VZCZCXRO7905
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0168/01 0361303
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 051303Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6004
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000168 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PGOV KPKO SOCI AU UN US SU
SUBJECT:  AMIS FORCE COMMANDER REACHES OUT TO DPA NON-SIGNATORIES IN 
WEST DARFUR 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1. (SBU) African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) Force Commander Luke 
Aprezi, accompanied by United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) 
Regional Head of Office, Ceasefire Commission (CFC) participants, 
S/CRS Poloffs, and other members of the international community, met 
February 4 in West Darfur with roughly 120 Justice and Equality 
Movement (JEM) field commanders and soldiers to provide an update on 
AMIS and UN activities, hear the JEM's views, and encourage the 
rebel group to participate in constructive dialogue with AMIS.  JEM 
commanders conveyed their continuing frustration with not having 
sector reps in the CFC, insisted that the second chamber be run 
according to the Ndjamena Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement (HCFA) 
rather than the Darfur Peace agreement (DPA), and requested greater 
humanitarian assistance in Jebel Moon.  The military wing of JEM 
remains firmly aligned with political leader Khalil Ibrahim, and is 
aware of recent efforts in Chad to expand their circle of influence. 
 JEM troops appeared well-disciplined and at ease in their 
mountainous stronghold.  End summary. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
RECONCILING VARYING CEASEFIRE AGREEMENTS 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) AMIS Force Commander (FC) Aprezi, accompanied by the UNMIS 
Head of Office, led a joint AU-UN delegation to Kalgo, West Darfur, 
in the mountainous JEM stronghold of Jebel Moon, to make his first 
face-to-face contact with the rebel leaders, clarify the functioning 
of the CFC, and encourage the JEM to join the peace process.  In his 
opening remarks, Aprezi thanked the JEM for committing to the most 
recent 60-day ceasefire and stressed that he continues to pursue a 
policy of "inclusiveness" in his efforts to stabilize the region. 
He expressed his concern that JEM representative to the CFC General 
Mohamed Bashir pulled out of the body's second chamber, protesting 
JEM's exclusion from the Sector sub-CFCs (septel).  The Force 
Commander repeatedly highlighted that in order for the peace process 
to advance, no side could afford to stick dogmatically to its 
preferred ceasefire arrangement, either the DPA or HCFA.  Aprezi 
further noted that he received the list of JEM and Non-signatory 
Faction (NSF) names nominated for the sector sub-CFCs and would 
deploy these individuals "in the next couple of weeks." 
 
¶3. (SBU) Over the course of the four and half hour meeting, JEM 
members repeatedly sought clarification on the terms of their 
engagement in the second chamber of the CFC.  On the one hand, the 
rebel group conveyed its intense need to have access to AMIS and the 
international community and, on the other hand, insisted that it 
rejected the DPA and would only adhere to the terms of the HCFA. 
(Note:  JEM's objection to participation in the CFC second chamber 
revolves around the body's chairmanship when the Force Commander is 
absent; JEM insists that the second chamber must be heaeed`by the 
European De0uty$Chairman- conskspenp ith HCFA!pr/cddures - wh|eJQr2e{i"(oldsthp Dj(PQedgSm AOQS Dmquvy Fp#m$co}cxe"PmUh*`daf|k$]gimw*"as@|b)QhFQ/$vf AFiQc9,Mez]!Ij19p4mxqqBmdhAarQcTx6r4zocommand er Mohammed Hassan Mohammed declared that his units were 
abiding by the ceasefire, per the instructions of the JEM political 
wing.  (Note:  Commander Mohammed's area of responsibility extends 
from El Geneina in the south to Tine in the north.  End Note.)  He 
demanded that AMIS deploy all JEM representatives to their 
respective sectors "within 48 hours" and that they be paid as soon 
as possible.  The field commander blamed AMIS in part for the 
deterioration in security and the resulting evaporation of 
humanitarian assistance.  AMIS, he contended, appeared to side with 
the Sudanese Government, which continues to support and direct Arab 
militias in the region.  Like other JEM members, Mohammed posited 
that Arab militia activity was intended deliberately to deter 
humanitarian organizations from delivering services in Jebel Moon. 
He countered, though, that the local area was secure and in 
desperate need of assistance, particularly in drilling more 
boreholes for water.  Mohammed pledged to continue protecting those 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) willing to venture into JEM's 
sector.  Aprezi pointed out that not only had the non-signatories 
representatives not received payments, but that AMIS soldiers 
themselves have not been paid for more than four months, which is 
having a demoralizing effect on the peacekeeping force. 
 
