VZCZCXRO4674
RR RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA
RUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHBW #0203 0431047
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 121047Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0240
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1293
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RXFEAA/HQ AFSOUTH NAPLES IT

UNCLAS BELGRADE 000203 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PBTS PREL PGOV UNSC SR
SUBJECT: MORE REALISM OVER KOSOVO OUTSIDE SERBIA'S GOVERNMENT 
CIRCLES 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary:  At a working breakfast with Serbia's analytical 
community, the Ambassador, together with the French Ambassador, took 
stock of the Ahtisaari plan and the way forward on Kosovo. 
Ambassador Polt stressed that active participation in the next stage 
of negotiations is the only way to have an effect on the outcome, 
and that, contrary to popular belief, taking a seat at the table is 
not equivalent to acceptance of independence for Kosovo. 
Participants reflected long-term guarded optimism about the Kosovo 
outcome based on a faith in the maturity of the Serbian electorate, 
but acknowledged that Kosovo will remain political kryptonite in the 
short term.  End Summary 
 
¶2.  (SBU) On February 9th, the Ambassador hosted a working breakfast 
attended by the French Ambassador, several respected journalists, 
politicians and NGO representatives from Serbia and from Kosovo. 
The focus of the meeting was on Serbia's response to the Ahtisaari 
plan and the upcoming negotiations.  Both Ambassadors stressed that 
more time, namely a significant delay in the next stage of 
negotiations, is not in Serbia's interest.  Several participants 
noted that a distinction needed to be made between "popular time" 
and "political time."  Politicians may benefit from a delay as they 
can leverage the current situation to strengthen their positions in 
ongoing coalition negotiations - but an extension will not affect 
the way the final outcome is accepted by the general public.  They 
also noted that Kostunica's current strategy of delay and refusing 
to meet with Ahtisaari may actually be backfiring as may people feel 
that Kosovo is being oversold in an attempt to distract them from 
more immediate concerns. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) A moderate Kosovo Serb political leader provided the view 
from Mitrovica, and stressed that his constituents were extremely 
tense and unsettled about the upcoming decision regarding final 
status.  According to him Kosovar Serbs are mainly afraid of two 
things - a mass exodus from the region and the potential division of 
Kosovo (driven by Belgrade) which would primarily affect Serbs south 
of the Ibar River.  He was also concerned about triumphalist 
Albanian outbursts affecting Serbs the day after independence was 
declared, and the role that Serbs would have in a future Kosovo 
government and in society as whole. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) He also expressed his hope that GOS leaders would appear 
on national television and urge the Serbs to stay in Kosovo and to 
work with their Albanian counterparts in a constructive way to 
ensure that their concerns will be reflected in the new Kosovo 
constitution.  Unfortunately both he and the majority of the other 
breakfast guests conceded that the more likely reaction from 
Belgrade would be that Prime Minister Kostunica's DSS would work 
through their contacts on the ground to encourage Serbs to leave the 
region in order to drum up international concern over the ensuing 
humanitarian crisis.  Both Ambassadors stressed that the 
international community would not abandon Kosovo Serbs, and that the 
KFOR troops would protect Serbs and Albanians alike, stating that 
the lessons of March 17th had been learned and that the response to 
any violence would be quick and decisive. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) The group also spoke about some recent articles and press 
commentaries that openly discussed the likelihood of Kosovo 
independence, one editorial in the pro-government daily Politika 
having posited that Serbia should accept the inevitable and to move 
forward with EU and Euro-Atlantic integration.  Ambassador Polt 
asked if the pieces constituted the beginnings of a more honest 
public dialog of Kosovo status reality.  The journalists in the 
group stressed that a realistic, forward thinking movement may be 
fermenting in some sectors of society.  That said, although the 
public would not rise up in opposition to unconstructive government 
rejection of Kosovo status, Serbs would not go along with a renewed 
break with the Western community. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) This meeting was part of an ongoing series of efforts we 
are making in cooperation with other Quint Ambassadors and Embassies 
to elicit Serb voices in favor of the Ahtisaari proposal and at 
least unhappy acceptance of Kosovo reality.  At the very least, this 
meeting provided a forum for a constructive and thoughtful 
conversation among people who help shape public opinion in however 
small a way.  The general consensus was that the current political 
situation is a product of the time the GOS lost by not negotiating 
and engaging the international community smartly over the past year. 
 There was hope that the current batch of reactionary politicians 
both in Serbia and in Kosovo would be replaced by a more moderate 
group once final status was achieved. 
 
POLT