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OO RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA
RUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHNC #0115/01 0380912
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 070912Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7501
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0770
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 000115 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PREF CY TU
SUBJECT: ARMENIANS IN CYPRUS:  FITTING IN BEATS FALLING OUT 
 
REF: A. NICOSIA 111 
     ¶B. NICOSIA 52 
 
¶1.  SUMMARY:  Successful for four hundred years in 
maintaining their unique culture, language and religion, 
Cyprus's Armenians -- who enjoy "official religious group" 
status under the Republic's 1960 convention -- nonetheless 
seek closer ties to the majority Greek Cypriot population. 
As such, Armenian Cypriots would willingly accept 
conscription into the Greek Cypriot National Guard, claims 
community leader Vartkes Mahdessian, "provided that certain 
conditions are met."  Mahdessian, a non-voting Member of 
Parliament, also has urged his flock to master the Greek 
language and become active in mainstream G/C politics in 
hopes of bettering their lot.  RoC census data reveal that 
Armenian Cypriots in the government-controlled area number 
approximately 3,000.  The true figure is higher, Mahdessian 
believes, owing to recent immigration from Armenia proper. 
Natives and newcomers have not mixed well, threatening 
community unity short-term.  Political parties of the right 
traditionally could count on the community's votes, but a 
mixed-blood Armenian's success within DIKO and Communist 
AKEL's lobbying of the immigrant population has brought the 
group toward the center.  Armenian Cypriots support the 
concept of a bi-communal, bi-zonal re-unified Cyprus, 
Mahdessian confirmed, but are leery of living amidst Turkish 
Cypriots, a product of historic animosity between "mother 
countries" Turkey and Armenia.  END SUMMARY. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Long a Tile in the Cypriot Mosaic 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  Armenians began arriving on Cyprus in the early 1600s, 
revealed Mahdessian in a January 25 meeting with Poloffs. 
Attracted by commercial opportunities, itinerant tradesmen 
established a presence in the island's then-largest cities, 
Nicosia, Famagusta, and Larnaca.  Historically urban unlike 
the agrarian Maronites (Ref B), Armenians were dispersed 
throughout the island prior to the 1974 conflict; all crossed 
south in the population exchanges that followed.  Official 
RoC census data report their population totals 3,000. 
 
¶3.  The actual figure was higher, Mahdessian asserted, 
although by what factor was anyone's guess.  The last 15 
years had witnessed a wave of immigrants, ethnic cousins 
fleeing economic hardship in Armenia proper or other parts of 
the former Soviet Union.  Many had settled in rapidly 
emptying Cypriot villages in the hinterlands, taking 
agricultural jobs no Cypriot would touch.  Some attended 
church services in the towns and had integrated into the 
native Armenian  Cypriot community, but others, mostly 
illegal, remained cloistered.  His community was thus 
divided, Mahdessian fretted. 
 
¶4.  Four hundred years living amidst the Greek- and Turkish 
Cypriot communities had not robbed the Armenian Cypriots of 
their identity, he continued.  Most considered Armenian the 
mother tongue, and, despite intermarriage, frequented 
Armenian churches primarily.  The RoC funded separate 
elementary schools for Armenian children, a welcome gesture, 
believed Mahdessian.  Finally, they retained their historic 
flair for commerce, as members of his community had excelled 
in businesses both large and small in Cyprus. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
Inter-communal Relations Good, Not Perfect 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶5.  In general, Armenian and Greek Cypriots coexisted 
peacefully and related well, Mahdessian thought. 
Nonetheless, discrimination did occur.  During the race for 
the DIKO party presidency, for example, unknowns, perhaps 
supporters of rival Nikos Kleanthous, planted rumors that 
half-Armenian candidate Marios Karoyian was less sympathetic 
to the national cause.  Karoyian's clear victory was proof, 
Mahdessian asserted, that most G/Cs thought favorably of 
their Armenian compatriots.  Others, however, criticized his 
group for seeking government assistance not available to the 
mainstream.  "They cite the fact that in 1960 we chose to 
align ourselves with the Greek Cypriot side.  What were we 
supposed to do?" he wondered, "Side with the Turks?  With our 
history?" 
 
¶6.  From his perch as community leader, Mahdessian sought not 
only to preserve his community's separateness, but also to 
strengthen its economic well-being.  To succeed it was vital 
that Armenians interact with Greek Cypriot society.  So, 
while many Armenians attended ethnic elementary schools and 
 
NICOSIA 00000115  002 OF 003 
 
 
international high schools, he encouraged Armenian students 
to study Greek on "the native track," not as a foreign 
language.  With pride he described how his efforts had won 
changes to the curriculum for Armenian Cypriot students at 
the English School, one of Nicosia's toniest. 
 
¶7.  Armenian Cypriot parents of means had turned to the 
English School and others due to the 2004 decision to shutter 
the Melkonian Armenian School.  Once a source of pride that 
helped forge a shared identity, Melkonian's closure had 
shaken his community, Mahdessian lamented.  He thought poor 
management, not weak demand, had forced the shut-down.  As 
private schools were big business in Cyprus, with parents 
willing to spend upwards of $10,000 per year, Melkonian might 
have survived, Mahdessian argued, had it offered a 
"two-track" curriculum for Armenian and non-Armenian 
students.  He did not hide his hopes that someday the school 
might re-open (Note:  Media February 4 reported that Cyprus's 
Supreme Court had dealt a blow to Mahdessian's hopes by 
overturning an earlier RoC decision to preserve the property 
on historic grounds, thus paving the way for the site's 
eventual redevelopment. End Note.) 
 
