VZCZCXRO1784
PP RUEHDBU RUEHIK RUEHYG
DE RUEHBUL #0435/01 0391234
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 081234Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6003
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUMICEA/JICCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFIUU/COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 3630
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 3445

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 KABUL 000435 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, S/CT, 
EUR/RPM, INL/CIVPOL 
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG, 
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN 
OSD FOR KIMMITT 
CENTCOM FOR CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: MARR SNAR PGOV AF
SUBJECT: AFGHAN NATIONAL CIVIL ORDER POLICE 
 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary:  The Afghan National Civil Order 
Police (ANCOP) (formerly the Civil Order Maintenance 
and Constabulary Police) is currently being recruited 
and trained by the MOI in close coordination with 
CSTC-A and civilian police trainers at the Regional 
Training Centers.  This element of the police, 
eventually totaling 5,000 personnel and scheduled to 
be recruited, trained and deployed over the next two 
years, should provide the GoA a highly trained, 
specialized, well led and robustly equipped police 
force.  Composed of urban and rural patrol units, the 
ANCOP will respond rapidly to urban unrest, civil 
disorder and national emergencies, while also 
providing a mobile police presence in high-threat 
remote areas.  The training for the first urban unit 
commenced in Mazar-e Sharif on January 27th.  Training 
of the first patrol unit is scheduled to begin in 
Herat on February 10th. (Comment:  The nationally 
recruited ANCOP will potentially provide the GoA a 
robust police force capable of enforcing the rule of 
law nationwide and enhancing security nationwide. End 
Comment.)  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) At a meeting conducted at Camp Eggers on 
January 29th, MG Durbin (Commanding General CSTC-A), 
CSTC-A senior staff, and Deputy Minister of Interior 
Khalid received a briefing on the ANCOP program. 
During this meeting, Khalid, expressing very strong 
support for the ANCOP, stated that the ANCOP was truly 
a joint effort between the MOI and CSTC-A.  He further 
stated that the ANCOP would greatly enhance security 
and is a long-desired capability. 
 
ANCOP Composition 
 
¶3.  (SBU) The ANCOP will be comprised of two elements: 
urban units and patrol units.  The difference 
between ANCOP and all other elements of the ANP is 
that ANCOP units will be better trained, more robustly 
equipped and better led.  To ensure that the best 
possible personnel are selected to lead ANCOP units, 
the MoI claims to be using a deliberate process to 
screen and evaluate candidates, which includes a 
review of available personnel files by senior leaders 
of the MOI and the Deputy Minister for Security, 
before assigning these future leaders.  Urban units 
focus on the ability to quell urban unrest, civil 
disorder and national emergencies, while patrol 
units will provide a mobile police presence in high- 
threat remote areas. As currently envisioned, the 
ANCOP force will include eight urban units, the first 
of which will be deployed to Kabul with future units 
being deployed to Mazar-e Sharif, Konduz, Jalalabad, 
Gardez, Kandahar, and Herat.  The patrol units 
will be deployed along the ring road and in areas 
where there are currently no ANP, ANA, or ISAF forces 
and will serve as the nation,s first police 
responders.  Currently there are significant areas of 
the nation with no ANP or ANA forces and by deploying 
professional patrol units that are ethnically 
balanced, the GoA may be able to extend its reach and 
improve the security situation.  The patrol 
units will differ from all other elements of the ANP 
in that they will not simply be a static force manning 
checkpoints like the Afghan National Auxiliary Police 
(ANAP) or Afghan Border Police (ABP).  ANCOP patrol 
units will be better equipped and more robustly manned 
in order to rapidly respond to emergencies that other 
police units are neither trained nor equipped to 
handle.  Quoting Khalid, "unlike the standby police, 
ANCOP will actually deploy and respond when called 
 
KABUL 00000435  002 OF 005 
 
 
upon".  (Note:  The standby police are the element of 
the ANP which are currently deployed to locations 
nation-wide when, due to an increased threat, there is 
a requirement for additional police presence. 
However, the standby police are generally poorly led 
and equipped and not effective. End Note).  The ANCOP 
operating in areas previously void of any ANSF and 
providing a civilian police presence where none had 
previously existed will establish internal security by 
disrupting the linkage between the insurgents and 
people serving as either passive or active supporters 
of the insurgency.  Another significant factor 
according to Khalid is that the ANCOP will include 
better screening of the recruits. 
 
