Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 64621 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 07ANKARA262, EURO-TURKISH PROSECUTORS' ANTI-TERRORISM ROUNDTABLE

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07ANKARA262.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07ANKARA262 2007-02-07 15:51 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Ankara
VZCZCXRO0767
RR RUEHDA
DE RUEHAK #0262/01 0381551
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 071551Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0879
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
INFO RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL 2074
RUEHDA/AMCONSUL ADANA 1628
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 5724
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 5345
RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE 1274
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 4207
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 3122
RUEHSW/AMEMBASSY BERN 0353
RUEHCP/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN 0237
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 ANKARA 000262 
 
SIPDIS 
 
JUSTICE FOR DAAG SWARTZ/OPDAT ALEXANDRE/OIA WARLOW 
TREASURY OTTF 
 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER KTFN TU FR NL UK
SUBJECT: EURO-TURKISH PROSECUTORS' ANTI-TERRORISM ROUNDTABLE 
 
Ref:  Ankara  6496  and previous 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: On January 25-26, the US Department of Justice, 
Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development Assistance and Training 
 
("OPDAT") through post's Resident Legal Adviser, hosted a 
legislative 
roundtable on methods to investigate and prosecute terrorist 
organizations, particularly the PKK.  .  This was a first-ever 
meeting in which terrorism 
prosecutors from Turkey met with French, Dutch and British 
terrorisms 
prosecutors to discuss strategic applications of their respective 
laws  in 
fighting terrorism.  At the last moment, several members of the 
Turkish 
Ministry of Interior attended the roundtable as well as two members 
of 
Turkish intelligence and a French diplomat.  The two- day workshop 
was 
filled with candid discussions on expediting flows of information, 
the 
possibilities and caveats in using classified information in 
prosecutions and 
specific cases.  The Netherlands, France and the UK gave detailed 
case 
presentations of on-going and past investigations, highlighting the 
need for 
closer relationships and quick access to Turkish counterparts in 
order to 
build stronger prosecutions.  The European participants had not been 
to 
Turkey before and most of the Turkish officials had never spoken 
with 
European prosecutors one-on-one.  The round table format allowed 
everyone the opportune to speak on all aspects of terrorism and law 
 
enforcement. We believe this roundtable was an important first step 
 in improving counterterrorism cooperation between Turkish and 
European prosecutors.  End Summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
Participants from Turkey and Europe 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) Turkish MOI presented an in-depth look at the PKK and 
the Turkish prosecutor from the Diyarbikar region gave a 
presentation 
on the terrorist threat presented by the PKK.  Deputy Public 
Prosecutors 
who all handled terrorism and organized crime from the eight 
districts in 
Turkey participated.  Those regions include Adana, Ankara, 
Diyarbakir, 
Erzurum, Istanbul, Izmir, Malatya and Van. The Ministry of Justice 
representatives included co-moderator Ozcan Avci, Director of 
International Training, Fahri Tosun, Deputy Director 
of International Training, Deputy and Ergin Ergul, Deputy General of 
 
International Law and Foreign Affairs.  European experts included 
France's Philippe Dorcet, Liaison Magistrate, Embassy of France in 
Turkey, Anne Kostoumaroff, Chief of Anti-terrorism section, Paris 
Ministry of Justice and Francois-Xavier Reymond, Second Secretary, 
Embassy of France in Turkey; The Netherlands' Eric Noordhoek, 
National Public Prosecutor AML/CFT and Anton C Maan, Senior 
Public Prosecutor; and the United Kingdom's Susan Hemming, Head 
of Counter Terrorism Section and Colin Gibbs, Senior Lawyer, 
Counter Terrorism Section.  US participants included Suzanne Hayden, 
 
Resident Legal Adviser US DOJ/OPDAT, Embassy Ankara and James 
Silverwood, Regional Director, OPDAT Washington DC.  Each of the 
participants described their laws and their desire to work with the 
 
Turkish prosecutors to build better international cases. 
 
---------------------------------- 
 
ANKARA 00000262  002 OF 004 
 
 
Prosecutive Issues in Europe 
---------------------------------- 
 
3. (SBU) The Dutch experience involved a detailed look at a 
prosecution 
of Al-Haramain and a discussion of the difficulties encountered when 
 
the court demanded information deemed classified and unavailable by 
 
another country.  The Dutch prosecutor discussed looking for 
alternative 
methods of addressing terrorist entities or businesses including 
administrative procedures such as licensing, if insufficient 
evidence 
existed for a criminal prosecution.  The prosecutor who serves as a 
 
liaison between the prosecution service and the intelligence 
community 
detailed the investigation of a PKK training camp located in the 
Netherlands.  He explained the difficult rulings of the court, the 
demands 
of the defense attorneys and the lack of international cooperation 
in 
obtaining information and/or access to witnesses.  Note: This 
presentation made it clear to Turkish participants that 
international 
media descriptions of the case did not accurately reflect the 
lengths to 
which the prosecution went to try maintain custody of the suspects. 
 
