VZCZCXYZ0002
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKH #0216/01 0450356
ZNR UUUUU ZZH (CCY AD7E4FFD MSI7932 538)
P 140356Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6108
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS KHARTOUM 000216 
 
SIPDIS 
 
C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT) 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, AF/RSA, AND S/CRS 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV KPKO ASEC SOCI AU UN US SU
SUBJECT:  Darfur Security Update, February 8 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary:  UNDSS characterizes the security situation in 
Darfur over the past week as "calm but unpredictable."  The threat 
of carjackings persists, especially in areas with increased Arab 
militia activity, and there remains the possibility of military 
confrontation between Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and non-signatory 
forces in East Jebel Marra.  UNDSS is considering, in consultation 
with the local NGO community, measures to impede future vehicle 
thefts.  End summary. 
 
------------------------- 
Darfur Security Landscape 
------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) In its weekly security briefing on February 8, UN 
Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) officials described 
conditions throughout the region as "calm but unpredictable."  In 
North Darfur, things remain quiet in El Fasher, while Sudanese Armed 
Forces (SAF) continue to maintain a heavy presence in the vicinity 
of Kutum, Kebkabiya, and Mellit.  Tribal fighting near Kebkabiya on 
February 4 resulted in a mobilization of Arab militia, though 
tensions have since dissipated with the intervention of community 
leaders.  In Tawila, friction between SAF and SLA-Minawi elements 
(over police station manning and water point access) led to 
heightened states of alert and low-level confrontations on both 
sides, though their respective leaders have since ordered forces to 
stand down.  (Note:  A February 8 UNDSS ground assessment of Tawila 
concluded that the situation was sufficiently stable for 
humanitarian organizations to continue operating there.  End note.) 
 
 
¶3. (SBU) In South Darfur, UNDSS estimates that the most likely area 
of military activity is East Jebel Marra, where SAF troops have been 
reinforced for a possible attack against SLA-Abdel Wahid elements. 
UNDSS posited that the Sudanese government intends to clear East 
Jebel Marra of all rebel elements in its ongoing effort to control 
this strategic terrain, and advised NGOs to exercise extreme caution 
if operating in the area.  There have also been unconfirmed reports, 
according to UNDSS, of Arab militia movement originating near 
Gereida and heading to North Darfur, which could create tensions as 
the armed group encounters the local and humanitarian communities en 
route.  In separate conversations with S/CRS Poloff, UN officials 
speculated that the Arab militia displacement may be the result of 
high level discussions in Khartoum between Minni Minawi and the Wali 
of South Darfur to resolve the problem; UNDSS also reports that they 
were informed by the National Intelligence and Security Service 
(NISS) that Minawi agreed to withdraw his soldiers within two weeks 
from Gereida and Muhajeria and re-position them in Sudanese 
government-provided camps outside of the two towns. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Near West Darfur, UNDSS highlighted periodic fighting over 
the past ten days in and around Adre on the Chad side of the border. 
 In its daily report, the UN noted that on February 6, Chadian 
National Forces (FANT) engaged Chadian deserters who had joined 
Chadian Armed Opposition Group (CAOG) near Adre.  UNDSS further 
noted that "this is the second act of desertion in a week by the 
Chadian military personnel.  On 2 February 2007, a Chadian army 
Colonel from the Goran tribe deserted the service with an assortment 
of weapons and personnel and joined the rebel groups opposing the 
Chadian Government." 
 
-------------------- 
Carjackings Continue 
-------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) The threat of carjackings continues throughout Darfur and 
the rising incidence of vehicle thefts is further shrinking the 
already narrow humanitarian space.  UNDSS highlighted at least three 
recent attempted or successful carjackings within the previous two 
days, noting that there has been a steady trend of thefts taking 
place within internally displaced person (IDP) camps and inside NGO 
compounds.  Based on its own analysis and input from the NGO 
community, UNDSS assesses that the rise in carjackings is most 
likely attributable to either: (a) armed groups (any affiliation) 
deliberately targeting NGO vehicles to increase their transportation 
capacity, perhaps in advance of renewed military operations; or (b) 
criminal elements or bandits exploiting a security vacuum in many 
parts of Darfur - particularly in IDP camps where there is 
essentially no AMIS presence - for economic gain.  With fewer 
humanitarian agencies operating in the field and using the roads, 
carjackers can no longer wait for the vehicles to come to them; they 
appear to be more willing to break into NGO compounds to access the 
vehicles directly. 
 
¶6. (SBU) In consultation with the humanitarian community, UNDSS is 
considering a variety of means to counter the threat of carjackings. 
 The UN is lobbying AMIS to increase its presence in and around IDP 
camps.  It is also considering the possibility of coordinated "NGO 
convoys" where humanitarian agencies travel together to pre-arranged 
 
destinations within a defined timeframe.  Yet another option 
mentioned during the briefing was installing GPS tracking devices in 
humanitarian organizations' vehicles. (Note:  UNDSS Chief Security 
Advisor Stephen Gluning met February 10 with the humanitarian 
community to discuss measures that might be taken to enhance vehicle 
security while at the same time not stifling humanitarian 
activities.  Additional analysis on carjackings provided septel. 
End note.) 
 
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COMMENT 
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¶7. (SBU) The ever tightening humanitarian space in Darfur has become 
even more constricted with the rise in carjackings targeting NGO 
vehicles, though AMIS and PAE have also been victims.  The most 
obvious implications of increased vehicle theft are a reduction in 
humanitarian agencies' capacity to move in the field and a 
corresponding increase in the transportation capabilities (and 
military capacity) of vehicle snatchers.  Additionally, the rash of 
car thefts - compounded by frequent Sudanese government harassment 
and erratic humanitarian access provided by armed factions - has 
stricken fear in many of the local NGO community, as evidenced by 
shrinking staffs and down-scaled operations.  There are no silver 
bullets to address the problem.  While the AMIS Force Commander 
indicated a willingness to increase patrolling near IDP camps, he 
can only spread his already-stretched Protection Force so far.  NGOs 
continue to engage at the field level with local commanders to 
ensure both access and security, though this mechanism too appears 
increasingly unreliable as areas of control shift and banditry 
swells.  GPS tracking devices, including models that allow remote 
ignition disablement, are an attractive option, but are costly 
(especially for NGOs operating on tight budgets) and susceptible to 
tampering.  A combination of heightened awareness and defensive 
measures (such as convoys or increased AMIS patrolling) may be able 
to mitigate the carjacking threat in the short term, though 
insecurity - whether real or perceived - will continue to disrupt 
the delivery of humanitarian services throughout the region. 
 
HUME