VZCZCXRO9116
RR RUEHDBU RUEHIK RUEHYG
DE RUEHBUL #0372/01 0371048
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 061048Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5936
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFIUU/COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 3616

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 000372 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, S/CR, SCA/PB 
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN 
OSD FOR KIMMITT 
CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD 
RELEASABLE TO NATO/ISAF/AUST/NZ 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PTER ECON EAID MASS SOCI AF
SUBJECT: PRT NURISTAN: SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT ON SECURITY, 
POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIAL SITUATION 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Nuristan Province has traditionally been neglected 
and remains underdeveloped, but recent initiatives by 
Governor Tamin are energizing district administrations and 
encouraging communities to take responsibility for their own 
security.  Despite these efforts, security remains 
problematic as anti-government elements continue to operate 
in the province.  An unprecedented number of big-ticket 
public work construction projects are due to start in the 
coming months.  The economy and infrastructure of the 
province and region are poised to undergo an unprecedented 
transformation that will bring new opportunities and benefit 
to even the most remote villages. Education and health care 
have seen little improvement.  Civil society organizations 
are not present, and the condition of women is unchanged: 
they have scant opportunities to do anything other than 
engage in traditional subsistence activities.  End Summary. 
 
----------------------------- 
Small, Neglected, Undeveloped 
----------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) Nuristan province, which by population is 
Afghanistan's smallest, remains largely neglected and 
undeveloped.  It has nothing that could be considered even a 
small town and no commercial or trading center.  Its 
proximity to Pakistan, its rugged, forested terrain and 
limited government presence contribute to it being a 
sanctuary for anti-government groups that enjoy some local 
support in some areas.  The basis and extent of this support 
are key issues for the government and the Coalition/ISAF. 
 
-------- 
Security 
-------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) Anti-government activity continues in the provinc, 
but hostile contacts fell to a low levelduring January. 
Winter's cold, short days and snow could account for the 
lull, but others suggest that it may be the result of a 
recent security initiative by the governor in eastern 
Nuristan. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Nuristani sources report that Coalition/IASF 
operations which eliminated high value targets in a November 
raid in Mondagal, Kamdesh district, and a January strike 
against three insurgents in western Nuristan delivered a 
message: enemies no longer can operate with impunity in the 
province, and the Coalition/ISAF's ability to find them is 
growing more effective.  According to one well-informed 
Nuristani source, the Mondagal operation brought a new 
willingness among the residents in the east to oppose 
insurgents who had previously operated without fear of 
consequences. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Insecurity in Nuristan has not deterred PRT 
operations, but it had largely stopped activities of UN 
organizations, international NGOs and implementing 
organizations.  Only a few international NGOs operate in the 
province, and none has a permanent presence with expatriate 
staff.  Afghans working for international organizations have 
been targeted in the past, but there were no significant 
incidents in the second half of 2006.  Nor were there 
incidents that targeted Afghan officials, schools or clinics 
or attacks against populations. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Afghan government law enforcement and security 
agencies have a limited presence in the province and 
contribute little to security and the rule of law.  The 
Afghan National Police (ANP) command little respect and are 
seen to be ineffective.  Border police operate from a base in 
 
KABUL 00000372  002 OF 004 
 
 
Bargimatal district, but they lack the means to control the 
border with Pakistan.  The Afghan National Army (ANA) which 
is more respected than the police is only present in a few 
locations where they work with Coalition/IASF units.  The ANA 
intends to extend its presence in Nuristan by building at 
least one post in Qala Gush. 
 
¶7. (SBU) The situation of the ANP is Nuristan is dire.  With 
their low pay and primitive facilities, most patrolmen insist 
on serving only in their home districts.  They reside at 
home, allowing them to eke out a living on their paltry 
wages.  But because they are working in their own communities 
and often musQdeal with their relatives, they often find it 
difficult to be even-handed and impartial.  Complaints are 
common about police officers who exploit their positions for 
personal gain and about patrolmen who ignore orders and the 
law in order to protect the interests of their relatives.  In 
response to proposals that would keep rank and file police 
from serving in their home districts, objections are raised 
that they cannot serve at distant posts because they lack 
adequate housing and they will be away from their families. 
In early 2007, as a result of national reform effort, more 
professional police officers are being assigned at both the 
provincial and district levels in Nuristan.  In addition, 
plans are being refined to start recruitment and training in 
order to deploy, in the near future, 550 auxiliary police who 
have been authorized for the province.  ANP training is a 
positive step, but, by itself only marginally improves the 
capacity and effectiveness of this troubled force. 
¶8. (SBU) Last November, Governor Tamim launched an initiative 
to mobilize councils to take responsibility for security in 
their region.  He spent several weeks in early winter 
organizing a "security" council comprised of 45 elders and 
religious leaders from Nuristan's two eastern districts.  The 
council agreed to visit communities in these districts in 
order to deliver the message that Jihad is not now justified, 
that communities must take responsibility for their own 
security, and that villages will not receive development 
projects unless they bar anti-government groups from 
operating on their lands.  Besides sending his deputy to 
ensure that the council would follow through in its 
commitments, the governor promised to return in the spring to 
evaluate the council's performance.  He has expressed his 
intention to set up similar councils elsewhere in the 
province. 
 
