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Viewing cable 07KHARTOUM250, DARFUR - VISIT OF THE USAID/DCHA ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07KHARTOUM250 2007-02-19 15:51 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO1343
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0250/01 0501551
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 191551Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6170
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHRN/USMISSION UN ROME
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000250 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AIDAC 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR AF/SPG, PRM, AND ALSO PASS USAID/W 
USAID FOR DCHA SUDAN TEAM, AFR/SP 
NAIROBI FOR SFO 
NSC FOR PMARCHAM, MMAGAN, AND TSHORTLEY 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
USUN FOR TMALY 
BRUSSELS FOR PLERNER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAID PREF PGOV PHUM SOCI SU AU
SUBJECT: DARFUR - VISIT OF THE USAID/DCHA ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR 
 
 
KHARTOUM 00000250  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
1. (U) From January 20 to 25, USAID Democracy, Conflict, and 
Humanitarian Assistance (USAID/DCHA) Assistant Administrator Michael 
E. Hess visited Sudan.  Hess and six USAID/Sudan staff members 
traveled to North and South Darfur to gain a better understanding of 
the current humanitarian, political, and security situation.  In 
both states, Hess visited program sites where beneficiaries receive 
US food aid and access USAID-funded programs that provide economic 
opportunities, conflict-management training, veterinary services, 
shelter materials, and other forms of emergency assistance. 
 
2. (U) USAID partners and other humanitarian organizations expressed 
concern over the deteriorating security situation in Darfur, the 
rising violence against humanitarian workers, and the ever-shrinking 
humanitarian space.  In North Darfur, agencies report that 
humanitarian access to some areas briefly improved in January, 
although many rural areas continued to remain off-limits due to 
insecurity.  In South Darfur, the deteriorating security situation 
is significantly hindering the provision of services to 
beneficiaries.  The December 18 attacks on humanitarian agencies in 
Gereida and the January 19 arrest and assault on humanitarian staff 
in Nyala have left many agencies questioning the viability of 
maintaining a humanitarian presence in South Darfur.  In addition, 
the lack of basic services for the 128,000 internally displaced 
persons (IDPs) in Gereida remains of particularly concern.  End 
summary. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
Windows of Opportunity in North Darfur 
-------------------------------------- 
 
3. (U) On January 22, the USAID team visited El Fasher, North 
Darfur, and met with representatives of the UN Mission in Sudan 
(UNMIS), the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), the UN Office 
for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), and other UN 
agencies.  Each organization highlighted the increasing 
fragmentation of opposition groups and the resulting inability of 
the humanitarian community to gain security guarantees previously 
granted to agencies operating in opposition-held areas. 
 
4. (U) According to humanitarian agencies, security in North Darfur 
briefly improved in January, although many rural areas such as Kutum 
and areas north of Birmaza remain off-limits to humanitarian staff. 
However, agencies report increased access to Birmaza and northeast 
Jebel Marra, which had been inaccessible previously.  Humanitarian 
organizations are currently working to obtain security guarantees 
from opposition leaders before returning to Kutum, following a 
December 8 attack on the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) residence there.  The UN World Health Organization (WHO) 
reported that insecurity has limited the WHO-supported early warning 
system, although the health situation in North Darfur has remained 
relatively stable.  The UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) noted that the 
period of relative security has allowed the agency to work on water 
services in southern and central North Darfur.  UNICEF plans to 
resume a polio vaccination campaign with other NGO and UN partners. 
In addition, in January USAID partner Relief International returned 
to Tawila IDP camp, where the organization provided health services 
to 34,000 IDPs.  (Note:  In early February Relief International 
temporarily withdrew from Tawila due to insecurity, indicating that 
the security situation remains precarious.  End note.) 
 
5. (U) Despite these improvements, insecurity still limits the 
provision of assistance in rural areas.  Some organizations, such as 
the International Rescue Committee (IRC) and GOAL, are now running 
rural programs with local staff; however, this approach reduces an 
agency's ability to effectively monitor and support projects.  Due 
to insecurity, IRC international staff members have not been able to 
access clinics in rural North Darfur since June 2005.  NGOs stated 
that an increased UN presence in rural areas and UN-negotiated 
security guarantees would improve humanitarian access in North 
Darfur. 
 
6. (U) During the visit to El Fasher, the USAID team met with AMIS 
representatives, who stated that a lack of resources constrains 
their ability to conduct patrols.  The current AMIS protection force 
consists of 5,207 personnel to cover a 53,000-square-kilometer area. 
 AMIS is also attempting to undertake "quick-impact" humanitarian 
assistance projects, but currently lacks adequate funds.  Hess 
stressed to the AMIS representatives that the careful coordination 
 
KHARTOUM 00000250  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
of these projects with NGOs and donors is necessary. 
 
