VZCZCXYZ0028
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUCNDT #0058/01 0251544
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 251544Z JAN 07
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1190
INFO RUEHXX/GENEVA IO MISSIONS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

UNCLAS USUN NEW YORK 000058 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: UNGA AORC KUNR PREL
SUBJECT: SPECIAL POLITICAL MISSIONS: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE 
U.S. OF POSSIBLE NEW FUNDING APPROACHES 
 
REF: USUN 52 
 
¶1.  1. This is an action request.  Please see paragraphs 2 
and 13. 
 
¶2.  As reported reftel, the General Assembly (GA) agreed on 
December 22, 2006 to additional funding for 27 special 
political missions (SPMs), including the UN missions in Iraq 
and Afghanistan (A/RES/61/252 Section VII).  However, during 
the Fifth Committee's consideration of the draft resolution, 
the Syrian delegate raised objections to the expected 
accomplishments and indicators of achievement associated with 
implementation of UN Security Council resolution 1559 
(withdrawal of foreign forces from southern Lebanon).  He 
also conveyed Syria's dislike of the Special Representative 
of the Secretary-General (Terje Roed-Larsen of Norway) in 
charge of the mission.  The Syrian delegate proposed a change 
in the financing scheme of special political missions, 
suggesting that SPMs be funded on the peacekeeping scale vs. 
the regular budget scale.  Both issues touch on the sensitive 
relationship between the General Assembly and the Security 
Council, as well as the role of the P-5 at the United 
Nations.  While a lack of time eventually cut off this 
conversation, USUN believes these issues are not behind us 
and that they will be raised again during the Fifth 
Committee's next discussion on SPM financing, scheduled for 
the March resumed session, when the Committee will consider 
financing for two new SPMs in Nepal and Burundi.  This cable 
provides background, analysis, and thoughts on these issues. 
USUN requests guidance on how to approach these issues in 
upcoming discussions. 
 
FINANCING OF SPECIAL POLITICAL MISSIONS 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  Over the last several biennia (the UN regular budget is a 
two-year budget), the funding requirements for special 
political missions, as well as the nature of these missions, 
have changed significantly.  The initial provision for the 
2002-2003 UN budget for special political missions was $98 
million, while the current 2006-2007 estimate for all special 
political missions is $702 million, more than a 700 percent 
increase.  In addition, special political missions now cover 
a wide range of activities and include everything from 
special envoys of the Secretary-General assigned to address a 
specific political situation, to panels of experts on 
sanctions, to peacebuilding missions, and to complex, 
multi-disciplinary missions in Iraq and Afghanistan.  As the 
nature of the mandates of special political missions become 
more complex and diverse and begin to include human rights, 
electoral and other functions, the mandates of many SPMs have 
become similar to those of most peacekeeping missions, which 
themselves have become more complex in recent years. 
However, no methodology exists to define a special political 
mission or a peacekeeping mission.  The general understanding 
has been that the key difference between the two is related 
to the deployment (or lack thereof) of troops.  All 
peacekeeping missions have troops deployed, generally to 
enforce some type of ceasefire or peace agreement, while SPMs 
do not have such a function. 
 
PROPOSALS TO FUND SPECIAL POLITICAL 
MISSIONS USING THE PEACEKEEPING SCALE 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  Until now, there has been agreement among Member States 
to finance special political missions from the regular budget 
and therefore at the scale of assessments applicable to the 
regular budget (currently 22 percent for the U.S.).  However, 
given the increasing costs associated with SPMs, their impact 
on the overall regular budget level, and the fact that all 
but one are mandated by the Security Council, some 
delegations, notably Japan and Syria, have called for the 
General Assembly to consider financing Security 
Council-approved special political missions at the 
peacekeeping scale of assessment (26.0864 percent for the 
U.S.).  Syria actually went one step further by proposing 
draft language during the December 2006 Fifth Committee 
discussions that, if adopted, would have immediately changed 
the scale of assessment used for special political missions. 
A change in the scale of assessments would impact only the 
P-5.  The P-5 pay a higher percentage of the budgets for 
peacekeeping missions than they do for the regular budget, 
based on the notion of "special responsibilities" for the 
permanent members of the Security Council.  Developing 
countries pay less on the peacekeeping scale, and therefore 
would benefit the most from a change in the scale used to 
finance SPMs.  Most developed countries, such as the non-P5 
EU members, Japan, and CANZ, would pay the same amount.  Any 
change in the scale used to finance SPMs would only, 
therefore, impact the P-5. 
 
