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FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
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INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NAIROBI 000628 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR AF/E AND INR/AA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KE KISL PGOV SOCI
SUBJECT: POLITICS & RELIGIOUS IDENTITY IN KENYA 
 
REF: A. NAIROBI 424 
     ¶B. 06 NAIROBI 5388 
     ¶C. 06 NAIROBI 5393 
     ¶D. 06 NAIROBI 5112 
 
Note: Reftels discuss ethnicity and politics in Kenya.  End 
Note. 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: We estimate Kenya's religious demographics 
at 80 percent Christian, 10 percent Muslim and 10 percent 
followers of traditional African religions and other faiths. 
In the past, significant numbers of Kenyan voters have 
responded to appeals by their religious leaders to rise above 
ethnic identity in support of political positions of their 
faith community.  Religious identity over time erodes the 
overwhelming influence of ethnicity on Kenyan politics. 
Signs of increasing tensions over political issues between 
Kenya's Christian majority and small, but vocal, Muslim 
minority are cause for concern.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) While estimates of Kenya's religious demographics 
vary widely, our close examination of the best available 
population data indicates a split of 80 percent Christian, 10 
percent Muslim and 10 percent followers of traditional 
African religions and other faiths.  Attempts to organize 
explicitly Christian and Muslim political parties have not 
succeeded.  Political mobilization is typically accomplished 
through ethnic and regional identities.  Certain religious 
leaders and organizations have notable political influence 
concerning specific issues and so are courted by politicians. 
 
 
¶3. (SBU) The Inter-Religious Council of Kenya brings together 
Christian, Muslim and Hindu leaders, but has a very limited 
public profile, seldom commenting on current affairs.  At the 
local level, religious leaders of various faiths and 
denominations often work together to address common issues of 
concern, such as calming ethnic or religious tensions. 
 
Muslim Kenya: Divided ethnically, regionally and politically 
 
¶4. (SBU)  Estimates of Kenya's Muslim population range as low 
as 8 percent and as high as 25 percent.  We are convinced 
that 10 percent is the most accurate estimate.  The Muslim 
population consists of four ethnic/regional divisions, 
discussed below.  These four divisions normally unite over 
specific issues of Islamic identity, but otherwise go their 
own way politically. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Coastal Muslims make up approximately 60 percent of 
Kenya's Muslim population and 6 percent of Kenya's overall 
population.  They account for approximately 50 percent of the 
population of Coast province.  This community is ethnically 
mixed and divided amongst competing sects and tendencies. 
These various ethnicities, sects and tendencies usually unite 
over issues of common concern, although they contend against 
one another for leadership positions in mosques and Muslim 
associations.  Coastal Muslims dominate leadership positions 
in Kenya's two main Muslim associations, the Supreme Council 
of Kenyan Muslims (SUPKEM) and the Council of Imams and 
Preachers of Kenya (CIPK). 
 
¶6. (SBU) The Kenyan Somali population, centered on North East 
province but with a substantial Nairobi-based component, 
accounts for about 20 percent of Kenya's Muslim population 
and 2 percent of Kenya's overall population.  They are 
overwhelmingly Sunni and have both a traditionalist/Sufi camp 
and a Wahabist/radical camp.  Of the 10 percent of top 
government positions held by Muslims, Somalis predominate. 
 
¶7. (SBU) The Borana (Oromo) and the closely related Orma and 
Gabra make up another division of Kenya's Muslim community. 
These Cushitic peoples live in remote and sparsely populated 
north central Kenya.  Their communities include a significant 
minority of Christians and traditionalists.  They make up 
about 10 percent of Kenya's Muslim population and about 1 
percent of Kenya's overall population.  They tend not to 
identify closely with fellow Muslims from elsewhere in Kenya, 
due largely to their isolation.  They are heterodox in their 
Islamic beliefs and practices, mixing many elements of 
traditional belief. 
 