-------------------------------- 
Conscription Opt-Out Soon to End 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  In recent years, the Greek Cypriot National Guard has 
faced difficulty filling its conscript billets.  One element 
of the GCNG plan to meet staffing gaps lay in ending the 
exemption from compulsory military service that Cyprus's 
recognized religious groups enjoy (Ref A).  Armenian Cypriots 
benefited greatly from the security the state provided, 
Mahdessian admitted, and their youth would serve if called. 
"Military service might even improve our standing in the 
community.  We're not against it, per se," he reasoned.  But 
the discrimination Armenian Cypriots had endured in 1992-94 
-- the only time community members had been drafted -- showed 
that an altered GCNG conscription regime was imperative. 
Mahdessian was drafting a letter to RoC President Tassos 
Papadopoulos that highlighted his community's concerns and 
offered suggestions on how Armenian Cypriots might better 
serve in the National Guard. 
 
¶9.  Topping his list was the recommendation that Armenians 
first enter service in 2008, not 2007, allowing those youth 
who already had finalized plans for work or university to 
continue.  Mahdessian hoped their conscripts might attend 
basic training as a group, reducing the odds of being singled 
out for mistreatment on account of ethnicity. 
Armenian-descent draftees ought serve in big cities to allow 
them to practice their religion, since the community had no 
facilities in rural, remote areas.  Finally, Mahdessian 
thought Armenian Cypriot officer candidates would lose ground 
because due to weakness in written Greek; he would urge the 
government to weigh language/communication test scores with 
this in mind.   He hoped Papadopoulos would respond favorably 
to the missive, but seemed resigned to the opposite outcome. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
Recent Arrivals Change Community's Dynamic 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶10.  Despite their contributions to the Republic's economy, 
filling menial jobs unacceptable to Cypriots, recent arrivals 
from Armenia proper rarely slept soundly, Mahdessian 
contended.  "(Minister of Interior Neoklis) Sylikiotis is 
after them all," he continued, "as if they were Pontians, Sri 
Lankans or Filipinos."  Acknowledging that most 
recently-arrived Armenians were illegal, like members of the 
aforementioned groups, Mahdessian nonetheless argued their 
shared bloodlines with an official religious minority group 
made their cases special.  "We're going to work on this with 
the Ministry," he pledged. 
 
¶11.  The presence of the Armenian migrants was changing 
politics within his community, Mahdessian contended. 
Armenian Cypriots traditionally had tilted right, supporting 
Democratic Rally (DISY) candidates in presidential and 
parliamentary elections; Communist AKEL, Cyprus's largest 
party, enjoyed little support.  AKEL was making inroads, 
however, deploying its numerous Russian speakers to recruit 
the newcomers, many of whom grew up in the FSU.  Were they to 
gain legal status and eventually naturalize, they could 
greatly alter voting patterns, Mahdessian believe. 
 
¶12.  Another factor bringing Armenian Cypriots to the 
political center was Marios Karoyian's political success, a 
source of pride within the community.  DIKO was President 
 
NICOSIA 00000115  003 OF 003 
 
 
Papadopoulos's party, he noted, and no Armenian Cypriot 
before had reached such political heights.  Mahdessian hoped 
younger community members would follow Karoyian's path and 
seek leadership positions in mainstream Greek Cypriot 
parties.  He estimated the current Armenian Cypriot voter 
breakdown at 40 percent DISY, 40 percent DIKO, 10 percent 
AKEL, and 10 percent split between Cyprus's smaller parties. 
 
¶13.  Despite voting "no" on the 2004 Annan Plan referendum -- 
at a rate below the Greek Cypriots' 67 percent -- the 
community generally favored a bi-zonal, bi-communal model for 
a re-unified Cyprus, Mahdessian reported.  Armenian Cypriots 
seemed in no hurry to live side by side with T/Cs, however. 
"Many Armenians went north after the checkpoints opened in 
2003, but the novelty soon wore off," he claimed.  Perhaps 
due to historic animosity between the mother countries, his 
constituents felt uncomfortable in the Turkish 
Cypriot-controlled areas and now rarely visited. 
 
--------------- 
Looking Forward 
--------------- 
 
¶14.  COMMENT:  While half the size of the Maronite community 
(Ref B), the Armenian minority has better prospects for 
survival in Cyprus.  Helping their cause is the absence of 
enclaved north of the Buffer Zone.  With four villages deep 
in the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" and thus 
vulnerable to T/C or Turkish aggression, Maronites sometimes 
stake wishy-washy positions anathema to the Greek Cypriot 
majority; Armenians hold no such divisions of loyalty. 
Immigration from Armenia has buoyed their numbers and 
provided needed new blood, friction with the old guard 
notwithstanding.  Marios Karoyian's success has brought 
visibility to the community and pride to its members.  The 
"enemy of my enemy" factor also contributes -- Greek Cypriots 
commiserate and empathize with Armenians, as both feel 
victimized by Ankara.  Finally, community leaders here, like 
their counterparts in Lebanon and Syria, have adopted a 
pragmatic approach to surviving alongside the majority group, 
evidenced lately by Mahdessian's decision on military 
service.  END COMMENT. 
SCHLICHER