VZCZCXRO7519
RR RUEHDE RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHNR #0759/01 0451244
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 141244Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7502
INFO RUCNSOM/SOMALIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHRN/USMISSION UN ROME 0094
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CJTF HOA
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 NAIROBI 000759 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AIDAC 
 
USAID/DCHA FOR MHESS, WGARVELINK, LROGERS 
DCHA/OFDA FOR KLUU, GGOTTLIEB, AFERRARA, ACONVERY, 
CGOTTSCHALK, KCHANNELL 
DCHA/FFP FOR WHAMMINK, JDWORKEN 
AFR/AFR/EA FOR JBORNS 
STATE FOR AF/E AND PRM 
STATE/AF/E FOR NGARY 
STATE/F FOR ASISSON 
STATE/PRM FOR AWENDT, MMCKELVEY 
NSC FOR TSHORTLEY 
USUN FOR TMALY 
BRUSSELS FOR PLERNER 
GENEVA FOR NKYLOH 
USMISSION UN ROME FOR RNEWBERG 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: EAID PREF PHUM PREL SO
SUBJECT:  SOMALIA DART SITUATION REPORT #14 
 
REF:  NAIROBI 00523 
 
NAIROBI 00000759  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
SUMMARY 
 
¶1.  As the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) 
expands its administrative reach in southern and 
central Somalia, humanitarian agencies have begun to 
engage with relevant TFG ministries and Transitional 
Federal Institutions (TFIs).  USAID's implementing 
partners in Somalia interact with local, regional, and 
federal level TFG institutions to varying degrees, with 
the UN agencies having the most direct communications. 
USAID is encouraging all partners to continue to engage 
the TFIs in the development and implementation of 
humanitarian relief activities.  End Summary. 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
¶2.  With the ousting of the Council of Islamic Courts 
(CIC) in December, humanitarian agencies have adapted 
to work with the new local, regional, and federal 
governance structures as the TFG expands its influence 
throughout southern and central Somalia. 
 
¶3.  This cable reviews the status of humanitarian 
agencies' engagement with the TFIs in southern and 
central Somalia and the challenges of the new 
relationships. 
 
COORDINATION WITH THE TFIS 
 
¶4.  All non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
implementing development and relief programs in Somalia 
interact with district and regional authorities who 
provide some degree of governance, guidance, and 
security at the community level.  Prior to the 
expansion of TFG presence in southern and central 
Somalia, these local governing bodies were under the 
control of either the TFG, the prevailing warlord, or 
until recently, the CIC. 
 
¶5.  NGOs have historically interacted with these local 
governing bodies that assist them with issues such as 
recruitment, procurement (especially vehicle hire), 
security, program development, and beneficiary 
selection.  USAID's Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster 
Assistance (OFDA) partners report that in former CIC- 
held districts and regions, the TFG has appointed or 
selected new district and regional governing officers 
and resurrected dormant district councils. 
 
¶6.  UN agencies have taken the lead in interfacing with 
TFIs; often acting as the main interlocutor between 
NGOs and technical ministries, playing a key role in 
coordinating policies, guidelines, and protocols with 
TFIs such as the Ministry of Water and Natural 
Resources, the Ministry of Health, and the Ministry of 
Forestry, Livestock, and Range. 
 
¶7.  According to USAID partner NGOs, there is no formal 
TFI-NGO coordination mechanism in place at the national 
or regional levels outside of Mogadishu and Baidoa. 
NGOs have raised the issue with the Nairobi-based NGO 
consortium, which they hope will be able to formalize 
communication channels between them and the TFIs, 
rather than relying on existing UN links to the TFIs. 
 
¶8.  The Nairobi-based Somali Support Secretariat (SSS), 
formerly known as the Somalia Aid Coordination Body 
 
NAIROBI 00000759  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
(SACB), has served as the main coordinating entity 
linking UN agencies, NGOs, and donors with the relevant 
Somali ministries over the past several years. 
However, the UN agencies are now directly interacting 
with TFIs in Baidoa and Mogadishu because some 
operational UN agencies are planning to expand their 
in-country presence once the security situation 
stabilizes.  This proposed expansion is part of the 
UN's strategy to provide greater support to the 
fledgling TFIs. (REFTEL) 
 
AID AGENCIES ENDEAVOR TO WORK WITH TFIS 
 
¶9.  USAID canvassed its Somalia UN and NGO partners to 
determine how they are working with TFIs.  The 
following are several examples: 
 
--In Huddor and Dinsor districts of Bakool Region, 
USAID NGO partner International Medical Corps (IMC) 
works with district councils on hiring, project 
location selection, and office and vehicle rental.  IMC 
reports that most of these interactions (with old and 
new officers) appear to be motivated by personal gain. 
 