-------- 
Politics 
-------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) The eastern Nuristan security council was one 
example of the sharply increased activity by the governor and 
his immediate staff in late 2006.  These efforts strengthened 
support for his administration, the Afghan government and the 
Coalition/IASF.  Tamim earned praise for naming new 
administrators for every district and for getting involved in 
settling some long-festering disputes between communities. 
He dispatched his deputy and several other provincial 
officials to work on settling a bloody, disruptive 14-year 
conflict between Kamdesh and Kushtoz villages in eastern 
Nuristan.  Tamim also sought to shake up and energize 
district-level administration through personnel changes. 
Other than the governor and his staff, however, the 
provincial administration appears to be ineffective: the 
Provincial Council is not active, and many line ministry 
positions for the province are vacant or the incumbents are 
seldom at their jobs. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Popular sentiment about the provincial 
administration hinges on the services it provides.  Support 
for the national government depends on this and also on 
intangibles, particularly perceptions of the legitimacy of 
the national leader, his character, integrity, and conduct. 
On all these counts Nuristanis continue to hold President 
 
KABUL 00000372  003 OF 004 
 
 
Karzai in high esteem.  While to some extent Karzai benefits 
from low expectations of national leadership, the perception 
is widespread in Nuristan that he has brought relative 
stability and development. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Despite enemy activities in Nuristan, support for 
the opposition does not appear strong.  When asked, most 
Nuristanis profess their indifference or outright hostility 
to the opposition and their agenda.  Yet, even in this 
context, in many parts of Nuristan, the opposition is 
tolerated and even supported.  This appears driven more by 
fear based on intimidation or material considerations than by 
conviction.  The minority in Nuristan who oppose the 
government employ a variety of strategies.  Some feign 
support for the government to benefit from projects and 
economic opportunities.  Others take a low-key, 
non-confrontational approach, expecting the tide to turn, 
with the government foundering and the Coalition/IASF 
withdrawing.  Others actively support or participate in armed 
confrontation. 
 
¶12. (SBU) Information from many different sources suggests 
that support for the government is growing while the appeal 
of the opposition is weakening.  Factors for this include the 
Coalition's successes over the opponents, increased 
provincial administration activity, and recognition of the 
prospects of receiving humanitarian assistance and 
development projects. 
 
--------- 
Economics 
--------- 
 
¶13. (SBU) Despite the dramatic changes that have transformed 
Afghanistan since the 2001 ouster of the Taliban, most 
Nuristanis have seen few changes to their difficult lives. 
They continue to practice the same subsistence activities as 
generations of ancestors: transhumant small-animal 
pastoralism and intensive cereal cultivation on postage-stamp 
sized irrigated fields built on steeply terraced hillsides. 
The province has no paved roads, only a handful of secondary 
schools, and no public telephone system.  Nuristan, however, 
is endowed with extensive valuable natural resources, 
particularly dense coniferous forests in the eastern and 
central regions and abundant deposits of semi-precious gems 
and minerals -- which are illegally mined and smuggled out of 
the country bringing little benefit to Nuristanis or the 
Afghan government. 
 
¶14. (U) In Nuristan, like most regions of Afghanistan, the 
public sector has contributed little to the economy.  That is 
about to change dramatically.  Plans for major projects, 
funded or mediated through the public sector are poised to 
inject massive amounts of money into the province's largely 
non-monetized economy.  A USAID-sponsored Alternate 
Livelihoods Cobblestone Road, Cash-for-Work project in 
Nurgram district is already underway and needs more workers 
than are available locally.  That project, which started in 
October 2006, will provide over 75,000 worker days of pay. 
Work on the five multi-million dollar road projects managed 
by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in Nuristan are planned 
to start in the coming months.  Each project will hire 
thousands of local unskilled laborers allowing their 
households to accumulate cash, in many cases for the first 
time.  Unfortunately, with Nuristan largely lacking anything 
except subsistence economic activities, there are few 
opportunities for this cash to circulate and generate added 
economic benefit in the province. 
 
¶15. (U) Beyond the work and earnings that these projects 
provide, these resulting roads will bring material changes to 
the people's lives by facilitating commerce, and creating 
opportunities for new transport and commercial services and 
even new productive ventures. Because the roads will lower 
 
KABUL 00000372  004 OF 004 
 
 
transport costs, they should reduce the price of goods even 
in the remote communities which lie far beyond the reach of 
the roads.  On the negative side, the roads will also make it 
easier to engage in illegal activities, particularly the 
smuggling of timber and gems and semi-precious stones 
extracted from unregulated mines. 
 
¶16. (U) Many small-scale development projects have been 
undertaken by the National Solidarity Program, NGOs and the 
U.S. military.  While they have improved the lives and 
livelihoods for residents of those communities where they are 
located, their effect on the overall well-being of the people 
in the province has been marginal.  Most Nuristani 
communities are not accessible from the existing roads and 
paths that can be negotiated by pack animals so have not 
benefited from such projects. 
 
------------------------- 
Cultural/Social Situation 
------------------------- 
 
¶17. (U) Conditions for the people in Nuristan have changed 
little.  There are only a handful of secondary schools, none 
for girls.  Most schools lack purpose-built structures. 
Eight hundred of the 1300 teachers are described as having no 
formal teacher training.  Health care facilities are 
rudimentary.  The province has no hospital and most 
communities are hours or days distant from even a basic 
health clinic.  Civil society organizations do not exist 
other than informal gatherings to address specific issues or 
problems.  Nuristan's mountains militate against the 
population developing a common identity, defining common 
interests or engaging in joint effort. 
 
¶18. (U) Few opportunities exist for women other than engaging 
in the subsistence activities practices by their mothers and 
grandmothers. The relatively greater influence of strict 
Islam practices, promulgated by religious leaders trained at 
madrassas in Pakistan has resulted in more restrictions on 
women including veiling.  However, because most communities 
in Nuristan are constructed in a manner where the houses are 
not surrounded by walls, and because Nuristani women 
typically are responsible for agriculture and other essential 
tasks such as collecting wood from the hillsides, it is not 
possible to restrict women to the confines of their 
residences as is typical in many other parts of Afghanistan. 
NEUMANN