VZCZCXRO2781
RR RUEHDE RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHNR #0828/01 0520753
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 210753Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7611
INFO RUCNSOM/SOMALIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHRN/USMISSION UN ROME 0098
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CJTF HOA
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 NAIROBI 000828 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AIDAC 
 
USAID/DCHA FOR MHESS, WGARVELINK, LROGERS 
DCHA/OFDA FOR KLUU, GGOTTLIEB, AFERRARA, ACONVERY, 
MLUTZ, KCHANNELL 
DCHA/FFP FOR WHAMMINK, JDWORKEN 
AFR/AFR/EA FOR JBORNS 
STATE FOR AF/E, AF/F AND PRM 
STATE/AF/E FOR NGARY 
STATE/F FOR ASISSON 
STATE/PRM FOR AWENDT, MMCKELVEY 
NSC FOR TSHORTLEY 
USUN FOR TMALY 
BRUSSELS FOR PLERNER 
GENEVA FOR NKYLOH 
USMISSION UN ROME FOR RNEWBERG 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: EAID PHUM PREL SO
 
SUBJECT: SOMALIA DART SITUATION REPORT 15 - THE CLUSTER 
APPROACH IN SOMALIA 
 
NAIROBI 00000828  001.2 OF 005 
 
 
SUMMARY 
 
The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs (OCHA) conducted a self-assessment of Somalia's 
pilot cluster system in October 2006.  OCHA noted 
significant improvement in coordination among UN 
agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and 
international organizations (IOs), with reductions in 
program overlaps.  However, OCHA also discovered 
weaknesses in cluster leadership, funding mechanisms, 
and Nairobi-field communications.  The USG Disaster 
Assistance Response Team (DART) has received mixed 
reviews of the cluster approach in Somalia, yet notes 
significant improvements in gap analysis and strategic 
planning.  End summary. 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
¶1.  OCHA and UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) 
principals endorsed a cluster approach to international 
responses to humanitarian crises in 2005.  The UN 
cluster system was designed as a global mechanism to 
address and identify gaps in response efforts and 
enhance the quality of humanitarian action.  The 
central coordination approach aims to improve the 
effectiveness of humanitarian response by ensuring 
greater predictability and accountability while at the 
same time strengthening partnerships between NGOs, IOs, 
and UN agencies. 
 
¶2.  At the country level, this approach aims to better 
prioritize available humanitarian resources by 
clarifying the division of labor among organizations, 
better define roles and responsibilities of 
humanitarian organizations, and provide a point of 
contact and a provider of last resort in all key 
sectors or areas of activity. 
 
¶3.  The UN cluster system comprises nine groups defined 
by technical and cross-cutting themes along common 
service areas.  The formal clusters and lead agencies 
are provided below: 
 
-- nutrition: the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF); 
 
-- health: the UN World Health Organization (WHO); 
 
-- water and sanitation: UNICEF; 
 
-- emergency shelter for internally displaced persons 
(IDPs): the Office of the UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR), and the International Federation of 
the Red Cross (IFRC) as the convening agency; 
 
-- camp coordination and management for IDPs: UNHCR and 
the International Organization for Migration (IOM); 
 
-- protection: UNHCR and UNICEF; 
 
-- early recovery: the UN Development Program (UNDP); 
 
-- logistics: the UN World Food Program (WFP); 
 
-- emergency telecommunications: OCHA, UNICEF, and WFP. 
 
¶4.  Formal clusters have not been designated for 
sectors where the leadership and accountability is 
 
NAIROBI 00000828  002.2 OF 005 
 
 
clear, such as the UN Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO) leadership for agriculture, UNICEF coordination 
of education, and WFP coordination of food assistance. 
 
¶5.  Not all humanitarian emergencies will require all 
nine formal sectors at the country level and the system 
allows for clusters to be merged, such as health, 
nutrition, and food and agriculture.  Additional 
issues, such as early recovery planning, may be 
integrated into existing clusters. 
 
¶6.  According to OCHA, country level clusters should 
adhere to norms, policies, and internationally 
recognized standards.  Cluster leads are expected to 
report to the UN country Humanitarian Coordinator while 
at the same time report through their agency specific 
hierarchy.  Lead agencies may appoint full-time staff 
to work as dedicated cluster chairs if warranted by the 
scope of the emergency. 
 
SOMALIA'S CLUSTER SYSTEM 
 
¶7.  The Somalia IASC requested that a pilot cluster 
system be adopted in Somalia, and in January 2006, OCHA 
identified and rolled out eight clusters:  food led by 
WFP, agriculture and livelihoods led by FAO, health led 
by WHO, nutrition led by UNICEF, water and sanitation 
led by UNICEF, education led by UNICEF, protection led 
by UNHCR, and logistics led by WFP.  There is no formal 
UN cluster for education in Somalia. 
 
