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P 231710Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7196
INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 7985
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 1706
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 0963
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 8510
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0259
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 1385

UNCLAS BERLIN 000376 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR ISN, EUR, WHA/CAN, EAP/J 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM MNUC PREL ETTC GM JA RS CA
SUBJECT: G-8 NONPROLIFERATION DIRECTORS GROUP MEETING, 
BERLIN, JANUARY 22, 2007 
 
REF: 06 MOSCOW 12144 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: The U.S. delegation, headed by Acting 
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Policy and Negotiations Andrew Semmel, considers the first 
meeting of the Nonproliferation Directors Group (NPDG) under 
Germany's G-8 Presidency a good start and hopes to see it 
engage in more action items with measurable results.  Other 
G-8 partners wanted to know the status of the U.S.-India 
Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative, and most seem to be 
warming up to the deal.  The partners discussed nuclear fuel 
cycle issues, with many stressing the need to address the 
concerns of states currently lacking enrichment or 
reprocessing technology.  The partners essentially agreed on 
the need for unity in dealing with the DPRK and Iran, but 
Russia urged that Iran not be isolated.  Germany will 
continue the practice of making G-8 demarches to support the 
universalization of the IAEA Additional Protocol and UNSCR 
¶1540.  The next NPDG meeting will take place March 30 in 
Berlin.  End summary. 
------------------- 
Priorities for 2007 
------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) The German Chair, Ruedieger Luedeking, MFA Deputy 
Commissioner for Arms Control and Disarmament, began by 
referring to the priorities in his letter to other NPDG 
representatives that repeated what he had called for at the 
last meeting of the Russian presidency in 2006 (see reftel). 
He also stressed that the 2007 G-8 Summit declaration on 
nonproliferation should be short and not repetitive.  Many 
others echoed this approach, while France, Japan, Canada, and 
the UK noted the importance of not diluting a strong message 
on Iran and the DPRK.  Russia said the focus should be on 
global issues, e.g., the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty 
(NPT), BW, and CW. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Luedeking,s question of whether the NPDG should 
address the issue of the proliferation of small arms and 
light weapons (SALW) generated little enthusiasm.  Most 
speakers said the focus should remain on WMD, with France 
arguing the theoretical point that "proliferation" should be 
reserved for WMD and that to include other issues would 
dilute its meaning.  Russian Delegate Anatolij Antonov said 
if the subject was discussed, he would have to raise the 
problem of "illicit production" (Russia's oft-repeated 
discussion of the unlicensed production of Soviet-era weapons 
by former Warsaw Pact and Soviet states).  The U.S. said the 
NPDG should focus on the most important subjects and that 
SALW was being addressed in other fora.  DAS Semmel also 
urged the NPDG to consider actionable items. 
 
¶4. (SBU) The Chair summarized the discussion as follows: 
-- There was a consensus on drafting a short Summit statement. 
-- The traditional agenda (nuclear weapons, BW, CW, and 
delivery systems) should be in the forefront. 
-- The Group should take a balanced approach. 
-- The partners should try to do justice to items addressed, 
such as undertake action items and broaden the consensus on 
items under consideration. 
-- SALW and conventional weapons would not be a primary focus. 
 
------------------------------------- 
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) Japanese Delegate Takeshi Nakane described the 
intentions of Yukiya Amano, the Japanese Chairman of the 
first Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) meeting, scheduled for 
April/May 2007.  Amano will try to resolve procedural issues 
quickly, to pave the way for substantive discussions.  Nakane 
informed the NPDG that Japan will host a seminar in Vienna 
February 5-6 to prepare for the NPT. 
 
¶6. (SBU) NPDG delegates generally agreed with the desire to 
solve procedural questions quickly.  On the substance, 
several (e.g., Canada and Italy) cited the importance of all 
"three pillars" (nonproliferation, disarmament, and peaceful 
uses) of the NPT regime.  Russia suggested the NPDG identify 
two or three issues as priorities for the first PrepCom. 
Antonov also proposed starting negotiations on a Fissile 
Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) before the PrepCom and hoped no 
one would use "events in China" (a reference to the Chinese 
 
anti-satellite test) as an excuse to avoid them.  Italy said 
the NPT Review Committee (RevCom) president should be chosen 
for his capabilities instead of his regional group.  (Note: 
No one else picked up on this point.  End note.) 
 