 
POTENTIAL IMPACT ON U.S. FUNDING 
OF SPECIAL POLITICAL MISSIONS 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  A special consideration for the U.S. is the way we pay 
our contributions to the regular budget vs. peacekeeping. 
Regular budget contributions are funded through the 
Contributions to International Organizations (CIO) account, 
while the Contributions for International Peacekeeping 
Activities (CIPA) account funds our assessments for 
peacekeeping.  Both accounts are facing shortfalls that 
challenge our ability to pay our contributions in full. 
Legislative language currently caps our payments for 
peacekeeping at 25 percent, although we are assessed at a 
higher rate, i.e. 26.0864 percent for 2007-2009.  In 
addition, CIPA language requires that Congress must be 
notified 15 days in advance of the U.S. agreeing to a new 
peacekeeping mission or any change in an existing 
peacekeeping mission.  If SPMs are funded on the peacekeeping 
scale, and therefore from the CIPA account, USUN would 
presume that this notification would apply to all 26 SPMs 
that are mandated by the Security Council, adding another 
step to the U.S. approval process. 
 
 
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AS APPROVER 
OF THE BUDGET 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  Article 17 of the Charter of the United Nations states 
that "The General Assembly shall consider and approve the 
budget of the Organization."  Over the years, the process for 
GA consideration and approval of the budget has evolved, with 
greater emphasis now placed on GA assessment of the views 
concerning program priorities expressed by the 34 members of 
the Committee for Program and Coordination (CPC).  Under the 
provisions of GA resolutions 58/269 and 59/275, the CPC 
convenes prior to the GA's consideration of each proposed 
two-year budget to consider and subsequently make 
recommendations on a plan outline prepared by the 
Secretary-General reflecting the longer-term objectives of 
 
SIPDIS 
the Organization and a proposed biennial program plan. This 
"experiment" in strategic framework planning, beginning with 
the 2006-2007 biennial UN budget, was strongly influenced by 
public sector trends toward results-based budgeting.  As a 
result, the UN budget now includes not only program 
narratives, but also expected accomplishments and indicators 
of achievement. 
 
¶7.  The strategic framework serves as the principal policy 
directive and the basis for program planning, budgeting, 
monitoring and evaluation for the UN regular budget.  The 
strategic framework is comprised of a number of logical 
frameworks - one for each program.  CPC members, including 
until recently the U.S., review the strategic framework in 
non-budget years and make recommendations for changes to the 
program narratives, expected accomplishments, and indicators 
of achievement in order to align them with the legislative 
mandates previously approved by the GA.  The recommendations 
are then, with few exceptions, routinely endorsed by the GA 
under the Fifth Committee's consideration of the agenda item 
on "program planning."  They then form the basis for the 
Secretary-General's proposed program budget for the following 
 
SIPDIS 
biennium period. 
 
DANGER OF POSSIBLE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 
ATTEMPTS TO REINTERPRET SECURITY 
COUNCIL MANDATES 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  The level of detail included in the strategic framework 
with regard to the Department of Political Affairs (where 
funding for all special political missions falls) does not 
allow for much scrutiny by the CPC with regard to individual 
SPMs.  However, as special political missions have grown 
larger and more complex, the General Assembly has requested 
greater detail about them in order to justify resource 
requests.  The GA ultimately has the authority to approve the 
strategic framework, as well as to seek additional 
information concerning any activity funded from the UN 
budget.  This has led to a unique problem for special 
political missions, where all but one current mission is 
approved by the Security Council. While there are other 
elements in the regular budget that are based on Security 
Council decisions, they tend to be buried and have not been 
subject to much GA discussion or scrutiny.  However, we are 
now facing a situation where the GA, acting in its role 
overseeing and approving resource allocation, may also 
suggest changes to expecQ accomplishmQand indicators of 
achievement, including for special political missions, 
thereby essentially reinterpreting Security Council mandates. 
 