¶8. (SBU) The final 10 percent of Kenya's Muslim community 
consists of small Muslim minorities among the predominantly 
Christian Kamba, Kikuyu, Luo, Luhya, Kalenjin, and Rendille, 
among others.  It also includes Nairobi's Nubian community 
(Sudanese origin) and Muslim members of the South Asian 
community outside Coast province.  Also included here are 
Kenya's Ismaili Muslim community, which is small, but 
influential due to its charitable activities and strong 
 
NAIROBI 00000628  002 OF 003 
 
 
presence in Kenyan commerce and media (the Nation group). 
The Ismailis are a moderate branch of Shi'a Islam led by a 
hereditary imam, the "Aga Khan." 
 
¶9. (SBU) Given the ethnic and regional cleavages noted above, 
no Muslim religious leader commands national influence among 
all Kenyan Muslims.  The two most influential leaders are 
Professor Abdul Ghafar Busaidy, Chairman of SUPKEM, and 
Sheikh Mohammed Dor, Organizing Secretary of CIPK.  They are 
both from Coast province and so have little influence with 
Somalis in North East province or Boranas in Eastern province 
and only limited influence with Nairobi's Muslim community. 
 
 
¶10. (SBU) The Muslim leadership attempts to mobilize the 
Muslim community around certain key issues, such as 
preservation of "Khadi courts" (courts that decide issues of 
personal status according to Shari'a law) and opposition to 
some anti-terrorism measures (claimed to be discriminatory). 
This mobilization is fairly effective on the coast, somewhat 
less so in Nairobi and generally ineffective elsewhere. 
Kenyan Muslims often complain of harassment by security 
officials on false suspicions of holding "terrorist 
connections" or sympathies.  SUPKEM and CIPK, along with a 
host of smaller, more radical groups, and Muslim NGOs (which 
receive substantial support from donors in Arab countries), 
often hold rallies to protest perceived anti-Muslim 
international events, such as conflict in the Middle East or 
recent events in Somalia.  The United States is almost always 
cited during these demonstrations for various alleged 
anti-Muslim offenses. 
 
¶11. (SBU) SUPKEM at times makes demands on the government to 
address specific issues, and threatens to withhold support 
should these demands not be met.  Past practice, however, 
indicates that, as concerns electoral politics, Muslim voters 
listen more to their ethnic and regional community leaders 
than to their religious leaders.  Normally, all candidates 
contesting elections in Muslim majority districts are 
Muslims. 
 
Christian Kenya: Organizing for Coordinated Engagement 
 
¶12. (SBU) Kenyan official national identity is largely 
Christian.  Kenyan national public events typically open and 
close with a Christian prayer and include Christian 
references throughout the ceremony, without a nod to fellow 
Kenyans who follow other faiths.  Major political figures are 
publicly favored by specific church leaders.  Christian 
leaders regularly speak out on political issues.  Most church 
leaders do not hesitate to instruct their flocks on how to 
vote.  It is common practice for ministers to yield their 
pulpit to favored politicians during worship services. 
Certain Christian leaders are able to attract larger and more 
enthusiastic crowds of supporters than can any of Kenya's 
political leaders. 
 
¶13. (SBU) Roughly 58 percent of Kenyan Christians are 
Protestant and the remaining 42 percent are Catholics (the 
single largest Christian denomination in Kenya present 
throughout the country).  The most prestigious and 
influential Protestant churches are the Presbyterians, the 
Anglicans, the Methodists and the African Inland Church.  The 
Baptists also have a substantial following.  Of growing 
importance, especially in cities, are the large number of 
small independent Pentecostal and "revivalist" churches. 
 
¶14. (SBU) Of the 18 most influential Christian leaders in 
Kenya (all denominations), seven are Kikuyu and two others 
are from the closely related Embu and Meru communities. 
Thus, while the Kikuyu/Embu/Meru make up 32 percent of 
Kenya's population, they account for 50 percent of top 
Christian leaders. 
 
