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Viewing cable 07ANKARA367, TURKEY SEEK TO REVITALIZE BSEC AS IT FETES 15 YEARS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07ANKARA367 2007-02-20 15:59 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Ankara
VZCZCXRO2235
RR RUEHDA
DE RUEHAK #0367/01 0511559
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 201559Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1026
INFO RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS 7825
RUEHKB/AMEMBASSY BAKU 1463
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 0092
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 4215
RUEHBM/AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST 0965
RUEHCH/AMEMBASSY CHISINAU 0452
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV 0009
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 5522
RUEHSF/AMEMBASSY SOFIA 1130
RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI 3090
RUEHTI/AMEMBASSY TIRANA 0259
RUEHYE/AMEMBASSY YEREVAN 1266
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL 2155
RUEHDA/AMCONSUL ADANA 1669
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 5351
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 000367 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
PARIS FOR USOECD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL SENV KCRM TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY SEEK TO REVITALIZE BSEC AS IT FETES 15 YEARS 
 
 
ANKARA 00000367  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
A) ANKARA 58 
B) 06 ANKARA 6154 
 
1.  (SBU)  SUMMARY: Turkey aims to use its BSEC (Black Sea Economic 
Cooperation) chairmanship to revitalize BSEC as it commemorates its 
15th anniversary at its Istanbul Summit on June 25.  BSEC and Turkey 
urge high level participation at this event.  BSEC hopes to 
highlight BSEC institutional reform and a new era of EU relations at 
the summit.  Both BSEC and Turkey support more active observers, 
including the U.S. and welcome a U.S. proposal for a workshop on 
environmental protection.  End Summary. 
 
---------------------------- 
Turkey Chairmanship Roll-Out 
---------------------------- 
 
2.  (SBU)  At a February 1 lunch hosted by Turkish Foreign Minister 
Abdullah Gul for Ankara-based Ambassadors of BSEC members and 
observers that also included new Secretary General Leonidas 
Chrysanthopoulos, Gul previewed Turkey's reform priorities for BSEC 
looking toward its chairmanship in May and the 15th anniversary 
summit in Istanbul June 25.  Gul said this would be an opportunity 
to reassess BSEC and define a new vision for the future and called 
for participation at the highest levels of political leadership.  He 
called BSEC a unique platform that brings together countries of 
different economic and political groupings.  He hoped that the 
recent accession of three BSEC countries to EU membership would 
create new opportunities for greater interaction between BSEC and 
the EU.  Gul also noted that BSEC provides an environment in which 
countries with political differences could meet around a common 
theme and exchange views in a friendly environment. 
 
3.  (SBU)  Chrysanthopoulos highlighted projects approved at the 
Moscow Ministerial: the Black Sea Ring Highway and the Motorways of 
the Sea (ports upgrade) project, and hoped that member countries 
would sign the implementing documents for these projects at an 
extraordinary ministerial meeting in March in Istanbul.  He also 
looked forward to BSEC cooperative efforts with the OECD and UNDP. 
Chrysanthopoulos hoped that progress on these and other BSEC 
initiatives would contribute to resolving the area's frozen 
conflicts. 
 
--------------------- 
Observers Can Do More 
--------------------- 
 
4.  (SBU)  In a separate February 2 meeting at the Embassy, 
Chrysanthopoulos and and his Turkish Deputy Murat Sungar pitched 
greater U.S. participation in BSEC activities to Ambassador. 
Recalling discussions with EUR DAS Matt Bryza last summer, 
Chrysanthopoulos welcomed the U.S. as observer and sought to 
increase participation by the U.S. and other observers.   He urged 
that the U.S. consider participating in the development fund for 
pioneer projects, including serving on the steering committee. 
Citing the importance of the Black Sea Ring Highway project, which 
would soon have the requisite eight supporting countries, 
Chrysanthopoulos noted that BSEC could use U.S. help in bringing 
along international financial institutions. 
 
----------- 
BSEC Reform 
----------- 
 
5.  (SBU)  Chrysanthopoulos highlighted the June 25 Istanbul Summit 
as a Qey event for the Turkish chairmanship.  He hoped for 
senior-level USG participation.  He saw two BSEC Summit 
deliverables: a BSEC reform initiative and a new era in BSEC-EU 
relations.  Chrysanthopolous noted the importance of procedural 
reform within the organization that would make BSEC more efficient. 
Describing how hard he has to work to get the Russians to stop 
obstructing institutional change, he cited the following specific 
objectives: 
 
--Greater enforcement of resolution implementation, 
 
 
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