¶7. (SBU) The Chair,s summary suggested the next meeting 
should consider how to overcome any obstacles that may arise 
following Amano,s consultations and the Japanese seminar. 
Otherwise the Chair drew the following conclusions: 
 
-- Delegates agreed on the need to support Amano,s efforts 
to solve procedural questions. 
-- The G-8 should take the lead in showing a constructive 
spirit. 
-- The PrepCom should copy the procedures from previous 
review cycles; discussions of new rules would allow some to 
hide behind disagreements to avoid substantive discussions. 
-- All three pillars should be endorsed. 
-- G-8 members might consider other venues and, in 
particular, decide how to start FMCT negotiations at the 
Conference on Disarmament (CD). 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
Central Asian Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (CANWFZ) Treaty 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) Luedeking said he added this agenda item to see 
whether it was possible to put the Treaty into effect, i.e., 
to persuade the U.S., France, and the UK (P-3) to sign the 
Treaty's protocol extending security assurances to the 
Central Asian Five (C-5).  He asked whether it could it be 
done without amending the Treaty, such as by a reservation or 
a statement made at the signing.  Doing so would send a 
positive signal as the NPT review process was under way, he 
noted. 
 
¶9. (SBU) All P-3 members said the problems with the CANWFZ 
Treaty were serious enough not to be solved without an 
amendment that made it clear that agreements existing at the 
time of entry into force (in particular, the Tashkent Treaty 
creating a common defense among the C-5 and Russia) cannot 
take precedence over the CANWFZ Treaty.  France stressed that 
the CANWFZ Treaty did not in fact create a nuclear 
weapon-free zone and that to welcome it as such was to 
devalue such zones altogether.  The U.S. said the P-3 were 
willing to discuss solutions with the C-5, but confirmed that 
only a Treaty amendment would solve the problems. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Russia disputed the P-3 analysis of the Treaty and 
the negotiating record and insisted that any consultations 
should include Russia.  Antonov offered to consult the C-5 
and report back on their plans. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶11. (SBU) The discussion of this agenda item was perhaps the 
most detailed and valuable of the session.  DAS Semmel 
described the initiative's status and the steps needed to 
bring it into being.  He noted: (1) the U.S. relevant 
legislation was passed in December 2006, (2) bilateral 
negotiations on a nuclear cooperation (the 123 agreement) 
with India had some distance to go, (3) India had not yet 
completed its talks on safeguards with the IAEA, (4) any such 
agreement would require the approval of the IAEA Board of 
Governors, (5) U.S. legislation required the President to 
certify to the U.S. Congress prior to a vote on the 123 
agreement that India had made "substantial progress" with the 
IAEA on concluding an Additional Protocol, and (6) a 
consensus decision by the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) was 
needed.  He doubted the steps would be completed by the time 
of the April Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) meeting, but 
suggested that an extraordinary NSG session in the fall could 
decide to provide an exception for India. 
 
¶12. (SBU) Canada welcomed the Henry J. Hyde United 
States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Promotion 
Act, but wanted to ensure that any nuclear cooperation with 
India did not violate NPT obligations to avoided assisting 
non-nuclear weapons states to acquire nuclear weapons. 
Canada said India could be asked to endorse elements of the 
NPT or to act in conformity with it. 
 
 
¶13. (SBU) Russia asked whether the U.S. planned to cooperate 
with India on enrichment, to which DAS Semmel answered no. 
Russia asked what "substantial progress" toward negotiating 
an Additional Protocol means (a condition in the Hyde Act for 
approving a U.S.-India cooperation agreement).  DAS Semmel 
said although progress is in the eye of the beholder, the 
President needs something that can be certified for Congress. 
 Russia was also concerned that India wanted some form of 
recognition from Russia during the upcoming Putin visit, 
claiming the U.S. had referred to India as a "responsible 
nuclear state."  Antonov said Russia would not recognize 
India as a nuclear weapon state. 
 
¶14. (SBU) Japan noted the Indian Prime Minister was scheduled 
to visit Japan, during which the two sides would discuss a 
framework for cooperation.  Japan would examine any agreement 
in light of its impact on the NPT regime. 
 
¶15. (SBU) France and the UK both emphasized the need for the 
right safeguards agreement between India and the IAEA.  The 
UK has said this repeatedly to India.  Italy would be more 
confident about the deal if India had more concretely 
committed to FMCT negotiations and had agreed to ratify the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). 
 
