VZCZCXRO1919
PP RUEHDBU RUEHIK RUEHYG
DE RUEHBUL #0564/01 0511244
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 201244Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6250
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 3671
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 3474

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 000564 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, S/CT, 
EUR/RPM, INR 
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG, 
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN 
OSD FOR SHIVERS 
CENTCOM FOR CSTC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: MARR ASEC NATO PTER PGOV AF
SUBJECT: ANA RETENTION RATES SHOW IMPROVEMENT; MORE WORK 
AHEAD 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary:  For the Afghan National Army to 
grow rapidly to the target strength of 70,000 
personnel by December 2008, traditionally high AWOL 
and attrition rates need to be reduced.  The Afghan 
Ministry of Defense (MOD) and Combined Security 
Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) are working 
hard to lower these rates through a combination of 
financial incentives and implementation of programs 
designed to foster improved morale.  The size of 
training class kandaks (battalions) in basic military 
training has also increased from a low of 600/class in 
January 2006 to 2,000/class in January 2007 with 
further increases being considered.  CSTC-A,s 
Commanding General, MG Durbin has briefed the MOD 
Chief of Army Staff General Bismullah Khan and the MOD 
leadership on the need for increased MOD efforts to 
improve retention rates.  There have recently been 
some signs of success, although work remains to bring 
the rates in line with target figures to reach the 
70,000 goal by December 2008.  Support from Coalition 
partners - in particular in fully meeting the ISAF 
requirement for Operational Mentoring and Liaison 
Teams (OMLTs) - is essential.  End summary. 
 
¶1.  According to CSTC-A statistics, as of January 31 
the assigned number of ANA personnel was 32,285.  This 
includes 2,419 at MOD/General Staff; 1,372 at 
sustaining institutions; 6,818 at intermediate 
commands; and 21,676 in Corps Forces (five Regional 
Combat Corps and Air Corps).  An additional 7,421 
personnel were in initial training, of which the 
majority (6,330) was at Kabul Military Training Center 
(KMTC).  The number of trained ANA present for duty 
was approximately 25,400.  Of these approximately 
2,900 were AWOL and 4,000 were on authorized leave. 
 
AWOL and Present For Duty Rates 
------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU)  AWOL rates for those ANA personnel not 
assigned to Corps Forces commands were negligible, due 
to a combination of factors including living closer to 
home and not being deployed to combat duty.  For the 
Corps Forces, as of January 31, of the 21,676 assigned 
Corps Force personnel, 15,033 were present for duty. 
This included 2,859 AWOL and 2,882 on authorized 
leave.  CSTC-A reports that AWOL rates have dropped 
somewhat for the five regional corps since early 2006, 
with notable improvements in the 201 and 209 Corps. 
Whereas reported AWOLs Army-wide on January 15, 2006 
were 16 percent (3,133 of 19,345), the reported rate 
for January 31, 2007 was 13 percent (2,882 of 21,676). 
(Note: This figure includes a two percent AWOL rate 
for the Air Corps, a unit that was still statistically 
insignificant in January 2006.)  AWOL is defined as 
absent without leave for 60 days or less.  After 60 
days enlisted personnel are dropped from the roles 
while officers are dropped after 30 days.  This is 
reflected in the statistics as a drop in the number of 
assigned personnel.   (Note: The statistics show that 
the Corps Forces assigned strength grew by 2,161 
personnel in the 12 months from January 2006 to 
January 2007 (19,515 to 21,676).  The slow growth in 
Corps Forces was due to a variety of factors including 
attrition, AWOL rates and combat losses, but also to 
an increased emphasis on filling other commands.  In 
particular, the Air  Corps grew from 170 personnel in 
January 2006 to 1,222 in January 2007.  The total 
growth in assigned personnel in the ANA was 5,421 over 
the 12-month period (26,864 to 32,285).  End note.) 
 
¶3. (SBU) Breakdown of AWOL rates by Corps is as 
follows: 
 
KABUL 00000564  002 OF 004 
 
 
 
201 (Northeast): 7 percent 
203 (Southeast): 15 percent 
205 (South): 18 percent 
207 (West): 18 percent 
209 (North): 10 percent 
Air Corps: 2 percent 
 
Present for duty rates were as follows: 
 
201: 83 percent of assigned, 60.4 percent of 
authorized 
203: 74 percent of assigned, 49.9 percent of 
authorized 
205: 66 percent of assigned, 45.6 percent of 
authorized 
207: 62 percent of assigned, 39.6 percent of 
authorized 
209: 78 percent of assigned, 52.4 percent of 
authorized. 
Air Corps: 90 percent of assigned, 38.5 percent of 
authorized. 
 
(Note:  The present for duty percentage is calculated 
against the current authorization numbers for a 
50,000-man force.   Future comparisons against a 
70,000-man ANA would result in a decrease of all 
Present For Duty percentages until additional 
recruitment/deployments catch up.  (Of the 50,000-man 
ANA, approximately 30,000 are designated for the Corps 
Forces; of a 70,000-man ANA, the number would increase 
to approximately 50,000.)  End Note.) 
 
