affect Article 
VI declarations and not meant to be an additional requirement 
to existing national customs measures.  The fact that was 
pointed out, however, is that, even if this is meant to be 
separate from customs, it certainly requires careful thought 
about whether it should impact customs measures. 
 
¶23. (U) India expressed its concern over the complexity of 
the import/export issue, stating that this type of change 
would require significant outreach efforts to industry and 
traders to ensure that they understand their obligations. 
The UK said that their recent discussions with industry show 
favor for the current non-paper definitions, but they share 
the same concerns as India about the ramifications of its 
complexity. 
 
¶24. (U) Switzerland and others pointed out that the resulting 
data comes only from industry, and that customs only does 
periodic spot-checks.  Canada and other delegations were 
quick to point out that such an action as proposed would not 
limit discrepancies but, at best, reduce the number of 
discrepancies.  The facilitators acknowledged this point and 
that this cannot be the goal of this consultation, as it is 
an impossible task. 
 
¶25. (U) Del rep reminded the delegates of the general support 
expressed in an earlier consultation for the redefining of 
what a discrepancy is - moving from a percent screen to one 
based on corresponding treaty thresholds.  The facilitators 
said that, in light of the earlier, general support for the 
redefinition, the TS had already put this into place, and 
that the most recent round of clarification requests sent to 
SPs were based on this new definition.  There were several 
delegations that were surprised by this, and Australia 
expressed strong dissatisfaction that the TS had moved 
forward unilaterally and so quickly. 
 
¶26. (U) In closing, the facilitators asked that delegations 
bring their proposals back to capitals to get reactions for 
the next round of consultations. 
 
------------------------------------ 
INDUSTRY CLUSTER - LATE DECLARATIONS 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶27. (U) The focus of the February 14 consultation was: (1) 
the November 3 draft decision language on "nil declarations" 
prepared by the facilitator (Denyer, U.S.), and (2) example 
reminder letters and notes verbale that SPs could use to make 
"nil declarations." 
 
¶28. (U) Several delegations gave minor editorial suggestions 
to the text of the draft decision.  Australia asked how the 
decision might require SPs who are late submitting their 
declarations (whether nil or otherwise) to provide the 
reasons why.  Options were discussed.  Although supportive of 
nil declarations, New Zealand expressed concern on the 
success of small SPs in meeting these obligations.  Others 
also expressed concern about the potential "burden". 
Switzerland suggested that, once a SP submitted a nil 
declaration (or perhaps even a nil initial declaration), that 
declaration could stand until amended.  This would be 
consistent with what is done for OCPF declarations.  There 
was also a suggestion by Turkey and others that the decision 
be more specific as to what the TS should report and do with 
the data gathered, including emphasis on future work to 
address factors that contribute to late declarations. 
 
¶29. (U) Although the discussion on the TS's example reminder 
letters, etc. went well, there was some confusion about how 
these documents would be used.  The facilitator made it clear 
that these documents were meant solely for helping the 
delegations present understand options for putting a nil 
declaration decision in place and that these documents would 
not be annexes to or in any other way affect the decision 
itself. 
 
¶30. (U) The facilitator committed to making the minor 
editorial changes requested, to try to address the more 
general concerns expressed, and to try to distribute a 
modified text fairly soon.  Also, the facilitator will 
provide a modified text to the TS in the upcoming days to 
allow their comments, including the Legal Advisor's thoughts 
on the requirement of "reasons." 
 
¶31. (U) In a later meeting with the Japanese delegation, they 
expressed concern about the burden of "nil declarations" on 
small island states.  The facilitator was able to address 
some of his ideas for the next draft of the decision text and 
how this dealt with their concerns. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
INDUSTRY CLUSTER - ARTICLE VI RISK AND INSPECTION FREQUENCY 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
 
¶32. (U) As a result of the protracted debate on the 2007 
program and budget, the Executive Council "decided to 
undertake discussions, under the industry cluster, in 2007, 
with the assistance of relevant experts of the Secretariat 
and States Parties, on the main issues related to the 
implementation of the verification regime established by 
Article VI of the Convention, including, inter alia, the 
frequency of inspections of the different categories of the 
facilities to be inspected as required by the Convention." 
With this in mind, Ambassador Dastis (Spain) chaired a 
meeting on February 15 to open a dialogue on this topic.  The 
meeting was attended by the DG and DDG. 
 