¶16. (SBU) DAS Semmel noted that until the IAEA Board of 
Governors approves a safeguards agreement, the other steps 
could not be taken.  He stressed that the Hyde Act is the law 
of the land, but the President had issued a signing 
statement, giving himself some flexibility in implementing 
it, which is not an unusual step.  Regarding the Russian 
comment, he stressed that the U.S. does not regard India as a 
nuclear weapon state and has told India that.  DAS Semmel 
also made clear that if India detonates a nuclear explosive 
device, U.S. law requires that cooperation stop and nuclear 
material and equipment supplied under the 123 agreement be 
returned. 
 
¶17. (SBU) In response to a Canadian question about whether 
other states had begun to negotiate bilateral nuclear 
agreements, the Russian delegate said Russia was discussing 
an agreement to expand the nuclear cooperation that it 
already had with India.  The UK said agreement within the NSG 
would be sufficient; there would be no need for a separate 
UK-India agreement.  France would seek an agreement with 
India, but IAEA safeguards were a prerequisite.  On the other 
hand, France did not need new legislation to engage in 
cooperation. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Other Nuclear Suppliers Group Issues 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶18. (SBU) The Group also discussed the status of nations that 
adhere to NSG Guidelines but are not NSG members and also the 
transfer of sensitive technologies.  For the first issue, 
Germany noted the need for continued discussion of the 
modalities for association with the NSG.  Luedeking expressed 
concerns that bringing India too close to the NSG could 
support India's desire to be recognized as a nuclear weapon 
state.  Russia asked the Chair to clarify the difference 
between Germany's March proposal on NSG 
association/membership and the earlier Russian proposal. 
Antonov suggested that Germany and Russia combine their 
suggestions into a joint proposal.  Antonov also commented 
that India would not accept anything less than full-fledged 
membership.  Japan pointed out that by the terms of various 
UNSC resolutions, all UN members had to adhere to NSG 
guidelines vis--vis Iran and the DPRK. 
 
¶19. (SBU) Summarizing the brief discussion, Luedeking said: 
 
-- NSG members should take great care in moving forward on 
this issue and that there was no rush, 
-- that previous Russian suggestions should be reconsidered, 
-- basic concerns over passing information on denial 
notifications to non-members and the question of NPT status 
as a criterion for association with the NSG still need to be 
addressed. 
 
¶20. (SBU) Concerning the transfer of sensitive nuclear 
technologies, Canada said it was no longer comfortable with 
 
the "rolling moratorium" on the transfer of sensitive 
technologies because it did not account for the good 
non-proliferation record of states that could be potential 
recipients of transfers.  Canada advocated that the NSG agree 
on criteria that would allow providers of sensitive 
technology to distinguish between states, and until the NSG 
agrees on such criteria, Canada cannot accept a continuation 
of the moratorium.  Canada noted that it is simply not honest 
to continue saying in G-8 summit statements that progress is 
being ade in reaching agreement on the criteria-based 
pproach in the NSG.  The UK agreed very strongly with this 
approach and hoped the NPDG could help move the NSG toward 
agreement. 
 
¶21. (SBU) In response to questions from the Chair and Japan, 
DAS Semmel said the subject was under active discussion in 
the U.S., but the U.S. position continues to be that no state 
should supply sensitive nuclear technology to any state that 
now lacks nuclear enrichment and reprocessing capabilities. 
 
¶22. (SBU) The Chair requested the U.S. to reconsider before 
the next NSG plenary, noting that another statement 
supporting a continuation of the moratorium was not 
acceptable to many G-8 members. 
 
-------- 
The DPRK 
-------- 
 
¶23. (SBU) Nakane introduced the subject, stating that there 
were good prospects for another round of the Six-Party Talks, 
which Japan considered the best way to resolve the issue. 
Japan hoped that the DPRK would come with a more positive 
attitude but also thought it useful to apply pressure on the 
DPRK by implementing UNSC Resolution 1718.  He noted that 
only a few states have reported on their implementation of 
1718 to the UN Sanctions Committee.  DAS Semmel reported on 
the positive statements following Assistant Secretary Hill's 
meetings in Berlin and said that a resumption of the talks 
was possible in February. 
 
¶24. (SBU) The Chair supported the call for implementation of 
UNSCR 1718 and noted that the EU was taking the necessary 
steps for this. 
 