Reasons for Improvement 
----------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) The lower AWOL rates for 209 and particularly 
201 Corps are significant.  Both those corps have been 
in the fight - 201 Corps in the Eastern border area, 
209 Corps in rotation to the South.  For each of 
these corps, two factors have positively impacted 
morale and consequently resulted in lower AWOL rates: 
 
- Effective partnering between the ANA and Coalition 
counterparts (including German OMLTs); 
 
-  Development and implementation of a Red/Amber/Green 
rotation cycle of active duty/training/reserve.   For 
209 Corps, this has come about informally as troops 
are rotated into and out of the fight in the South. 
201 Corps has implemented a more systematic rotation 
cycle.  Embedded trainers report that the morale boost 
for troops is significant as the red/amber/green cycle 
provides a predictable schedule to the soldiers.  They 
understand that they will receive a specific amount of 
time to recover from the stress of battle. 
 
¶5. (SBU) CSTC-A cites several other factors for the 
gradually improving AWOL rates: 
 
- Proactive efforts by the Afghan Minister of Defense 
and Chief of General Staff to replace underperforming 
ANA leadership and significantly improve the quality 
of life standards; 
 
- Implementation of pay reforms that increase ANA 
salaries; 
 
- Establishment of ANA delegations tasked with 
identifying, tracking, and returning AWOL personnel. 
These delegations, which have just begun their work, 
will engage with local elders, sponsors, and mullahs 
in the home communities of individuals that are AWOL. 
 
KABUL 00000564  003 OF 004 
 
 
 
Reenlistment Rate 
----------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU)  Another factor impacting ANA growth is the 
reenlistment rate.  This was predicted to be a 
problem, as soldiers recruited in 2003 reached the end 
of their three-year contracts.  Early indications 
confirmed this concern - the overall ANA reenlistment 
rate from March to December 2006 was 39 percent (859 
of 2,183 elected to reenlist).  Improvement appears to 
have begun, however.  For the month of January 2007, 
the reenlistment rate was 69 percent (157 of 228). 
CSTC-A assesses that the improved rate is due 
primarily to financial incentives implemented in the 
ANA pay reforms.  These include a USD 100 reenlistment 
bonus, a significant pay raise (USD 35-55/mo) when 
entering the fourth year of ANA service, and the 
prospect of future longevity pay raises.  The factors 
listed in paragraphs 4 and 5 also contributed to 
higher reenlistment rates. 
 
Kandak Size Increased 
--------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) Finally, in order to rapidly increase the 
size of the ANA, CSTC-A has worked with MOD to 
increase the size of the ANA recruit kandaks.  Whereas 
Kandak 50 (January 2006) had 654 personnel, Kandak 62 
(January 2007) included 2,004 personnel.   (Note: The 
larger kandaks, which are part of the expansion plan 
briefed to Washington by CSTC-A, have put a strain on 
KMTC resources and personnel.  MOD and CSTC-A are 
working to remedy this.  End note.)  The success in 
obtaining larger numbers of recruits for the ANA is 
attributable in part to recruiting conferences led by 
high-ranking MOD personnel, which are held two to 
three times per month in various provinces.  These 
conferences have attracted strong attendance and have 
been reported favorably in the Afghan media, including 
television news. 
 
The Way Ahead 
------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU)  Continuing to bring down attrition and AWOL 
rates will be critical to the success of building the 
ANA.  In a mid-December 2006 briefing to ANA Chief of 
Army Staff Bismullah Khan, MOD leadership, and then- 
CFC-A Commanding General Eikenberry, CSTC-A Commanding 
General Durbin and the CSTC-A Defense Reform 
Directorate staff stated that to reach  70,000 ANA by 
December 31, 2008, AWOL rates will have to drop to 10% 
nationwide and retention rates will have to rise to 75 
percent.  (Note: This estimate was based on a kandak 
size of 2,000.  CSTC-A is considering the possibility 
of even larger kandaks - up to 3,000 - if facilities 
and resources allow.  End note.)  CSTC-A Commanding 
General Durbin noted that while the USG can supply the 
equipment and trainers, the Afghan government must 
commit to retaining the troops.  The MOD officials 
agreed that more must be done to "plug the leaky 
bucket."  Improvements in AWOL and retention rates 
since this meeting confirm the commitment of the MOD 
and CSTC-A.  However, reaching the ambitious targets 
set in the December meeting, especially the 10 percent 
AWOL rate, will not be easy.  Critical to the effort 
is international mentoring and partnering of ANA 
troops, both at the command level and through 
ETTs/OMLTs.   At present, of the 69 OMLTs that non-US 
NATO committed to, less than one-third (20) have been 
filled, and of those 20 only 13 have been validated, 
or certified fully mission-ready.   Fully resourcing 
 
KABUL 00000564  004 OF 004 
 
 
the OMLT requirement will be essential not only to 
improving the quality of the ANA, but also to 
improving retention. 
NEUMANN