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Viewing cable 07MADRID296, SPAIN: DISAGREEMENT ON DSP-83 SIGNING AUTHORITY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07MADRID296 2007-02-16 16:53 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Madrid
VZCZCXRO0438
PP RUEHLA
DE RUEHMD #0296 0471653
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 161653Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY MADRID
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1892
INFO RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHLA/AMCONSUL BARCELONA 2455
UNCLAS MADRID 000296 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR PM/DDTC - ANN GANZER 
OSD FOR AT&L/INT'L COOPERATION - SETH WILSON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: MASS ETTC PREL SP
SUBJECT: SPAIN: DISAGREEMENT ON DSP-83 SIGNING AUTHORITY 
 
 
1. SUMMARY:  MOD is concerned because Spain's $1.2 billion 
program to sell frigates to the Norwegian navy is being 
delayed by an inability to reconcile US and Spanish technical 
legal requirements regarding signature of end-user 
nontransfer documents.  Post requests DDTC guidance on how to 
move forward. See action request paragraph six. END SUMMARY. 
 
2. Lockheed Martin and the Spanish shipbuilder Navantia have 
a $1.2 billion program to build frigates for the Norwegian 
navy.  This program, based on Spain's advanced new F-100 
class frigate and including US combat systems technology, has 
been brought to a temporary halt by DDTC's inability to 
process a DSP-83 (Nontransfer and Use Certificate) because an 
authorized representative of the Government of Spain (G0S) 
has not signed in block 8. 
 
3. In this case, the signed DSP-83 is a pre-requisite for an 
amendment (TA 1437-98H) to the existing Technical Assistance 
Agreement between Lockheed Martin and Navantia. This 
amendment is required as a result of a corporate name change. 
 This issue has surfaced because in the case of TA 1437-98H, 
the end user of the technical data to be transferred is a 
non-government entity and the signature of Spanish Government 
representative in block 8 is required by the ITAR.  MOD says 
that the person (MOD's National Industrial Security 
Authority) who signed the DSP-83 for the original TAA was not 
authorized to sign such a form. 
 
4. In lieu of signing block 8 of the DSP-83, MOD issued its 
own End Use Certificate, signed by MOD's Director General of 
Armament and Material (DGAM), in accordance with pertinent 
Spanish legislation - Royal Decree 1782/2004. MOD asserts 
that the DGAM is the only GOS representative authorized to 
sign an End Use Certificate on behalf of the GOS and that he 
is legally restricted to using only the designated GOS End 
Use Certificate that is included as an Annex to the Royal 
Decree. MOD says that the DGAM would exceed his legal 
authority by signing any form (e.g., a DSP-83) other than the 
one included in the Royal Decree (NOTE: Post has e-mailed a 
translation of the Royal Decree to DDTC.). 
 
5. MOD contends that the language of its End Use Certificate 
satisfies the protections required by the ITAR.  Until now, 
MOD has submitted its own End Use Certificate in lieu of 
signing block 8 of the DSP-83 because in past cases, the end 
user of the material/data to be transferred was a government 
entity. Therefore, the signature of the end-user in block 7 
was sufficient and the fact that the Spanish Government 
attached its own End Use Certificate Spanish was irrelevant 
to the USG. The GOS, however, understood that its End Use 
Certificate was being accepted in lieu of signing block 8. 
MOD is aware of the option offered by the ITAR to use an 
exchange of dip notes in place of signing a DSP-83.  MOD, 
however, notes that the GOS's end user certificate is legally 
binding, thus offering greater legal assurance than a dip 
note. 
 
6. ACTION REQUEST:  The broader issues raised by this case 
could be addressed by the Export Controls Working Group of 
Declaration of Principles when the group meets in May 2007. 
However, a near-term solution is needed to avoid Lockheed 
Martin and Navantia incurring serious contract penalties as a 
result of the work stoppage and to avoid disrupting the Royal 
Norwegian Navy's associated training programs. Post is aware 
that DDTC has developed various work-arounds with other 
European allies that have similar restrictions against 
signing a DSP-83.  Post requests DDTC guidance as to how to 
resolve this impasse with Spain. 
LLORENS