¶8.  OCHA has identified early recovery as a cross 
cutting theme for each cluster, hence it has not been 
given formal cluster status.  An early recovery working 
group was established under UNDP in late 2006 and will 
link with the Somalia Reconstruction and Development 
Plan (RDP) that UNDP is spearheading. 
 
¶9.  While cluster meetings are held in Nairobi, 
coordination meetings in regional hubs inside Somalia, 
such as Wajid and Bossaso, bring NGOs together with 
local counterparts and provide information to Nairobi- 
based staff. 
 
¶10.  Somalia's cluster system has faced resistance over 
the past year.  The Somalia Support Secretariat (SSS), 
formerly the Somalia Aid Coordination Body (SACB), had 
been facilitating sector coordination among 
international and local NGOs, UN agencies, and IOs 
since the early 1990s.  Health, as the largest sector, 
has a dedicated chairperson to facilitate meetings, 
ensure information flow between stakeholders, prepare 
contingency plans, and act as the focal person for 
emergency planning and response.  The introduction of 
UN clusters, which initially paralleled SACB 
activities, created frustration and stress due to 
duplicative meetings, repetitive agendas, and the 
perceived lack of capacity among some lead agencies and 
cluster chairpersons. 
 
¶11.  Some of the clusters immediately incorporated 
existing working groups, such as the nutrition and 
water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) clusters both led 
by UNICEF.  Following an initial cumbersome separation 
of emergent WASH issues from recovery and development 
focused activities, one integrated group now addresses 
the full spectrum of water, sanitation, and hygiene 
 
NAIROBI 00000828  003.2 OF 005 
 
 
needs and responses.  The WASH cluster was very 
effective during the 2005-2006 drought period, 
outlining coherent response plans at that critical 
time. 
 
¶12.  The nutrition cluster has strengthened early 
warning mechanisms with the aid of a former FAO Food 
Security Analysis Unit (FSAU) nutrition surveillance 
officer seconded as cluster chair to UNICEF.  The 
cluster has standardized protocols in malnutrition 
management and nutrition survey procedures, increased 
the number of supplemental and therapeutic feeding 
programs throughout Somalia, and continues to map 
nutrition focused interventions and analyze gaps in 
coverage. 
 
¶13.  The livelihoods cluster has integrated the 
existing SSS food security working group to address 
agriculture, livestock, and fishery issues.  While the 
livelihoods cluster had developed and facilitated an 
emergency response plan for drought-affected regions of 
Somalia, they have been much slower to respond to Rift 
Valley fever in recent weeks.  The cluster adequately 
shared information on the situation, but FAO, as the 
cluster lead, has been slow to operationalize 
significant responses. 
 
¶14.  The protection cluster, led by UNHCR, has 
successfully raised the profile of protection issues 
within the humanitarian community.  Initiatives include 
a protection monitoring network, population movement 
tracking, and a focus on IDPs including an IDP 
profiling exercise.  While the protection cluster has 
focused on gap analysis and coordination, operational 
response efforts have been minimal.  However, the 
heightened profile of IDPs has resulted in 
prioritization of IDP needs in the 2007 UN Consolidated 
Appeals Process (CAP). 
 
¶15.  The health cluster is probably the weakest and 
least effective cluster in Somalia.  WHO, the health 
cluster lead, has limited technical expertise to 
address, coordinate, and implement health-related 
activities beyond polio eradication and health 
information systems.  Additionally, high turnover of 
cluster chairpersons has resulted in poor continuity of 
leadership. 
 
¶16.  NGOs have been critical of WHO's decision not to 
integrate the health cluster into the existing SSS 
health sector committee.  WHO has instead maintained 
parallel meetings that duplicate SSS health committee 
meeting agendas.  Attendance at WHO cluster meetings 
tapered significantly after the first few months and 
the two entities eventually merged in late 2006 under 
the direction of an SSS health chairperson.  While WHO 
is still the cluster lead agency, in reality the SSS 
health sector chairperson leads the health cluster, and 
WHO has minimal representation in this forum. 
 
OCHA ASSESSMENT OF THE CLUSTER SYSTEM IN SOMALIA 
 
¶17.  OCHA Somalia conducted an in-country self 
assessment of the cluster system in October 2006 and 
noted wide variation in cluster performance.  Most 
clusters have avoided duplicating drought-focused 
relief efforts through mapping agency activities, 
 
NAIROBI 00000828  004.2 OF 005 
 
 
capacities, and geographic areas of coverage.  OCHA 
concluded that significant overlaps in coverage have 
been reduced due to greater prioritization of 
activities. 
 