Recruiting 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  ANCOP will be nationally recruited from a 
variety of sources to include the ANP, the less 
corrupt members of the disbanded highway police, the 
standby police and the general population.  The intent 
is to vet the recruits to form ethnically balanced 
units.  The use of faster promotions and the increased 
salaries associated with them should encourage the 
recruits not only to complete the training but 
additionally resist the temptation to go AWOL.  The 
current "tashkiel" (manning authorization document) of 
the standby police will be used to provide the 
manpower requirements of the ANCOP.  Eventually, when 
the ANCOP is fully fielded, the standby police will be 
disbanded. 
 
Comprehensive Training. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Units will undergo a 16-week training 
program, which is double the training provided to 
other elements of the ANP.  Both the urban and patrol 
units initially complete eight weeks of basic police 
training followed by a two-week common core 
curriculum.  Upon completion of the first 10 weeks of 
training, the units will receive an additional six 
weeks of specialty training.  During these six weeks, 
the urban units will be taught by personnel from the 
German Police Project Office (GPPO) on crowd control 
techniques.  The six weeks of specialty training for 
the patrol units, conducted by the MOI in close 
coordination with CSTC-A and civilian police trainers, 
will focus on techniques required to enforce the rule 
of law in remote, high-threat areas.  A significant 
departure from training provided to other elements of 
the police is the effort via the ANCOP curriculum to 
stress Afghan values and culture.  Khalid stressed the 
importance of including classes on Afghan culture, 
values, history and both Afghan and world geography. 
(Comment:  Although the importance of this Afghan 
focused training was highlighted by both Khalid and 
MG Durbin, the courses have not yet been developed 
or included in the curriculum being used to train the 
first urban police unit.  If included, this Afghan- 
centric training will address Khalid,s concern that 
ANP recruits are being taught too many western 
concepts and have forgotten their heritage, culture 
and values.  The inclusion of more Afghan focused 
training may produce patrolmen who better represent 
the Afghan culture and values.  Ultimately, this could 
help to generate greater acceptance of ANCOP by the 
Afghan population, if the training results in ANCOP 
personnel who are more broadly representative of the 
Afghan culture and values.  End Comment.) 
 
Well Equipped 
 
 
KABUL 00000435  003 OF 005 
 
 
¶6.   (SBU) As designed, the ANCOP will be the most 
robustly equipped element of the ANP.  The equipment 
currently being procured will include armored 
vehicles, which will replace the unarmored Ford Ranger 
trucks currently deployed throughout the ANP.  The 
equipment will offer significantly more protection 
from IEDs and small arms fire and greater mobility. 
The ANCOP will also be issued newer Eastern Bloc 
weapons, rather than the aging, unreliable AK-47s that 
are the common weapon of the ANP.  CSTC-A, using FY06 
supplemental funds, has already procured a significant 
quantity of the required vehicles and weapons and will 
use FY07 supplemental funds, if they are approved, to 
purchase the remainder of the required equipment. 
(Note:  MG Durbin intends to coordinate with US DSCA 
in February to determine the feasibility of expediting 
delivery of several different categories of vehicles 
that are not scheduled to arrive in theater until Aug 
- Sep 07.  End Note.) 
 