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MORE UN, MORE WATER PLEASE 
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KHARTOUM 00000168  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
¶5. (SBU) UNMIS Regional Head of Office Anna-Maria Laurini echoed the 
Force Commander's remarks regarding the necessity for dialogue and 
affirmed that the resolution of the conflict in Darfur remains the 
UN's highest priority.  She urged JEM commanders to take all 
measures to reduce violence so that a viable political track can 
move forward, adding that the arrival next week of UN Special Envoy 
for Darfur Jan Eliasson might re-energize this process. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Several JEM commanders inquired about the status of AU-UN 
collaboration, making it clear in asking their questions that they 
had little faith in AMIS and wanted to see a robust UN force as 
quickly as possible.  Aprezi noted that the two organizations are 
working to implement the Light Support Package and planning for the 
Heavy Support Package.  On the hybrid force, he noted that the AU 
and UN continue to negotiate with the Sudanese Government.  Aprezi 
half-joked that he too wants to wear the blue beret because "the UN 
will pay me more money!" 
 
¶7. (SBU) Underscoring the grim living conditions in Jebel Moon, the 
JEM Humanitarian Affairs Coordinator observed that there was only a 
single hand pump for the roughly 10,500 people living in the area. 
He expressed disappointment with the humanitarian community for not 
having followed through on various promises to commence programs in 
Jebel Moon, and asked that they clearly communicate their intentions 
so that expectations can be managed.  In response to this plea, 
Laurini contacted UN staff in El Geneina and confirmed that there 
was funding for water projects (UNICEF) in the area, though an 
implementing partner had yet to be identified.  She also 
acknowledged the JEM's strong record in ensuring the safety of NGOs 
operating in their sector, but pointed out that the problem was not 
security in Jebel Moon itself but rather banditry and Arab militia 
activity along the road from El Geneina.  On this point, Laurini 
committed to coordinate with the Force Commander about the 
possibility of providing AMIS troop escort to NGOs along the 
Geneina-Jebel Moon road.  Aprezi informed the rebel group that he 
would host a conference with all NGOs in El Fasher within the next 
two weeks to better understand their concerns and improve working 
relations with the humanitarian community. 
 
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COMMENT 
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¶8. (SBU) While the meeting achieved no breakthroughs, it was an 
important symbolic gesture on the Force Commander's behalf, in 
conjunction with the UN, to demonstrate goodwill and accessibility 
to the JEM.  The rebel group, for its part, made few political 
references, other than noting its rejection of the DPA and 
insistence on adhering to the HCFA.  In side conversations, several 
field commanders confirmed that the military wing remains firmly 
aligned with political leader Khalil Ibrahim, and those with whom 
S/CRS Poloff spoke were aware of recent efforts in Chad to expand 
JEM's circle of influence. 
 
¶9. (SBU) JEM field commanders were reluctant to discuss their troop 
strength in the region, but expressed confidence that Jebel Moon was 
firmly under their military control.  The soldiers - wearing an 
assortment of military uniforms - displayed a relatively high level 
of discipline, as indicated by their weapons maintenance and 
handling (mostly small arms, including pistols, AK-47s, G3 rifles, 
and RPGs), local security posture (well-positioned and alert 
sentries) and the organized military formation provided upon the 
arrival of the Force Commander.  No vehicles were present in the 
vicinity of the meeting and field Poloffs did not observe any from 
the helicopter, either when arriving or departing.  Many of the JEM 
commanders spoke English and were university educated; these, in 
particular, were vaguely intrigued with the notion of peace, but 
were more preoccupied with everyday concerns such as improving 
access to water points and protecting the internally displaced 
persons community from further Janjaweed attacks. 
 
POWERS