¶33. (U) In his opening remarks, the DG noted the following: 
work on the 2008 program and budget had already begun; the TS 
was preparing (as highest priority) a paper on Schedule 2 
facilities, including inspection experience to date; and the 
need to receive early direction from SPs. 
 
¶34. (U) Bill Kane (Industry Verification) made brief opening 
remarks in which he summarized the rather limited work that 
has been conducted on this topic to date, referencing: the 
October 2000 TS paper on the relative risk of Schedule 2 
facilities (which methodology is still in use); the Schedule 
3 selection decision of 1999; the urgent need for an OCPF 
site selection decision; and the fact that the "inclusion of 
additional declaration information" could be useful in 
improving OCPF site selection.  India and others supported 
 
the T sharing of inspection experiences. 
 
¶35. (U) Seveal delegations (including South Africa and 
Mexic) discussed the inequity of the TS's current OCPF ite 
selection methodology.  South Africa (suppored by India) 
also noted the need to balance any uture increases in OCPF 
inspections with a new seection methodology.  (Of note, 
South Africa quesioned rhetorically that, if the decision is 
to reduce the number of Schedule 2 inspections, what would be 
done with the exta inspections?)  Mexico expressed a need to 
retun to the Schedule 2 inspection frequency assumptios, 
noting that the "3 times in 10 years" approac in place was 
meant for the least-risky facilitie and that the others 
might need to be inspected ore often.  Iran also asked for 
background inforation on the methodology used for Schedule 1 
faclities. 
 
¶36. (U) Iran, supported by others, requsted the preparation 
of a background paper by theTS on this topic.  Although 
willing to have suchmaterials prepared, the DG insisted that 
SPs disuss this carefully to decide exactly what was needd, 
as he felt that existing documents, includingthose prepared 
during the budget discussions of lst fall, might be 
sufficient (and he was concernd about limited TS resources). 
 Ambassador Javit suggested the preparation of an annotated 
bibligraphy of applicable documents from the past that ight 
help delegations organize this work, along wth making the 
relevant documents available on th external server 
(currently, available documentsonly go back to 2003).  This 
was widely supported, and the TS committed to providing the 
bibliography. 
 
¶37. (U) Canada noted that, given the long history of this 
issue, our expectations on the outcome of these discussions 
should be tempered.  Even if common agreement could be found 
on the "risky" characteristics of various facilities, 
delegations would likely still have different ideas of what 
characteristics should be of highest concern when making 
inspection decisions.  He encouraged this discussion to focus 
not only on inspection frequency, but on the relative value 
of subsequent inspections, given inspection experience. 
 
¶38. (U) The meeting ended with Ambassador Dastis agreeing 
that two more meetings would be held before the March EC. 
The next meeting will be in two weeks, and the following 
meeting will be during the first week of March, with details 
on the discussions to be provided later. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
MOST RECENT SCHEDULE 2 INSPECTION WITH S&A - THE UK 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶39. (U) During the February 13 WEOG meeting, the UK 
delegation announced that they had recently completed a 
Schedule 2 subsequent inspection that involved sampling and 
analysis.  The delegation said that things went fairly well, 
noting the following points of interest: 
 
- The inspection team left the analytical equipment running 
until the very end of the inspection, just in case there was 
a need to re-run an analysis.  The result was a slight delay 
in the end of the inspection, as they needed time to pack up 
the analytical equipment. 
 
- The host team did not run parallel analyses, but were 
prepared to do so, if they felt they were needed.  This 
choice was made strictly because of the cost that would have 
been involved. 
 
- As was done during the Swiss and Chinese inspections, the 
TS arranged in advance for the inspection equipment to be 
 
SIPDIS 
delivered directly to the site, where technical equipment 
inspection was performed. 
 
