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Tim W Hayes  02/15/2007 03:26:42 PM  From  DB/Inbox:  Tim W Hayes

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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 000316 
 
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TAGS: PREL PTER ETRD PGOV TU IZ IR
SUBJECT: Scenesetter for the Visit of CODEL Dicks to Turkey 
 
(U) Sensitive but unclassified - please protect accordingly. 
 
¶1. Summary: Your visit comes at a critical period in the U.S.-Turkey 
bilateral relationship as the government grapples with continued PKK 
terrorist attacks from northern Iraq, fears that Iraq's instability 
will spread beyond its borders, the aftermath of the Dink murder, a 
potential U.S. congressional resolution on Armenian genocide, and 
how to find a balance between international and domestic priorities 
on Iran.  All this comes against the backdrop of an important 
election year here in Turkey.  Turks in and out of government 
predict that a genocide resolution will severely damage our 
bilateral relations and feed the flames of nationalist sentiment on 
the eve of elections.  End summary. 
 
Armenian Genocide Resolution 
---------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) Contacts from across the political spectrum in Turkey warn 
us that the passage of an Armenian Genocide Resolution (AGR) in 
either house of Congress will provoke a harshly negative public 
reaction here, one that will be magnified in this election year. 
(Parliament elects a new President in May, and parliamentary 
elections will be held by November.)  That any AGR will be 
non-binding and have no concrete effect on official U.S. policy 
toward Turkey will not matter.  In the context of already strong 
public disapproval of U.S. policies in Iraq, Turkish officials will 
have to confront an outpouring of public anger at the U.S. should an 
AGR pass. 
 
¶3. (SBU) The French experience may be illustrative for us. 
Following the French Assembly vote in favor of a law criminalizing 
denial of the Armenian Genocide in October 2006, the Turkish 
military announced the suspension of bilateral military relations 
with France, and protestors pelted the French embassy with rocks and 
eggs and hampered its operations for several weeks. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Most contacts warn us, however, that the reaction to an 
American genocide resolution will be far worse.  Differences over 
Iraq aside, they tell us that the U.S.-Turkey relationship runs much 
deeper than Turkey-France ties, and that they expected negative 
messages from France which has raised barriers throughout Turkey's 
EU accession process.  They anticipate that the Turkish people will 
react much more negatively and spontaneously to a resolution from 
the United States, forcing them to respond, especially in the 
current atmosphere of heightened nationalism.  It is possible that 
significant Turkish contributions to our key foreign policy agenda 
items could be at risk, such as our air supply routes to Iraq, use 
of Incirlik Air Base for cargo hub and air refueling operations in 
support of coalition efforts in both Iraq and Afghanistan, as well 
the Turkey-Iraq border crossing at Habur for trucking fuel to 
coalition forces in Iraq and as a future port to retrograde US 
military equipment out of Iraq.  Over half of US air cargo and 25% 
of fuel for Coalition troops in Iraq transits Turkey. 
 
PKK 
--- 
 
¶5. (SBU) The Kurdish terrorist organization PKK's safe-haven in 
northern Iraq is a continual irritant in U.S.-Turkey relations. 
Turkey has insisted since Operation Iraqi Freedom commenced in 2003 
that the Iraqi government and/or the U.S. must take steps to address 
this terrorist organization's freedom of movement in Iraq. 
 
¶6. (SBU) PKK terrorist attacks against Turkey from strongholds in 
northern Iraq killed 600 Turkish civilians and military in 2006 
alone.  A surge in PKK attacks last summer prompted the Turkish 
government to threaten a cross-border operation (CBO) into Iraq.  To 
forestall this and to seek concrete actions to reduce PKK violence, 
the U.S. appointed Gen. (r) Joseph Ralston as Special Envoy for 
Countering PKK Terrorism in August 2006.  The Turkish and Iraqi 
governments in turn named counterparts for Ralston: State Minister 
al-Waili for the GOI, and Gen. (r) Edip Baser for the GOT.  Ralston 
has conducted numerous meetings with Iraqi and Turkish officials, 
most recently in late January. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Although the Ralston initiative has gained us some time to 
address this problem, Turkey's leaders remain frustrated by the 
perceived lack of concrete results.  With continued clashes between 
the Turkish military and the PKK throughout the winter and an 
expected increase in PKK attacks against military and civilian 
targets once the snows melt in the spring, the government and 
military will find themselves under increasing pressure to take 
unilateral action against PKK strongholds in northern Iraq. 
 
Iraq and Kirkuk 
--------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) Turkey is concerned about growing instability in Iraq, 
increasing Iranian influence in the region, and the potential for 
the country to splinter along sectarian and/or ethnic lines.  Turks 
worry that the U.S. is unable to control the violence in Baghdad, or 
to moderate Iraqi Kurdistan's ambitions to expand its territory, 
including to Kirkuk.  The prospect of a referendum this year on the 
future status of Kirkuk exacerbates Turkish fears that a Kurdish 
annexation of the oil-rich province will lead to massive 
inter-communal violence and ultimately the dissolution of the 
country.  Turkey also fears that KRG control of Kirkuk will lead to 
the creation of an independent Kurdish state, which is perceived as 
an existential threat to Turkey. 
 
Iran 
---- 
 
¶9. (SBU) Turkey has cultivated increasing economic ties with Iraq, 
and PM Erdogan has made four official visits to Tehran. 
Approximately 375,000 trucks and 90 percent of eastbound Turkish 
Airline flights cross Iranian territory annually on the way to 
Central Asia.  More than a million Iranian tourists visit Turkey 
visa-free each year.  And Tehran has attempted to put space between 
Washington and Ankara by cooperating with Turkey on the PKK. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Despite this cooperation, Turkey remains distrustful of 
Iran's regional intentions and nuclear ambitions.  Seeing growing 
Iranian influence in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and the Palestinian 
Territories, Turkish officials and intellectuals have begun to speak 
with concern of an Iranian-controlled Shia "arc of influence" from 
Turkmenistan to the Mediterranean.  Turkey walks a cautious line on 
the Iranian nuclear issue.  The GOT will follow UNSC resolutions, 
but will not get out in front of the international community on this 
matter. 
 
WILSON