End Note 
 
4. (SBU) The French described a series of search warrants leading to 
 
information believed to be linked to PKK members, requested 
follow-up 
 information  from the Turks and described French legal practices 
that 
would ensure non-disclosure  of information received from Turkey. 
Both French participants indicated that they (France MOJ) had 
important information for the Turkish authorities and hoped to hear 
from 
them.   They stressed that they were committed to the investigation 
and 
prosecution of the PKK and would go forward regardless.  The Paris 
chief prosecutor inquired about known links to the PKK and drug 
trafficking.  She described specific examples of evidence recently 
found in a long-term investigation.  Note:  Press activity February 
4, 
2007 indicated the arrest of 13 individuals linked to the PKK.  This 
 
case was probably the one referred to in the French presentations. 
End Note. 
 
5. (SBU) The British prosecutors described their system as a middle 
 
ground between the Dutch and French regarding requirement to 
disclose 
information to the defendant.  They acknowledged that they did not 
have 
domestic issues with the PKK, but they had a number of terrorist 
organizations that they were actively working.  They both discussed 
 
the need to be creative in charging: to prosecute for an underlying 
or 
typical organized crime if terrorism charges could not be made.  The 
 
recurrent theme was "Don't be afraid to try something if the 
alternative 
is nothing."  They provided a detailed discussion of the on-going 
case 
regarding last summer's plot to bring liquid explosives onto 
airplanes. 
Although the case will not be tried for several years, the 
prosecutors 
wanted to share non-public information and theories with this group 
 
ANKARA 00000262  003 OF 004 
 
 
of 
their peers. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
Free flows of Information and Freedom of Speech 
------------------------------------------- 
 
6. (SBU) The Turkish prosecutors repeatedly inquired into formal and 
 
informal mechanisms to share information, extradition problems and 
the 
granting of asylum to putative terrorists.  While the US and 
Europeans 
urged the use of informal channels to elicit information for leads 
or to 
confirm suspicions, the Turkish participants questioned the legality 
and 
practicality.  Ergin Ergul, the primary representative for the MOJ 
section 
dealing with MLATS and other formal request channels, agreed with 
the 
European participants that informal methods were acceptable and 
important 
when speed was necessary.  He acknowledged that the formal channels 
 
were slower than informal but necessary to produce evidence for 
trials. 
He agreed that sometimes requests "languished" or were misplaced and 
 
that informal methods, i.e. a telephone call,  were appropriate. 
Contact 
details for all participants were provided and each European 
participant 
urged their Turkish colleagues to contact them with questions. Ergul 
 
urged his colleagues to make use of such contacts. 
 
7. (SBU) The issue of "freedom of speech" versus incitement was 
raised 
by the Turkish participants a number of times.  All non-Turkish 
participants 
discussed in general terms the limiting nature of their own "freedom 
of 
speech" issues and how they have dealt legislatively with printed 
media, 
clothing signifying terrorist association, and aiding and abetting 
acts of 
terrorism.  All agreed that in order to act (i.e. a criminal 
prosecution) against 
an entity or organization there have to be clear demonstrable links 
to terrorism. 
 
-------------------- 
The Way Forward 
--------------------- 
 
8. (SBU) The "roundtable" format was a new one for all of the 
Turkish 
participants and the French participants.  The initial 
get-acquainted period 
was shortened because all participants stayed in the same venue as 
the 
workshop.  The MOJ furnished their Hakim Evi ("Judges' House") and 
paid for full room and board for all the participants.  The Consul 
General 
hosted a reception at her Residence and invited several 
Istanbul-based MOJ, 
MOI and European counterparts.  The formal and informal exchanges of 
 
information that flowed for 36 hours set the stage for next steps. 
The RLA 
was contacted by MOJ, MOI and several of the European participants 
to 
request that this meeting should be the first of many such 
gatherings. 
 
 
ANKARA 00000262  004 OF 004 
 
 
------------ 
Comment 
------------ 
 
9. (SBU) This format proved a valuable tool to advance DOJ/USG goals 
to 
encourage Turkish and European coordination in prosecuting terrorist 
 
organizations.  By moderating the discussion, the US was able to 
support all 
of the participants, clarify the issues and remain unobtrusively 
involved in the discussion.  No one felt that this was "led" by the 
US, but rather felt simply that 
the opportunity for a dialogue was provided.  Without exception, the 
six 
European participants excelled in their presentations, their 
patience and their 
grasp of the unique situation that the Turkish participants found 
themselves confronting.  The parties were able to talk candidly and 
express concerns for 
their own position.  The Turkish participants were able to raise 
issues regarding 
EU countries and to discover directly through interaction with three 
EU 
members, that each country had different laws and practices in 
investigating 
and prosecuting terrorism.  Non-Turkish participants reiterated at 
every 
opportunity that they would assist in any way they could but that 
Turkish 
officials should be willing to assist the Europeans if prosecutions 
could only 
take place outside of Turkey.  The roundtable opened possibilities 
for future workshops between Turkish participants and different EU 
members.  Such 
workshops could address legislative tools that work well or may need 
 
amending, "following the money" to identify leadership and funding 
of 
terrorist organizations and enhanced cooperation. The roundtable was 
also a 
tangible example of U.S. ability to facilitate Turkey and European 
countries cooperation  against the PKK. 
 
WILSON