Increased Pay 
 
¶7.  (SBU) In an effort to recruit quality personnel 
and decrease the corruption prevalent throughout the 
rest of the ANP, a more rapid promotion system will be 
used for ANCOP personnel.  During the first eight 
weeks of training, the ANCOP patrolman will receive 
the standard ANP salary of $70 per month.  However, 
after completion of the eighth week of training, each 
patrolman will be promoted to 3rd Sergeant and will 
receive a salary of $115 per month.  Another promotion 
will occur after completion of the 16th week of 
training, at which time the individual will become a 
2nd Sergeant and receive $140 per month. The rapid 
increase in rank is designed to discourage corruption 
in the ANCOP ranks.  The relatively rapid promotions 
may also help with ANCOP retention and reduce improper 
behavior and performance that would result in 
dismissal while also promoting future recruiting 
efforts. 
 
Current Status 
 
¶8. (SBU) The first urban unit consisting of 321 
patrolmen from six different provinces began training 
in Mazar-e Sharif on January 27.  While this unit is 
only scheduled to be assigned 300 personnel, the 
additional 21 recruits will provide a reserve to 
backfill units as recruits are lost due to attrition. 
This unit is scheduled to complete training on May 19 
and will deploy to Kabul.  The first patrol unit, 
scheduled to begin training in Herat on February 10, 
will consist of 200 patrolmen.  Upon completion of 
training on June 7th, it will deploy to Kandahar. 
Obtaining the correct ethnic balance of this force is 
deemed to be crucial by both Khalid and the CSTC-A 
Commanding General.  The standard is that the ethnic 
balance of the first two units will be representative 
of the national ethnic composition plus or minus 5 
percent.  If this standard is not achieved, the MoI 
will rebalance the force using the excess pool of 
manpower.  Geographic representation, although 
important, remains a future goal.  (Comment:  As with 
the Afghan National Auxiliary Police (ANAP), the 
verification of the ethnic balance is crucial to 
prevent creating a force that is not representative of 
the nation,s ethnic composition.  Post working with 
the international community will verify the ethnic 
balance throughout the ANCOP program development.  End 
Comment.) 
 
Germany Commits to ANCOP 
 
KABUL 00000435  004 OF 005 
 
 
 
¶9.   (SBU) Although initially opposed to the Civil 
Order and Maintenance Constabulary concept (ANCOP,s 
predecessor) because it was envisioned to be a para- 
military organization and potentially another branch 
of the ANA, German Special Ambassador Frick and the 
German Police Project Office (GPPO) now completely 
support the need for urban and patrol units.  The 
change occurred after it was explained that the ANCOP 
is a civilian police force that will be provided 
extensive specialty training focused on riot control 
and patrolling.  The GPPO realized the necessity, in 
the midst of an active insurgency, of recruiting, 
training and deploying a police force capable of 
providing internal security to people in remote areas. 
The fact that German Instructors developed the 
training curriculum for the urban crowd control 
specialty training and will conduct the training in 
coordination with the MOI is a good sign of the German 
acceptance and support of the ANCOP program 
 
MOI Support of ANCOP 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Deputy Minister for Security Khalid 
strongly supports the ANCOP program and stated that an 
ANCOP type force has been long required, and that he 
was very pleased that Afghanistan would soon possess a 
national police force that would be "well led, well 
paid, and well equipped."  Khalid stressed the 
importance of deploying the first unit of the ANCOP to 
Kabul as this would be a strong signal that ANCOP 
would belong to the people of Afghanistan.  Other 
indicators of the MOI,s acceptance of ANCOP include 
the direction to implement a deliberate process, by 
the senior MOI staff, to select qualified leadership 
for ANCOP units. 
 
Concerns 
 
¶11.  (SBU) There remain unresolved elements that may 
impact the success or failure of this concept, to 
include: 
 
- (SBU) Leadership.  The MOI has yet to identify the leaders 
of the ANCOP 2nd and 3rd Battalions which, on a positive 
note, may indicate that a deliberate process is being 
employed to identify the high caliber of leadership 
required for this force.  However, this could also 
indicate that there is too small of a pool from which 
to select the quality of leaders required for this 
type of force.  If the MOI fails to identify 
qualified, corruption free leaders, the ANCOP will 
become yet another element of a police force that 
performs poorly and does not have the acceptance of 
the citizens.  CSTC-A is working closely with the MOI to 
monitor the selection of the ANCOP future leaders. 
 