---- 
Iran 
---- 
 
¶25. (SBU) After some introductory remarks by the Chair, who 
said that the unity of the "P-3 plus 3" was important in 
getting UNSCR 1737 approved, DAS Semmel said that UNSCR 1737 
represented the single most important nonproliferation issue 
and that much was at stake in its implementation, such as the 
credibility of the IAEA and the UN Security Council.  The 
sanctions had to be targeted, multilateral, and enforced; 
Iran needs to know it stands alone.  But if it were concluded 
that the UNSC resolution route had run its course, the G-8 
partners must consider steps outside the Council, such as 
financial measures. 
 
¶26. (SBU) France, Japan, and Canada all called for 
implementation of 1737, and France asserted that the unity 
behind it may be causing Iran to change its position.  Russia 
called 1737 a serious signal to Iran but argued against 
isolating Iran.  Antonov expressed surprise that the day 
after passage of UNSCR 1737, a G-8 state had introduced 
sanctions "against Russia."  Doing so meant Russia had 
created the legal basis for sanctioning itself.  He 
questioned the unity of the six under these circumstances 
(Note:  He was clearly referring to U.S. unilateral sanctions 
imposed on Russian entities in late December.  End note). 
 
¶27. (SBU) Luedeking summarized the discussion as follows: 
 
-- The six were committed to UNSCR 1737, 
-- The six were prepared to suspend the measures if Iran 
suspended enrichment and negotiations followed, 
-- The six need to be credible, which means implementation of 
UNSCR 1737, 
-- The G-8 partners hoped the process was not coming to the 
end of the line in the UNSC, 
-- Many shared the concern that Iran was not complying with 
 
the resolution. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶28. (SBU) Luedeking said that despite all the attention given 
to developing multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel 
cycle, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) had shown little 
interest, seeing them all as restrictions.  Canada also 
raised questions about these approaches, wondering if it was 
not a solution in search of a problem.  The various 
proposals, he pointed out, were designed to solve the "Iran 
problem," but he was not sure a global problem existed. 
 
¶29. (SBU) France believed the reason for the lack of response 
was that the nuclear suppliers did not really have a product 
to sell.  The next step might be for the IAEA to look at the 
proposals and determine which made sense.  He agreed with 
Canada that there might not be a supply problem, but there 
was a political problem, and the developed countries had to 
show they were not creating a one-sided embargo.  The UK and 
Russia also said there was a need to engage with the 
recipient countries, while the U.S. said there were reasons 
why states had made all these proposals: the expansion of the 
nuclear industry, the projected growth in global energy 
needs, nonproliferation concerns, environmental concerns, and 
concerns over waste. 
 
¶30. (SBU) The Chair summarized the Group's conclusions: 
 
-- Acceptance by recipients was a key point, 
-- The supplier countries needed to be seen as addressing the 
issue, 
-- The IAEA could play a key role. 
 
¶31. (SBU) Luedeking also referred to the paper he had 
circulated before the meeting and which suggested several 
criteria by which proposals could be evaluated: proliferation 
resistance, assurance of supply, legitimacy, and market 
compatibility (to which several delegates had added 
feasibility).  He asked for comments on the paper by March 15 
and said that at some point "perhaps at the G8 Summit" it 
would be useful to make a common statement about this 
subject. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
Universalization Issues: Additional Protocol and UNSCR 1540 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
 
¶31. (SBU) As time was running out, the Group did not discuss 
these issues.  The Chair circulated papers containing points 
to be used in demarches on both issues and asked for any 
comments by February 9.  If none is received, the Germans 
will proceed.  Luedeking also said the group might consider 
coordinating assistance to states in carrying out the 
requirements of UNSCR 1540 and noted that the EU is very 
active in this area. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
BW and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
¶32. (SBU) These items were skipped, but the Chair called 
attention to a G-8 Forensic Epidemiology Workshop to be held 
in London, March 13-15.  He also pointed out that the EU and 
the European Commission had a major role in nuclear energy 
and therefore should be represented in the Global Initiative. 
 
--------------------------- 
Other Business/Next Meeting 
--------------------------- 
 
¶33. (SBU) The U.S. called attention to the growing and 
anticipated burdens the IAEA will face, as many new demands 
for safeguards will arise in the next few years.  He 
suggested that the G-8 consider how to meet this concern. 
 
¶34. (SBU) The Chair promised a short agenda for the next 
meeting and cancelled the meeting scheduled for February. 
Thus the next meeting will take place March 30 in Berlin. 
TIMKEN JR