¶15. (SBU) The Catholic hierarchy in Kenya is widely perceived 
to be pro-government (President Kibaki is Catholic), despite 
the opposition of the Catholic Episcopal Conference to the 
government's draft constitution (see below).  Catholic 
Archbishop Okoth of Kisumu is widely considered a supporter 
of fellow ethnic Luo Raila Odinga, a prominent opposition 
leader. 
 
¶16. (SBU) There are three main Christian interdenominational 
organizations in Kenya.  The National Council of Churches of 
Kenya (NCCK) brings together all the mainline Protestant 
churches.  The NCCK was considered anti-Government during the 
Moi era.  NCCK leaders were outspoken on human rights issues 
and at the forefront of the movement for multiparty 
democracy.  Today, NCCK is not clearly identified as pro- or 
anti-government, although several former NCCK leaders now 
 
NAIROBI 00000628  003 OF 003 
 
 
serve in senior posts in the Kibaki administration.  The 
Evangelical Alliance of Kenya (EAK) was prominently 
pro-government in the Moi era.  Among its member churches is 
the African Inland Church, of which Moi is a staunch member. 
EAK took the position during Moi's rein that churches should 
stay out of politics.  These days, EAK leaders join NCCK 
leaders and the Catholic Episcopal Conference in advocating 
certain political positions while not identifying with a 
particular party.  The Organization of African Independent 
Churches (OAIC) does not engage in political activity, 
although some of its member churches do.  The OAIC represents 
independent African churches, mostly of a strongly 
charismatic bent. 
 
¶17. (SBU) A perceived threat from Kenya's small but vocal 
Muslim community is the greatest spur to interdenominational 
Christian political activism in Kenya.  During the run up to 
the November 2005 national referendum on the draft 
constitution, the NCCK, EAK and the Catholic Episcopal 
Conference all publicly opposed the draft constitution on the 
grounds that it included provisions for "Khadi Courts" to 
rule on personal status questions for Muslims.  They objected 
that the constitution should not provide institutions for one 
religious community denied to others.  While Kenya's 
Protestant and Catholic leaders had worked together to 
promote reconciliation among warring ethnic communities, they 
had not previously collaborated on a national political 
issue.  "The Christian vote" played a major part in the 
success of the anti-draft constitution forces in the 
referendum vote.  The concerns regarding the Muslim community 
that led to the political position of the Christian churches 
during the referendum vote have not dissipated. 
 
Traditional Kenya & Others:  Not Politically Engaged 
 
¶18. (SBU)  About 10 percent of Kenyans are adherents of 
traditional African religions.  They are found in small 
numbers among nearly all of Kenya's ethnic communities.  They 
are not formally organized and have very little public voice 
and practically no political influence. 
 
¶19. (SBU) Kenya's Hindu and Sikh communities possess 
prominent places of worship in Nairobi and Mombasa, but their 
numbers are very small relative to the general population 
(less than one-half of one percent).  They are, however, 
politically influential out of proportion to their numbers 
due to their strong presence in Kenyan commerce and habit of 
financing Kenyan politicians.  Kenya also has a Baha'i 
community (about 100,000 members) and a Jewish community 
(about 100 Kenyans and 300 expatriate members), neither of 
which engages in politics. 
 
Comment: Religious Identity Contributes toward the Slow 
Erosion of the Ethnic Factor in Kenyan Politics 
 
¶20. (SBU) In the past, significant numbers of Kenyan voters 
have responded to appeals by their religious leaders to rise 
above ethnic identity in support of political positions of 
their faith community.  Religious identity over time erodes 
the overwhelming influence of ethnicity on Kenyan politics. 
 
¶21. (SBU) Signs of increasing tensions over political issues 
between Kenya's Christian majority and Muslim minority are 
cause for concern.  The government is regularly accused by 
SUPKEM leaders of possessing an anti-Muslim bias while 
Christian leaders often complain of government "pandering" to 
the Muslim leadership.  Kenyan society would be well served 
by a more activist Inter-Religious Council of Kenya to 
promote peaceful coexistence and mutual understanding.  We 
will advocate a more proactive stance by the Inter-Religious 
Council during our discussions with its leadership. 
RANNEBERGER