- Although this site has historically expressed serious 
concerns regarding confidential business information (e.g., 
even the name of the plant site manager is "highly 
protected"), the analyses were performed in open-mode. 
 
 
¶40. (U) In further discussions with the UK delegation, 
several other points were raised with del rep: 
 
- The delegation was not certain exactly what arrangements 
the TS had made to get the equipment to the site.  They 
speculated that the bulk of the equipment may have come by 
truck through the Chunnel.  However, given the Chunnel's 
restrictions on compressed gases, these were flown into 
Heathrow - not the normal point-of-entry. 
 
- The delegation acknowledged that the TS arrangements 
alleviated the National Authority's burden of having to 
arrange transport of this equipment to the site.  And, given 
that the UK would be able to do that via truck, they 
acknowledged that this would be much more difficult via air 
transport in a State Party like the U.S. 
 
----------------------------- 
GERMAN UNCERTAINTIES RESOLVED 
----------------------------- 
 
¶41. (U) In a previous WEOG meeting, the German delegation 
discussed a Schedule 2 inspection that had resulted in an 
uncertainty because of the inspection team's inability to 
"close the loop" on the material balance.  In the February 13 
WEOG meeting, the German delegation announced that this 
uncertainty had been resolved. 
 
¶42. (U) In further discussions with the German delegation, 
del rep learned that the uncertainty was resolved by 
follow-up "visit(s)" to the site by the TS, during which 
additional records were provided.  This was not done in the 
way of another inspection, but rather some other arranged 
visit.  Clearly, this option was available to the TS, given 
the relative nearness of the plant site.  And the German 
delegation seemed to feel that this was a satisfactory 
solution.  However, this could be seen as problematic as a 
routine avenue for resolution of inspection uncertainties. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
ARTICLE VII OUTREACH - THE PADILLA INITIATIVE 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶43. (U) On February 15, del reps (Sanders and Denyer) met 
with a representative of the Japanese delegation (Kiwako 
Tanaka) and a representative of the Japanese Ministry of 
Economy, Trade and Industry (Takuya Igarashi), at their 
request.  The topics they wished to discuss were: (1) 
Indonesia-Japan-Australia industry workshop on 26-27 February 
in Jakarta; (2) U.S. initiatives to assist the "20-in-10" 
States Parties; (3) assistance to East Asian States Parties; 
and (4) assistance by means of promoting industry dialogue. 
 
¶44. (U) The Japanese delegation expressed concern about the 
size of Asia and their ability to tackle all of the SPs 
therein.  They said that they would only consider outreach 
efforts for those SPs with national implementing legislation 
(but where Article VII is not fully satisfied) in the 
following order of priority: (1) East Asia - Indonesia, Laos, 
Mongolia, the Philippines; (2) Central and South Asia - 
Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan; (3) West 
Asia - Jordan, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates; and (4) small 
island states - Fiji.  Clearly, the Japanese focus is on East 
Asia.  When pressed, they said they were not likely to turn 
their attention to their second priority - Central and South 
Asia - until 2008.  And, the expectation is that West Asia 
and the small island states would not be addressed at all. 
 
¶45. (U) After some discussion, the Japanese delegation said 
that their Ministry of Foreign Affairs considered the 
Philippines a promising target for assistance this year. 
They have already talked about this with the Philippines, as 
was reported in last week's cable.  They did seem interested 
in pursuing further discussions on joint assistance with the 
U.S. and, potentially, Australia for efforts like this. 
 
¶46. (U) The Japanese delegation was very interested in how 
 
the APEC Chemical Dialogue might be used to forward Article 
VII goals.  Their only concern is whether the right people 
would attend the Dialogue, noting that environmental and 
safety personnel might not also handle CWC issues.  Del rep 
shared the U.S. experience during inspections, that often a 
single representative at a site handles all regulatory 
issues, including environmental and CWC concerns, but 
conceded this might not always be the case at a corporate 
level. 
 
¶47. (U) The Japanese delegation also shared that South Korea 
has expressed an interest in assisting other SPs in their 
Article VII efforts.  We concluded that future discussions 
about Asia should probably include Australia and Korea. 
 