- (SBU) Ethnic Balance.  If the ANCOP units are not 
representative of the national ethnic balance, there 
is the potential the ANCOP could serve as a coercive 
asset, directly or indirectly furthering the ambitions 
of Afghan warlords or other power brokers, or even of 
an individual or unit intending to undermine the GoA. 
Based upon initial recruiting information, it is not 
clear that ANCOP is a nationally representative 
ethnically balanced police force.   Enforcement of 
CSTC-A,s established standard and Post,s engagement 
with the international community to verify ethnic 
composition of the ANCOP will be essential factors in 
successful implementation. 
 
- (SBU) Funding.  FY07 Supplemental funding is critical to 
 
KABUL 00000435  005 OF 005 
 
 
the success of the program.  If funding is not 
approved, the equipment package needed for the ANCOP 
will be unavailable and it will lose its mobility and 
lethality advantages.  The timing of the receipt of 
FY07 Supplemental funds also could affect equipment 
delivery dates and delay ANCOP fielding. 
 
-  (SBU) Impact on other programs.  The ANCOP program may 
divert personnel and assets from other ANP 
initiatives.  The emphasis on recruiting and equipping 
for the ANCOP could delay the completion of other 
initiatives to include the ANAP and ABP.  Oversight 
and management of the ANCOP program and any subsequent 
impacts on other police programs will need to be 
carefully coordinated to prevent negative influence on 
the ANP as a whole. 
 
-  (SBU) Specialization of the ANP and sustainability.  The 
ANCOP will result in the creation of very specialized 
patrolmen.  Lacking a recruiting system that continues 
to ensure only the best recruits enter the ANCOP, a 
merit-based promotion system that promotes only the 
best personnel and an ability to maintain the more 
advanced equipment, the MOI,s ability to sustain the 
quality of this force is uncertain.  CSTC,s efforts to 
ensure that these systems are not only in place but 
fully operational will be essential if ANCOP is to 
succeed. 
 
-  (SBU) Land procurement.  The ANCOP proposal envisions a 
total of 16 permanent facilities that will be used to 
support day-to-day operations and training and 
currently there is a lack of land for eight of these 
sixteen future ANCOP operating locations.  A failure 
to procure the land would subsequently impact the 
construction of future operating locations and would 
undermine the ability of the ANCOP to successfully 
perform its mission.  Again, CSTC-A is working with 
the MOI to obtain the necessary land to build ANCOP 
operating locations. 
 
Comment 
 
¶12.  (SBU) The ANCOP may be the first national, multi- 
ethnic Afghan Police Force that can be relied upon to 
serve the people of Afghanistan and reliably quell 
future internal unrest, similar to what was 
experienced in Kabul in May 2006, while also helping 
to promote the rule of law throughout the entire country of 
Afghanistan.  However, the ethnic balance of the force 
is critical during the initial development and 
training and must involve the efforts of US and 
international elements in country.  The level of 
commitment of the MOI, CSTC-A and GPPO are initial 
positive indicators.  As ANCOP is now a high priority 
within both MOI and CSTC-A, Post will provide 
oversight and diligently work with the international 
community to monitor this effort.  How soon  the ANCOP 
will make a difference is still unknown.  The rural 
patrol units could have a positive impact as soon as 
they are fielded as they will be the first ANSF forces 
to operate in remote areas of the country.  However, 
the commitment to providing rigorous training means 
that the deployment of these units will take longer 
than what was experienced for other ANP elements and 
consequently ANCOP,s impact on security will be 
delayed.  Ultimately the training and resources 
devoted to ANCOP could lead to a force that will help 
to quell the insurgency but it will take time, 
continued effort and resources. 
NEUMANN