VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHIT #0103/01 0431448
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 121448Z FEB 07
FM AMCONSUL ISTANBUL
TO RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT IMMEDIATE 0112
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6589
INFO RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 6100
RUEHKB/AMEMBASSY BAKU PRIORITY 0008
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0049
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0337
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0202

UNCLAS ISTANBUL 000103 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EPET PGOV TX
SUBJECT: CALIK ON ASHGABAT LEADERSHIP 
 
 
Classified by Consul General Deborah K. Jones for reasons 1.5 
(b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (C) Ahmet Calik, Turkish oligarch and longtime Ashgabat 
insider, shared his views on Turkmen developments February 11 
in Istanbul with visiting SCA PDAS Mann.  We convey them as 
an additional window on Turkmen issues. 
 
¶2.  (C) Calik has known interim President Berdimukhammedov 
since 1997 when the latter, as health minister, was making 
his first trip abroad to Israel via Turkey.  Calik 
accompanied him in Istanbul and Berdimukhammedov spoke no 
single word that was not on his printed talking points. 
Calik considered this either very smart or very stupid, and 
he now inclines to the former view.  In the succeeding years, 
they both resided in the same Ashgabat apartment building 
(one that Calik's construction firm built) and developed a 
closer acquaintance.  He considers Berdimukhammedov very 
intelligent and a master of detail.  He is rough on 
subordinates, though he may be compelled to change as 
president.  Asked who are his allies within the current 
leadership, Calik replied that there are no permanent ties, 
only shifting allegiances. 
 
¶3.  (C) The current leadership configuration, Calik believes, 
consists of Berdimukhammedov, the defense minister, and the 
intelligence chief.  The defense minister, he asserted, is 
close to Russia, the intelligence chief less so, though this 
is not true of the his subordinates in the intelligence 
service, who are more influenced by Russia . 
Berdimukhammedov remains more distanced from Russian 
influence than the other two.  Rejepov, head of Presidential 
security, has put out the word that he plans to retire.  This 
information comes from Rejepov's son, who is employed by 
Calik.  Calik, though, is not ready to take this at face 
value; he believes Rejepov may be distancing himself from the 
current leadership maneuverings and looking toward a future 
role.  Power, he believes, rests with the army and the 
intelligence service.  Another key player to watch:  the 
Turkmen ambassador in Moscow, who Calik says is the main 
channel for conveying the Kremlin's views to the new 
leadership.  He considers this ambassador as a potential 
future president. 
 
¶4.  (C) Calik stated that Berdimukhammedov's priorities are 
first, to stay in office, and then to address key 
deficiencies, notably education and health.  Turkmen 
agriculture is a major problem and Berdimukhammedov will want 
to tackle the problems of the money losing Soviet-style 
system.  Calik believes the Turkmen people had high 
expectations with independence, expectations which were then 
dashed by Niyazov's misgovernance.  If the national decline 
continues, it could lead to unrest, and Calik therefore 
recommends that the US push hard on reform at the onset of a 
new government but push in a way that does not isolate 
Berdimukhammedov.  The useful way to do this, he believes, 
would be to reach out through frequent senior visitors to 
Ashgabat and make clear to him the alternatives and the 
advantages that the United States can offer.  He advised 
outreach to the intelligence chief, who he believes is 
persuadable, and even to the defense minister. 
 
¶5.  (C) On Turkmen energy, Calik believes that the sector is 
troubled, through underinvestment and the meager capabilities 
of the Chinese.  By way of example, he disclosed an incident 
that has thus far been kept close-hold within the Turkmen 
government, a fire that developed in late 2006 in the Yolotan 
gas field.  When local personnel were unable to control the 
fire, Niyazov requested Calik's assistance in bringing it 
under control.  Calik then consulted American specialists and 
prepared a work proposal; the minister of energy, however, 
sidelined the proposal in favor of Chinese efforts.  He 
stated that the Chinese have thus far proved unsuccessful and 
the fire continues.  Calik was particularly scornful of the 
minister of energy as corrupt and inept.  He warned that the 
Chinese have paid off both the minister and subordinate staff. 
 
¶6.  (C) Calik agreed with the USG view that Turkmenistan has 
large unrealized gas export potential and he suggested that 
both a trans-Caspian pipeline and a trans-Afghan pipeline 
were feasible, though not simultaneously.  He expressed 
concern about Caspian delimitation impeding a TCP.  Mann 
outlined the USG view that delimitation was not a 
prerequisite for a pipeline and he described the talks on 
energy issues held by Assistant Secretary Sullivan and his 
delegation in Baku.  He advised Calik that the Turkish 
government must successfully address the transit tariff 
issue, in the first instance, with Azerbaijan, in order to 
achieve TCP development. 
 
¶7.  (C) Calik will travel to Ashgabat for the inauguration as 
part of the Erdogan delegation.  Mann urged the Turkish 
delegation to reassure Berdimukhammedov that we do not expect 
him to change existing gas sales arrangements but that 
Turkmenistan should not undertake new commitments for 
development or export until it has had a chance to assess the 
issues fully and accurately and to discuss these with Turkey 
and the United States.  Calik endorsed the message and 
stressed that it would be unwise to press Berdimukhammedov 
for specific commitments at this early stage.  His advice: 
build a relationship, visit frequently, and continue to 
provide the new president with data and options. 
Berdimukhammedov may still be unsure in dealing with 
foreigners, and Calik thought it would not be unexpected for 
the president to divert meetings to his ministers until he 
gained greater sureness. 
 
¶8.  (C) Comment:  Calik has been a player in Turkmenistan 
since independence and at one point in Niyazov's reign was 
termed the second most powerful man in the country.  He 
clearly is concerned about his fortunes with the new regime, 
in energy, construction, and textiles, and has a strong 
interest in confronting Russian influence and in being able 
to show the new leadership that he is influential with the 
Turkish and the American governments.  Calik was famously 
close-mouthed throughout the Niyazov years, so to speak at 
length and in detail on Ashgabat developments is a sign in 
itself of his concern. 
JONES