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Viewing cable 07DAKAR355, DAKAR FRAUD SUMMARY - FIRST QUARTER FY2007

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07DAKAR355 2007-02-13 15:01 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Dakar
VZCZCXRO6205
RR RUEHMA RUEHPA
DE RUEHDK #0355/01 0441501
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 131501Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY DAKAR
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7567
INFO RUEHPNH/NVC PORTSMOUTH NH 0907
RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 0141
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DAKAR 000355 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPT FOR CA/FPP AND AF/W 
DEPT PLS PASS TO KCC 
PARIS FOR DHS/ICE 
ECOWAS POSTS FOR FRAUD PREVENTION MANAGERS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: CVIS KFRD CPAS CMGT ASEC KSTC SG
SUBJECT: DAKAR FRAUD SUMMARY - FIRST QUARTER FY2007 
 
REF: A. 05 STATE 205073 
      B. 06 Dakar 1802 
      C. 06 Dakar 2661 
 
1.  Following is Embassy Dakar's quarterly fraud reporting cable for 
the first quarter (October-December) of FY2007.  Responses are keyed 
to Reftel A. 
 
A.  COUNTRY CONDITIONS: The economic situation in Senegal is 
difficult and has sparked concerns within the international donor 
community and among foreign investors.  Key sectors behind Senegal's 
export-oriented economic growth in recent years (fishing, phosphate, 
and peanuts) have experienced production declines, and economists 
predict overall GDP growth for 2006 was significantly below earlier 
expectations.  The supply of electricity and petroleum products has 
experienced numerous interruptions in recent months and continues to 
negatively affect the country's overall economic performance and the 
living standards of the population.  Higher prices for cooking gas 
and other daily staples have also increased the financial 
difficulties for much of the population.  As a result, Senegalese 
continue to see illegal migration as a means to improve their 
economic situation.  With other routes becoming more difficult, 
Senegalese are increasingly using fishing boats to travel to Spain. 
 
The current political situation is characterized by tense 
competition between the ruling Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS) and 
the opposition parties.  The Government has already announced that 
legislative elections that were scheduled for February 2007 will be 
postponed until June 3, 2007.  The presidential election is still 
scheduled for February 25, but the imperfect level of preparation is 
still a cause of concern.  The numerous legal and constitutional 
reforms undertaken in the electoral field during a period close to 
elections have been a cause for concern among leaders of the 
opposition and civil society organizations. 
 
B.  NON-IMMIGRANT (NIV) FRAUD: Post's Fraud Prevention Unit 
completed a validation study to confirm the return of all 15 
students who attended summer camp in the U.S. in the summer of 
2006. 
 
C.  IMMIGRANT VISA (IV) FRAUD: In this quarter, Post returned 32 
petitions to USCIS for review with the recommendation that they be 
revoked. 
 
Post continues to see scam marriages for the sole purpose of 
immigration.  Two Nigerians who were refused non-immigrant visas 
used a Christian website to find their spouses.  Both petitioners 
are poor single mothers who are marginally employed.  Fraud 
indicators for Sierra Leonean marriage include: revived a 
relationship with old flames; seeing the beneficiary's photo at a 
mutual friend or family member's residence; and a chance encounter 
at an airport or taxi stand. 
 
D.  DV FRAUD: No change. 
 
E.  ACS AND PASSPORT FRAUD: Post denied one Consular Report of Birth 
Abroad (CRBA) certificate after DNA testing revealed that the 
alleged Amcit father was not the biological father of a child born 
out of wedlock.  The Amcit later confessed that he knew he was not 
the biological father, explaining his girlfriend had been raped and 
he was trying to assist her.  Eight CRBA applications submitted in 
2004 and 2005 have been abandoned because alleged Amcit parents have 
not presented sufficient evidence of a biological relationship with 
the child and have declined to conduct DNA testing. 
 
F.  ADOPTION FRAUD: Amcits of Sierra Leonean origin appear to be 
submitting false adoption decrees to obtain IR2 visas for other 
Sierra Leoneans.  For example, three Amcits living in Woodbridge, 
Virginia, submitted 13 petitions for alleged adopted children.  Post 
returned nine petitions to the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 
Service (USCIS) because of fraudulent adoption certificates.  Four 
of the nine beneficiaries appear to be in their thirties.  Post has 
not yet adjudicated the remaining four petitions. 
 
The rate of adoption fraud in orphan cases remains at approximately 
50 percent.  Embassy Freetown completed field investigations for 
nine adopted orphans this quarter.  Four of these children were not 
orphans under INA 101(b)(1)(F) and one case is pending with USCIS to 
make the orphan determination.  Field investigations for ten adopted 
orphans are still pending. 
 
G.  ASYLUM AND OTHER DHS BENEFITS FRAUD: No change. 
 
H.  COOPERATION WITH HOST GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES: No change. 
 
 
DAKAR 00000355  002 OF 002 
 
 
I.  AREA OF PARTICULAR CONCERN: Security at Leopold Sedar Senghor 
International Airport is vulnerable.  According to officials working 
for firms in charge of security for Delta and Air France, 
clandestine migrants breach the airport's perimeters on a regular 
basis.  Clandestine migrants usually rush to the tarmac to mingle 
with outbound passengers when they leave the airport bus to board 
the plane.  An official from the security firm working for Delta 
confirmed that an individual climbed into a Delta airplane's wheel 
compartment at Dakar's airport on January 12, 2007.  The individual 
did not survive the flight.  According to an article from the 
January 17 edition of "The Soleil" newspaper, a similar incident 
occurred with SN Brussels.  A victim believed to be a Gambian 
airport employee did not survive the January 17 Banjul - Dakar - 
Brussels flight.  His remains were found in the wheel well of the 
plane in Brussels. 
 
According to airport contacts, the Gendarmerie is more reliable than 
airport police.  Since the Gendarmerie only has authority to arrest 
and incarcerate clandestine migrants caught on the tarmac, Air 
France prefers to intercept malafide travelers on the tarmac instead 
of during check-in.  In contrast, South African Airways (SAA) stop 
travelers with suspicious documents during check-in and sends those 
passengers to the airport police.  SAA security staff suspect that 
the police release most of these individuals or assist them to take 
alternative routes out of Senegal.  As a result, Post receives few 
requests to verify U.S. Refugee Travel Documents (I-571s). 
According to post contacts, the current rate to assist clandestine 
migrants to board a flight is 1,000,000 CFA francs (CFAF) (USD 
2,000).  If the passenger is repatriated, he is reimbursed 700,000 
CFAF (USD 1,380). 
 
The new transit route for illegal immigrants is Dakar's port. 
According to a source from Aeroport International Leopold Sedar 
Senghor (SOFRASEP - AFRIQUE), I Messina Senegal, a well known 
container company, spends about 15,000,000 CFAF a month in tickets 
to repatriate clandestine immigrants from just one country, Italy. 
 
Post is still seeing fraudulent entry/exit stamps in passports, 
primarily from Dubai. 
 
J.  STAFFING AND TRAINING: Roksana K. Houge started working as the 
new Fraud Prevention Manager in December 2006.  In the second 
quarter, the Fraud Prevention Coordinator hopes to attend an 
interviewing techniques workshop organized by Post's Federal Bureau 
of Investigation and an All-Africa Fraud Conference in Accra, 
Ghana. 
 
JACOBS