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Viewing cable 07AMMAN662, WELCOME CODEL KYL

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07AMMAN662 2007-02-12 16:54 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Amman
VZCZCXYZ0004
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHAM #0662/01 0431654
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 121654Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7020
UNCLAS AMMAN 000662 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR H, NEA, AND RM/F/DFS/FO/AA/CAA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OREP AMGT ASEC AFIN IZ IS JO
SUBJECT: WELCOME CODEL KYL 
 
REF: STATE 17137 
 
1. (SBU) Embassy Amman warmly welcomes CODEL Kyl to Amman, 
Jordan from February 17-18, 2007.  All visitors should 
carefully review this message, especially the threat 
assessment at paragraph 8. 
 
2. (SBU) Control officer for this visit is Matthew Eussen, 
Political-Military Affairs Officer.  Contact numbers are as 
follows: Office: 962-6-590-6598; Fax: 962-6-592-0159; Cell: 
962-79-516-1196.  The Embassy's after-hours telephone number 
is 962-6-590-6500.  Embassy will provide airport expeditor 
services and transportation to and from the hotel as 
required. 
 
3.  (U) (SBU) Hotel reservations have been made at the 
Intercontinental Hotel, 962-6-464-1361, for the night of 
February 17. Cost is at a rate within per diem.  Due to 
security concerns in Jordan (para 9) TDY personnel are 
assigned hotels on a rotational basis.  Therefore, Embassy 
Amman will make the final decision on hotel accommodations 
for all visitors. 
 
4. (U) Valid visas are required for entry into Jordan.  Visas 
may be obtained at Queen Alia airport though not at all land 
border crossings; however, Embassy Amman suggests visitors 
obtain their visas prior to arrival, as there can be long 
queues for visa issuance at the airport. Money can be 
exchanged at Queen Alia airport. 
 
5. (U) ADMINISTRATIVE GUIDELINES: Each visitor, regardless of 
length of stay, must have fiscal data to pay for direct costs 
of the visit.  Each agency, organization, or visiting 
delegation will be charged for the actual costs attributed to 
the visit.  Direct charge costs include, but are not limited 
to, American and LES overtime (for such services as airport 
expediting, cashier accommodation exchange, control room 
staffing, representational event support), travel and per 
diem costs incurred by post personnel in support of visitor's 
field travel, rental of vehicles and other equipment, long 
distance telephone calls, office supplies, gasoline and other 
vehicle maintenance costs, departure tax, and other airport 
fees. 
 
6. (U) HEALTH:  Although Jordan does not pose any unusual 
health hazards for visitors, the quality of health care 
facilities is not up to the U.S. or European standards, 
particularly outside of Amman.  As medications on the local 
economy are often in short supply, visitors should bring 
sufficient medications to post for their chronic medical 
problems.  Immunizations should be current for Tetanus and 
Diphtheria, Hepatitis A and B.  Visitors should drink bottled 
water rather than tap water.  Food in the hotels and most 
restaurants is safe to eat, but some of the smaller local 
restaurants do not always observe proper food handling 
procedures. 
 
 
Only those personnel covered under the State Department's 
medical program and who have a valid medical clearance for 
Jordan are eligible for a medical evacuation at USG cost. 
All other visitors are advised to have their own medical 
evacuation insurance to cover evacuation by air ambulance. 
Otherwise it will be necessary to ensure that the respective 
agency will cover any costs related to a medical evacuation. 
All local hospitals take major credit cards. 
 
7. (U) SECURITY CLEARANCE AND BUILDING ACCESS: In compliance 
with State Department regulations and Embassy policies, 
visitors requesting unescorted access to the Embassy compound 
should inform RSO Amman of their security clearance level (if 
any) and should name the agency that granted that clearance. 
Telegrams containing this information should include the 
"ASEC" tag to ensure distribution to the RSO. 
 
Electronic devices:  RSO approval must be obtained before any 
electronic device is brought into the Embassy. Privately 
owned laptops and personal computers, peripherals, diskettes, 
and tapes are prohibited in all mission facilities. 
Cellular/mobile phones and palm pilots are prohibited in 
controlled access areas. 
 
Travelers with USG-owned unclassified laptops or notebook 
computers, peripherals, diskettes, and tapes must receive 
RSO/IMO authorization before being granted access to U.S. 
Mission buildings.  USG-owned classified computers must be 
sent to post via classified diplomatic pouch.  Classified 
equipment must bear external USG bar-code inventory numbers 
and classification markings commensurate with the highest 
level of information processed on the system.  Questions 
concerning other types of electronic devices and magnetic 
media may be directed to the RSO and IMO. 
 
Mandatory personal security training:  Per 04 STATE 66580, 
all employees traveling to post for 30 days or more (whether 
PCS or TDY) must have completed the mandatory personal 
security training (State Department Security Overseas Seminar 
or equivalent) before arriving at post.  Agencies must 
provide the Chief of Mission with certification that this 
training will be completed prior to the employee's travel. 
Failure to do so will result in denial of country clearance. 
 
