VZCZCXRO5642
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHNJ #0163/01 0540809
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 230809Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4959
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000163 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PREL PREF CD SU
SUBJECT: CHAD INTERETHNIC CONFLICT: "A POLITICAL CRISIS 
- FOR NOW" 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: Leading "Chad watcher" Roland Marchal 
emphasized that resolving the Darfur crisis required 
pressure on President Deby - pressure on Khartoum was 
not enough.  President Deby's calculated pitting of 
ethnic group against ethnic group in eastern Chad (for 
the sake of regime survival) risked seriously damaging 
Chad's social fabric.  Marchal cautioned that what is 
now "just a political crisis" in Chad could well become 
something much more serious.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) The Ambassador and DCM met with Roland 
Marchal, Senior Research Fellow at the Paris-based 
Center for International Studies and Research on 
February 18 to discuss political developments in Chad. 
Marchal sees President Deby destroying the gains of the 
last 15 years of peace by fostering corruption, 
appointing family members to high-ranking positions and 
degrading the professional army through undeserved 
promotions and use of militias.  Most pernicious, 
according to Marchal, is the destruction of the social 
and civil fabric by a policy of setting ethnic group 
against ethnic group - all for the sake of regime 
survival. 
 
HOW TO CREATE A FAILED STATE: SET GROUP AGAINST GROUP. 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Marchal pointed to the conflict between 
Zaghawa and Tama in the vicinity of Guereda in Dar Tama 
(the traditional home of the Tama ethnic group). 
Conflict had already broken out between these two 
groups (with the Tama at the receiving end) well before 
the signing of a peace agreement between Tama leader 
Mahamat Nour and the Government of Chad (GOC). The 
situation has further deteriorated: a full-blown feud 
between Mahamat Nour and Zaghawas of the Kobe sub-group 
appears to be in the works with Zaghawa pitted against 
demobilized FUC rebels (the latter now empowered by the 
recent peace accord).  Although the government has 
recently taken steps to move the FUC troops elsewhere 
in Chad, the President was not stepping in to support 
the Zaghawa, according to Marchal, because he suspects 
them of supporting the Erdimi brothers against him. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Another example offered by Marchal was that 
of the arming of the Dadjo tribes in Dar Sila to take 
on Chadian Arabs suspected of being aligned with 
Chadian rebels.  Marchal recalled that in 2004 the 
Government of Chad had armed the Arabs because the 
Dadjo themselves were seen as "a problem." Now the 
situation was reversed ("the mirror image of Darfur") 
and Deby was fighting his wars by assembling militias 
and arming citizens to fight each other. (Comment: An 
International Red Cross Delegate based in Goz Beida 
informed DCM as well that the government had been 
arming Dadjo militias.  End comment). 
 
.AND STAND BACK 
--------------- 
¶5.  (SBU) Marchal underscored that by these acts, the 
Chadian state could no longer be seen as able to 
impartially maintain security or administer justice. In 
setting tribe against tribe, Deby was "undoing the 
social bonds" which held Chad together.  Furthermore, 
according to Marchal, by their unwavering support of 
President Deby, the French were complicit in helping 
Deby destroy the Chadian state 
 
DARFUR: "NATIONALIZE" THE CRISIS AND THEN RESOLVE 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶6. (SBU) Recognizing that the Chadian roots of the 
Darfur crisis run deep, Marchal argued that solving 
that crisis required a two step solution.  First, the 
crisis must be "nationalized" - i.e. understood and 
dealt with according to the different circumstances in 
Chad and Sudan.  While this approach might appear more 
time-consuming, two crises were in fact easier to deal 
with than one regional one according to Marchal. 
 
¶7. (SBU) In Chad, Marchal singled out the importance of 
targeting those groups which are responsible for 
"transnationalizing" the conflict.  He explained that 
JEM was the most dangerous Darfur rebel group - not for 
military reasons -- but for political reasons.  JEM 
embodies the political and nationalist aspirations of 
the Kobe sub-group of the Zaghawa (note: President Deby 
is from the Bideyat sub-group).  According to Marchal, 
the Kobe needed to be pressured - and at the same time 
reassured that they will not be eradicated by Khartoum. 
If Chadian support for JEM could be reduced, JEM's 
ability to operate in Darfur would be curtailed - its 
 
NDJAMENA 00000163  002.3 OF 002 
 
 
credibility with the Darfur people called into 
question, and there would be greater pressure to return 
 
to the negotiating table.  In sum: Darfurians need to 
be more realistic - and the only way to do this is to 
limit their resources and power. 
 
WAY FORWARD FOR CHAD? 
--------------------------------------- 
¶8. (SBU) In the meantime, a creditable political 
process was needed in Chad which would bring in the 
Chadian armed opposition, and reduce President Deby's 
need to support his regime through Darfur rebel groups. 
By allowing greater political space, this process would 
also give Zaghawa Kobe "aspirants to the throne" a 
legitimate political process in which to engage.  To 
clear the way, the international community should make 
it clear that it would not accept a Khartoum-staged 
regime change in Chad. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) In Marchal's view, a credible political 
process would include: 
 
-- an agreed division of power between the President 
and the Government; 
-- a process of national reconciliation - reaching to 
the communal level and including demobilization of 
militias; 
-- steps to ensure equitable allocation of oil 
resources; 
-- steps to improve delivery of government services; 
 -- decentralization and empowerment of ministries; 
-- electoral reform (Marchal suggested that most 
political parties would be satisfied with an agreement 
on political party and campaign financing); and 
-- a clear understanding of the fate of the Head of 
State once he left office. 
 
¶10. (SBU) And finally, the GOC needed to talk to the 
armed opposition - many of whose "preconditions" (such 
as Deby stepping down) were negotiating strategies 
which would be discarded under pressure. 
 
Comment 
--------- 
¶11.  (SBU) Marchal has looked closely at the Chadian 
roots of the Darfur conflict, and is one of the best- 
informed "Chad watchers" on this subject.  Post concurs 
that the situation in Chad cannot simply be understood 
as spillover from Darfur - rather, Chad's own political 
crisis feeds the Darfur crisis.  A Chad-focused 
approach can assist in giving momentum to the Darfur 
peace process. 
 
¶12.  (U) Tripoli minimize considered. 
Wall