¶18.  OCHA Somalia cited weak leadership and poor 
dissemination of cluster lead roles and 
responsibilities.  OCHA also stated that a proper 
analysis of prior coordination mechanisms should have 
preceded adoption of the new cluster approach. 
Recommendations following the assessment call for 
clusters to be led by persons of high caliber, with 
emergency coordination experience, who can draw in a 
wide variety of actors and provide a vision of 
consultative strategies, workplans, and agreed-upon 
indicators and targets. 
 
¶19.  OCHA Somalia also highlighted the sometimes 
antagonistic relationship between NGOs and UN agencies. 
Some UN agencies have adopted patronizing positions, 
viewing NGOs as the implementers, thereby compromising 
the spirit of partnership.  Also, NGOs often prefer not 
to be closely associated with the UN to avoid blurring 
the distinction between political and humanitarian 
agendas.  OCHA Somalia noted a need to address the 
roles of UN and local and international NGOs, while 
maintaining equity and respect for the autonomy of 
individual agencies. 
 
¶20.  Local and international NGOs can include emergency 
projects for funding through the CAP process; they can 
also apply for project funding through the OCHA 
Humanitarian Response Fund (HRF).  The cluster lead 
agencies are requesting that NGOs channel not only CAP 
and HRF projects for review and endorsement, but also 
NGO projects that receive direct donor support outside 
the CAP and HRF process.  For some NGOs there is little 
advantage in accessing funding through the cluster 
system, especially if they are able to secure funds 
directly from donors.  In addition, NGOs have strong 
feelings of neutrality and independence that cannot be 
overshadowed by participation in the UN cluster system 
or accessing funds through the UN system. 
 
¶21.  According to OCHA Somalia, direct donor funding to 
NGOs without endorsement of NGO proposals from the 
relevant cluster signals less than full donor support 
for the cluster mechanism.  OCHA Somalia recommends 
evaluating the role of donors and funding mechanisms to 
identify a solution that is acceptable to all parties. 
 
¶22.  Lastly, the assessment reviewed field-level 
coordination.  OCHA Somalia observed that despite 
improvements in field-level coordination with the 
cluster approach, a disconnect still exists between 
Nairobi and the field.  OCHA Somalia noted that 
insecurity and poor access to certain locations in 
Somalia contribute to this issue.  Because of years of 
insecurity in Somalia, the substantial humanitarian 
community serving Somalis is largely based in Nairobi. 
 
¶23.  OCHA Somalia determined that the cluster system is 
viable, but that it is too early in the ongoing 
learning process to make final conclusions regarding 
overall effectiveness. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
NAIROBI 00000828  005.2 OF 005 
 
 
 
¶24.  The cluster approach in Somalia has received mixed 
reviews, as identified by OCHA's assessment, USAID's 
Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) 
discussions with NGO partners, and direct observations 
by USAID officers.  OCHA highlighted significant areas 
of concern, however, some of the critical issues could 
be resolved if recommendations highlighted in the OCHA 
self-assessment are adopted. 
 
¶25.  OFDA has seen significant improvement in multi- 
sector coordination, the formation of strategic plans, 
and gap analysis, with greater NGO involvement from 
Nairobi and the field since the inception of the 
cluster system.  The nutrition and WASH clusters, and 
to some extent the livelihoods cluster, have had a 
significant positive impact on information sharing, 
coordination, planning, and initiating appropriate 
responses during the 2006 drought and recent flood 
crisis.  However, the health and livelihoods clusters' 
response to Rift Valley fever in southern Somalia has 
been less impressive, in part due to ongoing insecurity 
in affected areas, but also due to insufficient 
contingency planning by cluster leads. 
 
¶26.  OFDA's greatest concern relating to the cluster 
system is WHO's ability to lead the health cluster, as 
its ability to perform this task at the Somalia country 
level is questionable.  Unless WHO expands its in- 
country technical capacity to coordinate at the field 
level, strengthens disease surveillance, and recruits a 
cluster chairperson to facilitate a strategic plan with 
indicators and benchmarks, health sector coordination 
should be managed by the SSS.  UNICEF, with greater 
operational capacity and historically a leader in 
health sector coordination, could provide additional 
input and support. 
 
¶27.  Donor support for the cluster approach needs to be 
addressed by the wider UN and donor community.  It is 
not feasible to mandate that donors only fund 
implementing partners through the cluster system, as 
not all clusters have the technical or programmatic 
expertise to provide objective feedback and funding 
recommendations.  There is also a clear risk of 
conflict of interest, with UN agencies acting as 
cluster lead, program implementer, and donor, for the 
UN cluster leads to process international NGO funding 
proposals. 
 
¶28.  The role of OCHA as monitor for cluster 
performance is of concern, and OFDA recommends that 
OCHA implement a mechanism to address non-performing 
cluster leads.  The DART will continue to participate 
in key cluster meetings and facilitate the flow of 
information on critical issues as they arise, and 
continue to provide feedback to OCHA on cluster 
performance issues. 
 
RANNEBERGER