VZCZCXRO2953
PP RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA
RUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHSF #0169 0400937
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 090937Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY SOFIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3178
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS SOFIA 000169 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV KJUS KCRM EUN BU
SUBJECT: BULGARIAN CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS: ANOTHER ATTEMPT AT 
JUDICIAL REFORM 
 
REF: 06 SOFIA 250 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  Bulgaria's latest batch of constitutional 
amendments, approved February 2, attempt to reform Bulgaria's 
dysfunctional judicial system by creating an OIG-like entity 
within the Supreme Judicial Council.  Building on earlier  core 
amendments, which were seen as a precondition for EU membership, the 
 
new changes seek to strike a balance between judicial 
independence and accountability.  While some amendments, 
particularly those providing for fiscal decentralization and 
abolishing conscription, are non-controversial, critics have 
zeroed in on changes affecting the judiciary.  Opponents predict 
limited  effectiveness and warn that  establishment of a judicial 
inspectorate chosen by parliament could lead to political 
interference.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (U) On February 2, the National Assembly adopted a package of 
amendments with a particular emphasis on reforming the judiciary. 
This is the fourth change in the country's basic law, and the 
third in less than four years aimed specifically at increasing 
the transparency and accountability of the judicial system.  The 
European Commission criticized the last revisions, adopted in 
March 2006, as injecting ambiguity into magistrates' independence 
(reftel).  The Commission's October 2006 report recommended that 
Bulgaria address the shortcoming, identifying it as one area that 
could potentially trigger EU safeguard clauses. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) The new amendments, adopted with broad political 
support, strive to find a middle ground between judicial 
independence and accountability.  The Parliament confirmed the 
Supreme Judicial Council (SJC) as the sole governing body over 
the judiciary, solidifying its independence.  At the same time, 
MPs limited the magistrates' immunity to functional immunity, 
making it easier for judges, prosecutors, and investigators to be 
prosecuted for actions outside their official capacity.  The 
parliamentarians' most controversial decision was to establish an 
11-member inspectorate within SJC to check and monitor the 
judiciary's work.  The inspectorate's members will be selected and 
confirmed by two-thirds majority of Parliament to four-year terms 
and will have 
authority to investigate all judicial operations except those 
pertaining to case merit.  Many leading judicial figures openly 
expressed skepticism about the new body's efficacy, highlighting 
its unclear mandate, its vulnerability to political pressure, and 
the existence of a similar inspectorate within the Ministry of 
Justice. Judges confided to us serious doubts the new body will 
make much of a difference, especially in what they characterized 
as the hierarchical -- and often corrupt -- system where the 
leadership "does not want to hear the word transparency." Various 
EU embassies have warily eyed the judicial amendment, uncertain 
of its usefulness or practicality. 
 
¶4. (U) Along with judicial reform, the new constitutional 
amendments also allow fiscal decentralization, enabling 
municipalities to set local taxes and duties within the 
boundaries of the law; abolish conscription and provide for a 
fully professional army as of January 1, 2008; give parliament 
budgetary independence; and eliminate the requirement for a 
quorum to be present in parliament, except during actual votes. 
 
¶5. (SBU) COMMENT:  While some of the constitutional amendments 
seem of dubious merit, others unequivocally represent positive 
developments.  Fiscal decentralization has been a goal of USG 
assistance for many years, with USAID-supported projects actively 
advocating for more local budgetary autonomy.  The limits on 
magistrates' immunity should, over time, increase judicial 
accountability and allow the system to rid itself of some of its 
negligent and corrupt members.  The inspectorate, if staffed by 
dedicated, reform-minded officials, should help speed the 
administration of justice, lessen internal resistance to change, 
and limit the corruption that hobbles the system's effectiveness. 
Implementation of the judicial reform will serve as a de facto 
litmus test of how well the system self-regulates, but on balance 
the amendments overall are a step in the right direction.  END 
COMMENT 
 
KARAGIANNIS