8. (U) THREAT ASSESSMENT: The threat of terrorism remains 
high in Jordan.  Transnational terrorist groups, as well as 
less sophisticated local elements, have demonstrated the 
capability to pose threats in Jordan.  The Al-Qaida in Iraq 
network (AQIZ) in particular continues to focus its terrorist 
activities against U.S. and Government of Jordan (GOJ) 
targets in Jordan.  AQIZ claimed responsibility for the 
November 9, 2005 bombings of three international hotels in 
Amman, which killed 60 people and injured over 100. 
Pedestrian suicide bombers wearing explosive vests carried 
the bombs into the hotels.  AQIZ also claimed responsibility 
for the Aqaba rocket attacks on August 19, 2005, which killed 
on Jordanian soldier and wounded another.  The assassination 
of American diplomat Larry Foley outside his west Amman 
residence on October 28, 2002 was also attributed to AQIZ 
leader Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, who was killed in Iraq in June 
2006. 
 
In addition, there has been a series of serious, confirmed 
terrorist threats and disrupted terrorist plots targeting 
U.S. or Jordanian interests in Jordan.  In February 2006, the 
Government of Jordan (GOJ) disrupted a terrorist cell 
plotting to attack Queen Alia International Airport.  In 
November 2005, the GOJ indicted six men for planning to carry 
out attacks against Americans at hotels and bars in Amman and 
Aqaba.  In August-September 2005, four militants were 
arrested for plotting assassinations of Americans in Jordan. 
In July 2005, GOJ authorities arrested 17 men linked to AQIZ 
who had planned to assassinate GOJ officials and Americans in 
Jordan.  In February 2005, four men were arrested for 
plotting attacks against GOJ officials, tourists and 
five-star hotels.  In the same month, another four-man group 
was disrupted while plotting to attack liquor stores in Amman 
and foreign tourists in Aqaba. 
 
Terrorists often do not distinguish between U.S. government 
personnel and private citizens.  Terrorists may target areas 
frequented by Westerners, such as tourist sites, hotels, 
restaurants, bars, nightclubs, liquor stores, transportation 
hubs, places of worship, expatriate residential areas, and 
schools.  In light of these security concerns, Americans are 
urged to maintain a high level of vigilance, to be aware of 
their surroundings, and to take appropriate steps to increase 
their security awareness.  It is especially important for 
travelers to be unpredictable by varying their times and 
routes and to maintain a low profile.  Moreover, Americans 
are urged to avoid contact with any suspicious or unfamiliar 
objects and to immediately report the presence of such 
objects to the authorities. 
 
Anti-American and anti-Western sentiment exists in Jordan and 
has been sparked on occasion by incidents in the region, 
particularly those related to Israeli/Palestinian issues and, 
to a lesser extent, Iraq.  This may lead to random acts of 
violence against Westerners.  On September 4, 2006, a gunman 
fired on foreigners at a popular tourist site in central 
Amman, killing one and injuring six. 
 
Travelers are advised to avoid any demonstrations or large 
gatherings of people, especially during times of increased 
tension.  Many demonstrations occur near mosques after Friday 
prayers.  Consequently, special sensitivity and caution 
should be exercised at or near mosques and religious sites 
during holy days and the Friday Muslim Sabbath. 
Demonstrations also often take place at universities and 
refugee camps. 
 
Crime is generally not a serious problem for travelers in 
Jordan, but petty crime is prevalent in the downtown Amman 
Hashimiyah Square area and near the Roman amphitheater. In 
the narrow streets of the older parts of the city center, 
crowded conditions invite pickpockets and other petty 
criminals.  Travelers are urged to be more guarded in these 
areas so that they do not present easy opportunities for 
criminals. 
 
In central and west Amman, there have been reports of thieves 
snatching pedestrians' purses from moving vehicles and then 
driving off.  In some instances, victims were injured when 
they were unable to free themselves from their purses.  When 
carrying a purse, it would be wise to conceal it if possible, 
to avoid walking near the road within reach of passing 
vehicles, and to walk against the flow of traffic. 
 
Jordanian police have warned the public to exercise vigilance 
when leaving banks or ATM machines, as thieves have 
reportedly preyed upon persons soon after using these 
services. 
 
Western women both visiting and residing in Jordan report 
sexual harassment and unwelcome advances of a sexual nature. 
There have been isolated reports of assault.  Women are 
advised to take reasonable precautions including dressing 
conservatively and not traveling alone.  Modest attire should 
be worn in deference to local custom. 
 
9. (U) TRAVEL GUIDELINES: American citizens and official 
visitors traveling in Jordan should exercise caution, be 
alert, and stay informed of regional and local events that 
could quickly impact the security environment in the country. 
 It is also recommended to maintain a low profile and not 
establish predictable patterns of movement, even if only 
visiting for a short period.  Taxis are the only form of 
public transportation that is recommended. 
 
For further information, see the State Department's Consular 
Information Sheet for Jordan at 
http://travel.state.gov/jordan.html and link from that site 
to the most recent Public Announcement on Travel in the 
Middle East and South Asia and the most recentWorldwide 
Caution. 
 
Visit Amman's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.state.gov.sgov.gov/p/nea/amman/ 
HALE