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Viewing cable 07BERLIN399, SECOND ROUND OF US-GERMAN "PRUEM" DISCUSSIONS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07BERLIN399 2007-02-27 15:56 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Berlin
VZCZCXRO9169
RR RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA
RUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHRL #0399/01 0581556
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 271556Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7251
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNFRG/FRG COLLECTIVE
RUEAHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHDC
RUEAWJC/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC
RUEFHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0438
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BERLIN 000399 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER KHLS PGOV CVIS KVPR GM
SUBJECT: SECOND ROUND OF US-GERMAN "PRUEM" DISCUSSIONS 
 
REF: BERLIN 59 
 
1. (SBU) Summary.  German and U.S. officials resumed 
discussions of a data sharing agreement modeled on Germany's 
"Pruem" Convention for law enforcement and counterterrorism 
cooperation in Berlin January 23.  The German delegation said 
it had not had time to study the U.S. draft text or discuss 
it internally and was in a position only to give initial 
reactions and to ask questions.  They appreciated detailed 
explanations for various articles, said that some issues 
would require intense discussion and that they hoped to get 
back to the U.S. in 4-5 weeks.  Their comments/questions 
focused on areas of data protection, inclusion of terrorist 
screening information, lack of direct access to the U.S. DNA 
data base, and need for the referenced Annex on screening 
data and some definitions.  At the next round of talks, the 
German side will seek U.S. clarification why it cannot accept 
the EU-centered data privacy provisions in Pruem.  End 
Summary. 
 
Second Meeting of Working Group 
------------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) At the first meeting between the U.S. and German 
sides in December (reftel), the U.S. delegation offered to 
table a draft text.  The U.S. side did so January 18, 
cautioning the German delegation at the January 23 
discussions that the text should be considered a discussion 
draft.  The German side advised that due to the limited time 
to prepare, their comments were preliminary and informal. 
 
3. (U) German officials included officials from the Interior, 
Justice, and Foreign Ministries and the Chancellery.  As 
before, the head of the German delegation was Andreas 
Schultz, the MOI Office Director for Police Information 
Technology.  The U.S. delegation included DOJ, DHS, and State 
(including Embassy Berlin). 
 
4. (SBU) The German delegation asked numerous questions about 
the U.S. discussion draft as the Working Group went article 
by article through the text.  The issue of greatest concern 
for Schultz was data privacy.  He explained that under German 
law, each new agreement has to include explicit data privacy 
provisions.  Schultz added walking away from Pruem,s data 
privacy provisions would be very hard because all EU members 
who sign onto the Pruem Convention, "even Malta," are 
expected to comply.  For the U.S. not to comply would cause 
"difficult debate" in the Bundestag.  He proposed that at the 
next round of talks, the U.S. explain its objections to each 
of the Pruem data privacy paragraphs. 
 
5. (SBU) DHS Acting A/S Rosenzweig explained the U.S. desire 
for an exchange of the fingerprints of those on the German 
List of those who pose a threat ("Gefaehrderliste") and those 
forbidden from entry ("Einreiseverbotliste") for screening 
purposes.  Rosenzweig noted the value of such data, how 
several Pruem articles envision information exchange to 
combat common threats and that by carefully limiting the 
scope of the information exchanged we are, in effect, 
creating a case.  Schultz said that Pruem did not include 
such provisions and that Germany was still determining its 
position on direct exchanges, but he could see the utility in 
such a relationship.  The German delegation requested the USG 
provide a draft annex and a definition of "known or suspected 
terrorist" to inform further their considerations. 
 
6. (SBU) Concerning fingerprints, Schultz noted that the U.S. 
draft text envisioned automated searching of fingerprint data 
conducted by a national contact point in order to facilitate 
an MLAT request.  This provision is similar to the Pruem 
text, and so posed little difficulty outside of their data 
protection concerns.  Concerning DNA, Schultz asked why the 
U.S. discussion draft did not allow for automated searches by 
one party of the other,s database.  The U.S. delegation 
explained that the central U.S. DNA database is primarily 
made up of DNA information submitted by the states and 
managed by the FBI; provisions in U.S. law prevent direct 
access to the DNA database by anyone other than the FBI lab 
because a "hit" would also disclose the underlying DNA 
profile.  Schultz observed that the Pruem Convention had 
prompted other countries to make investments in technology to 
enable foreign hit/no hit access. 
 
7. (SBU) The German delegation circulated the Pruem 
 
BERLIN 00000399  002 OF 002 
 
 
Implementing Agreement and explained that its provisions 
would address U.S. technical questions.  The U.S. delegation 
explained that an eventual agreement text would not be a 
treaty and therefore not require Senate advice and consent. 
Schultz said the German government would have to submit the 
agreement to the Bundestag for formal ratification. 
 
Next Steps 
---------- 
 
8. (SBU) The German delegation said their formal review of 
the text would take another three to four weeks.  Schultz 
pledged to propose a date for the next round of talks when he 
visited Washington February 6-7.  Schultz said he was eager 
to see the National Counterterrorism Center, the Terrorist 
Screening Center, and the National Targeting Center to learn 
more about the possibilities of increased information 
exchange.  The two sides discussed the possibility of holding 
the next round of discussions via video conference, and 
holding the next formal round February 28 when the German 
delegation will be in Washington for other consultations. 
 
9. (U) The U.S. Delegation cleared this cable subsequent to 
their departure from Berlin. 
TIMKEN JR