---------------- 
Enough is Enough 
---------------- 
 
7. (U) In Nyala, the USAID team met with representatives of UNMIS, 
OCHA, the UN Country Team, and partner NGOs.    Agencies reported 
that security and humanitarian access in South Darfur since the end 
of the rainy season has deteriorated to unacceptable levels, placing 
significant limits on the provision of humanitarian services. 
Increased conflict between Arab ethnic groups in South Darfur has 
also resulted in decreased humanitarian access in southern South 
Darfur and increased displacement.  Since September 2006, 
approximately 50,000 new IDPs have arrived in Otash camp near Nyala 
due to fighting south of Buram, and OCHA believes that approximately 
50,000 IDPs may still remain near the area of conflict.  However, 
OCHA reports that even with heightened insecurity in South Darfur, 
the humanitarian situation remains relatively stable, with no known 
health crises. 
 
8. (U) In South Darfur, NGO staff members feel a deepening 
disrespect for humanitarian space by both opposition leaders and the 
Sudanese government.  Direct violence against staff members has 
dramatically raised the threat level.  NGOs are highly concerned 
about the January 19 incident in which government security officials 
arrested and severely beat 20 international and Sudanese staff 
members attending a social gathering at an NGO compound in Nyala. 
Although NGOs are increasing coordination with substantial support 
from OCHA, many NGOs are unsure of how to continue assistance in the 
current security environment and are questioning whether they will 
be able to maintain humanitarian programs in the state.  On January 
29, Medecins du Monde (Doctors of the World) announced the 
discontinuation of their operation in Darfur, due to the mounting 
level of violence against humanitarian workers. 
 
9. (U) Due to its population size, Gereida IDP camp remains a 
particular challenge for aid agencies.  Following the December 
incident, more than 70 aid workers relocated and most humanitarian 
organizations suspended their programs.  ICRC is currently the only 
organization maintaining normal operations in Gereida.  USAID 
partner American Refugee Committee (ARC) continues to operate its 
clinic in Gereida camp with local staff.  Of the 170,000 people in 
South Darfur who did not receive food assistance in January, 
approximately 123,000 individuals were in Gereida, according to WFP. 
 WFP reports that 70 metric tons of food remains in the Gereida 
warehouses of its partner Action Contre la Faim.  WFP is currently 
seeking Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA) security assurances and 
strong follow-up action in response to the December attacks before 
resuming operations in the camp; however, no such SLA actions have 
occurred to date.  ICRC has agreed to assume responsibility for food 
distribution in the camp as of February 2007. 
 
10. (U) The USAID team met separately with the walis of North and 
South Darfur, who expressed appreciation for USAID's assistance to 
the people of Darfur.  The North Darfur Wali expressed his interest 
in working on reconstruction and rehabilitation, towards 
development, as well as support for the eventual returns of IDPs. 
The South Darfur Wali solicited support in rural areas to encourage 
the return of IDPs, particularly seed and tool distributions. 
 
--------------------- 
Khartoum Perspectives 
--------------------- 
 
11. (SBU) In Khartoum, the USAID team met with the NGO and UN 
leadership, including the head of OCHA and the NGO Steering 
Committee.  NGO representatives echoed the security concerns of 
their field colleagues, adding that insecurity resulting from the 
Chadian conflict has significantly affected humanitarian operations 
in West Darfur.  NGOs report frequent Chadian and Sudanese military 
flyovers in West Darfur, as well as a steady flow of IDPs into the 
Zalingei area of West Darfur as a result of the conflict.  NGO 
leaders are concerned over a perceived Sudanese government attempt 
to assert greater control over IDP camps, indicated by the Norwegian 
Refugee Council's departure from Kalma IDP camp.  NGO 
representatives also reported an escalating Government of Sudan "war 
of attrition" against NGOs in the form of mounting bureaucratic 
impediments selectively applied to NGO operations.  Such impediments 
include burdensome visa and registration requirements as well as 
labor regulations. 
 
 
KHARTOUM 00000250  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
12.  (U) OCHA is working to expand the UN's presence beyond the 
major towns in Darfur to work more closely with NGOs and increase 
the protection of civilians.  The UN also noted that land issues 
remain a concern, estimating that approximately 30 to 40 percent of 
the population may not return to rural areas due to the loss of 
their land. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
13.  OCHA has done an excellent job of providing leadership for NGOs 
and coordinating NGO activities at the country and state level in 
Darfur.  USAID should encourage OCHA's continued coordination with 
NGOs, particularly as these organizations face increasing security 
challenges in Darfur.  In addition, USAID offices working in Darfur 
should expand strategic communication efforts to manage 
beneficiaries' expectations and increase visibility for USAID 
programs.  End comment. 
 
HUME