VZCZCXYZ0008
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTC #0223/01 0371326
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 061326Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8109
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY

UNCLAS THE HAGUE 000223 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S 
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP 
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC 
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN) 
NSC FOR LEDDY 
WINPAC FOR WALTER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP-UP FOR THE 
WEEK ENDING FEBRUARY 2 
 
 
This is CWC-11-07. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
RECENT MEDIA COVERAGE OF U.S. CW DESTRUCTION 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶1.  (U) In response to inquiries over the past several weeks, 
del rep briefed WEOG on recent press articles concerning the 
U.S. chemical weapons destruction program.  With respect to 
Dupont's recent decision not to treat the VX hydrolysate from 
Newport, del rep explained that the program impact was still 
being assessed, alternative options were being explored, and 
that it is possible that the incineration sites may be able 
to make up Newport's relatively small contribution to the 45% 
milestone.  Del rep also addressed articles generated by the 
Nunn/McCurdy submission to Congress, which indicate 
completion of destruction at the two sites remaining to be 
constructed could be delayed until 2020 and 2023. 
 
¶2. (U) Del rep offered a brief explanation of the 
Nunn/McCurdy process to address questions delegations are 
likely to have about the timing of release of this new 
information, and why the figures are so different from those 
submitted with the U.S. extension request.  Del rep also 
indicated that questions exist as to whether additional 
funding now might significantly accelerate progress, and that 
this issue of funding is to be distinguished from statements 
made last year, which still hold true, that the U.S. 
inability to complete destruction by 2012 cannot be altered 
by increasing the program budget.  Delegations had no 
immediate questions, although the German representative later 
indicated his hope that this was a political ploy to increase 
program funding. 
 
---------------------- 
ALBANIA CW DESTRUCTION 
---------------------- 
 
¶3. (U) Although destruction operations at the Qaf-Molla CWDF 
officially began February 1, due to significant program 
delays, Albania has already missed its first two intermediate 
deadlines (approved during CSP-11), and will miss its third 
intermediate deadline and the final deadline, April 29, 2007, 
established by the Convention for complete elimination of its 
CW stockpile.  Del rep met with the Albanian delegation and 
senior members of the Verification division to discuss a 
sensible, transparent way forward.  There have been an 
increasing number of questions concerning Albania's inability 
to meet its recently established deadlines, and, regardless 
of the relatively small scope of operations in Albania, it 
seems unwise to set the precedent that further extensions of 
intermediate deadlines are not required. 
 
¶4.  (U) A letter explaining the general nature of the delays, 
and the fact that several weeks of operations will be 
required before new deadlines can be credibly established, 
will be submitted to the Technical Secretariat, along with a 
request to make this information available to member states. 
Del will work with the Albanian delegation and Washington to 
ensure an extension request for the 45% and 100% deadlines is 
submitted as soon as possible, and that maximum transparency 
is provided in the interim. 
 
------------------------ 
END POINT OF DESTRUCTION 
------------------------ 
 
¶5. (U) Delegations are demonstrating an increasing interest 
in returning to the issue of defining the End Point of 
Destruction.  Del rep, in discussions with the UK and WEOG 
Coordinator Christer Ahlstrom, has recommended any discussion 
of the topic in WEOG be preceded by a briefing from the TS on 
current operations at the Maradykovsky CWDF, particularly in 
light of the fact that the Russian Federation has yet to 
table a draft facility agreement or verification plan for 
this facility.  Internal opinions at the TS as to the nature 
of operations at this particular site range from serious 
concern about the adequacy of measures being used to mutilate 
the munitions, to a fairly high comfort level that reaction 
 
mass and metal parts mutilation are being handled 
appropriately. 
 
¶6.  (U) One thing is certain; the TS is not inclined to make 
any political judgments as to whether or not the VX will be 
considered destroyed after the first stage of treatment, and 
simply intends to present a factual accounting, leaving the 
politics of EPOD to the member states.  The TS is, however, 
drafting a paper on the topic for the DG, and some TS members 
have indicated their belief that it might be appropriate to 
return to the definition in light of current and future 
practices and technologies to be used. 
 
¶7.  (U) Del rep will follow up with Ahlstrom and members of 
the TS to encourage that a briefing be provided by the end of 
the month.  Del rep will also reassure States Party that the 
U.S. does not intend to change its definition of EPOD, and 
will claim destruction credit only after the second stage of 
treatment.  WEOG delegations, most notably the UK and 
Germany, are likely to take a firm position supporting the 
U.S. definition, given the uncertainty as to precisely what 
technologies and secondary treatment methods will be employed 
at future Russian facilities.  While this issue may not be 
specifically addressed at the March Executive Council, it 
will certainly receive increasing attention as the Russian 
20% deadline of April 29, 2007 approaches. 
 
---------------------------- 
90-DAY REPORTING REQUIREMENT 
---------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (U) Delegation has now on several occasions been 
approached by the TS regarding the U.S. intent to comply with 
the 90-day reporting requirement stipulated in the Convention 
as a condition for granting of an extension of the final 
deadline for CW destruction.  Most recently, Ambassador 
Khodakov (Secretary of the Policy Making Organs) noted that 
many important decisions regarding deadlines were taken 
during CSP-11, and so he expects that the possessor states 
will submit updates as required.  Although it was assumed 
earlier in the process that the destruction updates offered 
during the destruction informal sessions preceding EC 
meetings would likely suffice, this no longer appears to be 
the case. 
 
¶9.  (U) Given the sometimes lengthy gaps between EC sessions, 
and the general atmospherics surrounding not only the 
granting of the extension request, but also recent news that 
the U.S. is unlikely to complete destruction before 2023, 
delegations are likely to expect strict compliance with this 
reporting requirement.  Del will quietly query the Russian 
del, who has stated that provision of this information should 
not be a problem for Moscow, to gauge the level of detail 
Russia intends to provide.  Del recommends Washington 
consider what format and depth might be most appropriate and 
be prepared to submit the first update before the end of 
July. 
 
¶10. (U) Javits sends. 
ARNALL