-------------------------------- 
EXTERNAL AUDITOR AND OIO REPORTS 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶48. (U) Facilitator Rick Snelsire (U.S.) called a meeting on 
February 12 to discuss OPCW documents EC-47/S/4 on 
Implementation of Recommendations of the External Auditor and 
EC-47/DG.4 on Implementation of the 2005 Report of the Office 
of Internal Oversight.  The facilitator went through both 
reports, and while acknowledging that the documents had 
already been noted in the CSP report, said he wanted to 
reinforce the precedent of holding consultations to discuss 
all such reports. 
 
¶49. (U) EC-47/S/4 -- The facilitator asked the TS to discuss 
the progress of Results Based Budgeting (RBB).  Budget chief 
Rick Martin noted the TS has asked program managers to review 
RBB and said they are adding their suggestions to the coming 
year's budget.  This is an effort to make the budget more 
transparent.  India asked if they will use the 
performance-scorecard approach to targets, and the TS 
indicated it will continue a narrative approach.  Iran 
questioned if the suggestion under the Travel Office to have 
an in-house contracted travel agency with a comprehensive 
agreement has been implemented.  Martin said it had started 
in January 2007, and in response to a question by Italy said 
they are currently reviewing travel policies to make certain 
their system is cost effective and efficient.  In response to 
a question from the facilitator, Martin said the next report 
of the External Auditor will be out on March 15. 
 
¶50. (U) EC-47/DG.4 -- There was little comment here.  Iran 
and India questioned whether the Dutch Accreditation Council 
should be certifying that the OPCW, and in particular the 
lab, are in compliance with ISO standards. The TS said this 
certification was primarily focused on the lab. The next OIO 
report will be issued in May. The facilitator noted there 
will be another meeting soon after the next relevant report 
is issued. 
 
--------------------------------- 
DONORS MEETING/GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶51.  (U) Konstantin Gavrilov, the Russian Deputy PermRep, 
invited delegations from the donors group to a February 16 
meeting at the Russian Embassy.  Ostensibly it was to brief 
on the results of the January 23 meeting in Berlin of the 
Working Group on Global Partnership.  In fact, it turned out 
to be a request for donors contributing to Russian CW 
destruction efforts to bring an enhanced group of experts to 
the March 12 donors meeting.  However, Gavrilov undercut the 
importance Russia attaches to this meeting by conceding that 
it will be the usual working-level team from Moscow, and 
not/not senior officials, such as deputy head of the Russian 
Federal Agency for Industry, Viktor Kholstov. 
 
¶52.  (U) Noting that he had attended the Berlin meeting, 
Gavrilov said there had been a general agreement for more 
intense activity by the G-8 plus the larger group of donors. 
He emphasized that 2007-2008 was important for Russia with 
regard to getting destruction facilities up and running, and 
commented that there were extensive discussions in Berlin on 
 
CW destruction.  Gavrilov then went through the numbers for 
how much Russia has shelled out, and how much the donors have 
promised and actually provided.  He said the total amount 
pledged was 45 million pounds and 9.7 million pounds had been 
received.  With regard to the U.S. number, he commented that 
Parsons is estimated to get $20 million annually "just to be 
the U.S. sub-contractor." 
 
¶53.  (U) Gavrilov then made the point to New Zealand, Italy 
and others that the Russian view is that it would be better 
to have bilateral agreements, rather than have them 
"piggy-back" onto U.S. and other programs.  He added that the 
report from Moscow is that an agreement on a bilateral with 
Italy is close.  Annie Marie (France) reported that French 
ratification of the bilateral agreement apparently could be 
completed by the end of the month.  Gavrilov said he 
understood Russia had already ratified the bilateral with 
France. 
 
¶54.  (U) Gavrilov closed by stressing that the Russian del is 
ready to assist if any of the donors had questions or 
encountered difficulties, and, if nothing else, would convey 
the query to Moscow and try to get a response.  Attendees 
were Canada, Czech Republic, Finland, France, FRG, Ireland, 
Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, UK, and the U.S. 
 
¶55. (U) Javits sends. 
BLAKEMAN