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DE RUEHCV #0423/01 0591925
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FM AMEMBASSY CARACAS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7957
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RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L CARACAS 000423 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/28/2017 
TAGS: MARR MASS PGOV PM PREL VE
SUBJECT: ACTION REQUEST: BRV QUERIES ON MILITARY 
ACQUISITIONS 
 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Robert Downes, 
Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) This is an Action Request; See Paragraph 3, and action 
recommendation in Paragraph 5. 
 
¶2. (C) BACKGROUND:  In May 2006 the Department announced that 
the BRV was not fully cooperating with the global war on 
terrorism.  As a result, the USG, though the Arms Export 
Control Policy, "suspended" all Foreign Military Sales cases 
to the Venezuelan Air Force (FAV), closed FAV's Military 
Acquisition Office (VMAO) in Miami, and placed a moratorium 
on all commercial training and contracts that required export 
licenses under the Policy.  At the time of the closing the 
BRV had some items in the pipeline as well as material in the 
warehouse.  The Director of Logistics for FAV Major General 
(MG) Jose Felix Caraballo Gomez faxed a January 27 request 
for information to MILGROUP concerning the status of FAV's 
purchases currently in the pipeline and regarding the removal 
of items in the VMAO. 
 
¶3. (U) Post requests Department guidance on responding to the 
issues raised by the FAV in MG Gomez' fax.  In particular, MG 
Gomez raises the following matters: 
 
--The status of repaired and returned parts that are 
currently at repair facilities, including those in 
calibration at the Air Force Metrology and Calibration 
Program (AFMETCAL). 
 
--The status of parts acquired and processed through VE-D-QCP 
that are now in the Bond Room of Tech Space 
Aero in Belgium. 
 
--The status of parts ordered, processed through contracting, 
acquired, or ready for delivery in BV, BA, BB, 
BZ, BD status, among others.  (Note: Post assumes Gomez is 
referring to back-ordered parts. End Note) 
 
--The status of parts acquired and/or repaired that are 
currently in the VMAO awaiting export licenses. 
 
--The status of discrepancy reports in process. 
 
--The status of safety bulletins and technical orders. 
 
--Will there be any cost associated with the cancellation, 
storage, or other transactions related to cases 
affected by the sanctions? 
 
--FAV continues to require receipt of information from the 
Security Assistance Management Information System 
(SAMIS), AFSAC Online, and Country Manager due to the fact 
that there remain active cases and requirements 
in process. 
 
--FAV is required to recuperate a percentage of the funds 
credited to the holding accounts 1QD and 1QF that have extra 
funds. 
 
--MG Gomez requests a meeting between VAF, State, and DoD 
interested parties to discuss the status of pending 
transactions, holding accounts, and items in the VMAO. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Embassy-Proposed Course of Action 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C)  MG Gomez' fax presents a challenge for us, but one 
that we can deal with.  To be sure, he's asking the right 
questions, and by asking them now, he probably thinks he is 
forcing us to act.  In order to answer those questions, we 
collectively (BRV and USG) need to know what is in the 
warehouse and the pipeline.  MG Gomez' note indicates that 
the FAV will compile an inventory of all the items they 
believe are included in these cases.  Embassy suggests that 
the Department respond to MG Gomez' letter (or authorize us 
to do so), by asking him to expedite said detailed inventory, 
to include all items in storage in the United States or 
elsewhere and those items in the pipeline, through the 
Venezuelan Embassy in Washington.  Our guess is that the FAV 
won't be able to do this.  At that point, we can propose a 
meeting among FAV working-level contacts (two of whom have 
already applied for PCS visas to serve in the DAO at the BRV 
Embassy in Washington, apparently to clean this up), along 
with appropriate representatives from DOD and PM. 
 
--------------------------- 
Ambassador's Recommendation 
--------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) We should conclude the VMAO drama as soon as possible. 
 It is a net loser for the USG.  To Venezuela, the rest of 
the world, and even inside the United States, retaining 
material already purchased by the BRV and offering no 
compensation will appear to be expropriation without 
compensation.  Chavez would have a field day with the issue 
in light of our public comments on private sector 
expropriations.  Our own Embassy warehouse might eventually 
be at risk.  The longer this issue stretches out, the more 
damage we do to ourselves.  As best as we can tell from here, 
there is no truly sensitive equipment in the VMAO, and little 
that could be classified as "lethal."  I hope the 
policymakers will direct the lawyers to find an argument 
permitting the immediate export of everything in this 
warehouse that is not subject to absolute legal prohibition. 
 
BROWNFIELD