--USAID's partner Adventist Development and Relief 
Agency (ADRA) is operational in Bulo Burte, Hiraan 
Region, and reports that the district council there is 
requiring NGOs to register their guards' weapons, 
obtain weapon permits, and receive security clearance 
for staff movement.  Outside of these new requirements, 
ADRA has minimal engagement with local TFG authorities, 
and ADRA believes this is because the local 
administration is focused on maintaining security in 
the district. 
 
--Action Contre la Faim (ACF) operates in Wajid 
District of Bakool Region and reported that they have 
had no contact with the TFIs at the operational level, 
their primary point of contact is the Wajid district 
council and district commissioner.  ACF has seen no 
change in their relations with the newly TFG-appointed 
district and regional administration since the TFG's 
expansion. 
 
--The UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) has established an 
operational relationship with the Ministry of Water and 
Natural Resources (MWNR).  UNICEF liaises with this 
ministry in Nairobi and Baidoa, Bay Region, and plans 
to work with it to establish policies, guidelines, and 
protocols based on structures already in place under 
the SSS and UN cluster system.  UNICEF plans to provide 
office space, supplies, and equipment to support the 
MWNR.  UNICEF has found that the MWNR in southern 
Somalia has good technical capacity. 
 
--UNICEF also works with the Ministry of Health (MOH) 
and shares work plans for health and nutrition 
programs, operating procedures, and guidelines for 
nutrition and primary health programs.  According to 
UNICEF, the MOH has limited technical capacity and has 
not demonstrated the ability to develop its own 
policies, standards, and guidelines.  However, UNICEF 
plans to support the MOH with office equipment, 
supplies, and provide technical assistance on health 
policy issues. 
 
--In responding to the outbreak in Rift Valley fever 
(RVF), many NGOs and UN agencies were active in 
spreading public health messages, identifying possible 
 
NAIROBI 00000759  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
human and livestock cases, as well as collecting 
samples.  On January 29, the Ministry of Livestock, 
Forestry, and Range announced that all future RVF 
interventions must receive their approval before being 
implemented in Somalia.  World Vision noted that after 
this announcement they decided to defer a proposal for 
possible RVF interventions. 
 
--The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs (OCHA) has regular contact with the TFG at the 
ministerial level, either by telephone or in person in 
Nairobi or Somalia.  OCHA will work with whichever 
ministry or authority is relevant for the issue at 
hand.  For example, during the flooding in 2006 it 
worked with a flood committee set up under the Ministry 
of Finance.  For issues in Mogadishu, it works with the 
mayor.  OCHA also said that the UN Resident Coordinator 
Eric LaRoche frequently speaks with Prime Minster Gedi 
on a variety of issues, and occasionally with President 
Yusuf.  (The OCHA head, an Italian national, noted that 
he sometimes speaks with Yusuf himself since the 
President is fluent in Italian.) 
 
¶10.  The level of engagement with TFIs and TFG local 
and regional authorities varies from region to region. 
Local governing administrations are not yet engaged in 
issues beyond their immediate security agenda, and some 
newly appointed governing officers merely see NGOs as a 
means of personal gain.  NGOs have not had significant 
access to TFIs, especially those that are not 
operational.  UN agencies have had a greater level of 
interaction with relevant TFIs and expect increased 
levels of engagement in the coming weeks. 
 
CHALLENGES FOR AID AGENCIES 
 
¶11.  The TFG-appointed local administrations are 
focused on maintaining security in their districts and 
do not have the capacity to effectively link with 
Baidoa or Mogadishu-based TFIs to address technical 
issues related to health, nutrition, agriculture, 
livestock, natural resources, or other sectors. 
 
¶12.  NGOs voiced willingness to work closely with local 
administrations but most are taking a pragmatic stance, 
waiting to see how much control TFG-appointed local 
governing bodies have in maintaining security, 
implementing basic governing procedures, and whether or 
not the Baidoa or Mogadishu-based TFIs can develop a 
presence at the district and regional levels. 
 
¶13.  Another challenge for humanitarian agencies has 
been the constant flux in authorities due to the 
evolving political situation in Somalia.  There is some 
frustration that just when they seem to be establishing 
a good working relationship (which takes time in 
Somalia) the authorities are changed and they need to 
start again. 
 
¶14.  NGOs are also confronted with the need to 
differentiate between local and national authorities, 
which do not necessarily agree on issues affecting the 
NGOs.  Dealing with issues such as where to work, what 
type of programming is needed, who to hire for 
transportation, and many others, NGOs often get stuck 
between differing perspectives.  This is one reason the 
NGOs have developed a pragmatic, localized approach 
that has mirrored Somalia's patchwork governance 
structure. 
 
NAIROBI 00000759  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
 
¶15.  USAID encourages its implementing partners to 
continue to engage with district and regional TFG 
governing bodies and develop mechanisms for inclusion 
of TFI participation in humanitarian aid efforts. 
 
RANNEBERGER