 
¶9.  This issue surfaced during the December discussions on 
financing for special political missions, in particular with 
regard to the logical framework associated with the 
implementation of Security Council resolution 1559. The 
Syrian delegate, under instructions from Damascus, submitted 
all manner of objectionable language for the draft resolution 
on SPM's being considered by the Fifth Committee in response 
to the Syrian Government's dislike of the expected 
accomplishments and indicators of achievement of the UN 
mission in Southern Lebanon, as well as the Syrian 
Government's dislike of the Secretary-General's Special 
Representative (Terje Roed-Larsen of Norway) in charge of the 
mission.  In effect the changes that were submitted would 
have constituted a reinterpretation of the mandate.  Despite 
objections by USDel and the EU to opening up the logical 
framework, and repeated statements that it was not the role 
of the General Assembly, or the Secretariat for that matter, 
to interpret Security Council resolutions, Syria insisted 
that as part of the GA's responsibilities in allocating 
resources, GA members had the right to ensure that 
results-based budgeting was being accurately implemented. 
 
 
THOUGHTS FOR THE FUTURE 
------------------------ 
 
¶10.  As we look ahead to the Fifth Committee's next 
discussions on SPMs in March, USUN believes that more thought 
must be given to the issues raised above, taking into account 
the high priority we place on the mandates of many special 
political missions, as well as the paramount role played by 
the Security Council.  Given the higher costs the U.S. would 
face if SPMs were financed from the peacekeeping scale, as 
well as the CIPA-related issues that might make it more 
time-consuming and difficult for the Department to secure 
Congressional support for financing these missions, USUN 
recommends that we work with other members of the P-5 to 
ensure SPM financing is kept in the regular budget.  However, 
achieving this will not be easy given the likely lack of 
interest by many traditional allies, such as Japan and CANZ 
(since the change in scale would not impact them), and the 
group dynamics that play into Fifth Committee negotiations. 
 
¶11.  The Russian Federation and the U.S. are the only members 
of the P-5 that operate on their own during Fifth Committee 
discussions.  China is part of the Group of 77 and China 
(G-77), typically endorsing the G-77 "group" position, while 
the United Kingdom and France are constrained by their 
alignment with other European Union partners.  The EU 
consistently now speaks with one voice in the Fifth 
Committee.  Separately, Russia and China are not particularly 
vocal in the Fifth Committee on budgetary issues.  During the 
December discussions, the Chinese clearly had no 
understanding of the extent of the implications for the 
Security Council and the P-5 of the language proposed by 
Syria.  Only after other P-5 Ambassadors raised the issue 
with the Chinese Ambassador did the Chinese Fifth Committee 
delegate begin to pay some attention.  And even then, neither 
the Chinese nor the Russians provided much support to the P-3 
in trying to eliminate problematic language. 
 
¶12.  Another item to consider is that if we succeed in 
keeping SPM funding in the regular budget, we will continue 
to have discussions on the logical frameworks for the various 
missions, most likely those in the Middle East.  There is 
also the possibility that some delegations will move to have 
the CPC review the logical frameworks, a topic which also was 
raised in December, although such an idea did not gain 
traction at that time.  With a review of the entire strategic 
framework "experiment" scheduled for the sixty-second General 
Assembly in the fall of 2007, the door is open to further 
changes in the review process, including CPC's role in 
examining the logical frameworks for SPMs.  Given our 
numerous concerns with the CPC and the fact that the GA seems 
perfectly content to endorse CPC's recommendations, and not 
make its own changes to the strategic framework, this could 
prove highly problematic in our efforts to promote U.S. 
interests.  Therefore, we should keep in mind that any 
position that supports keeping SPM funding in the regular 
budget will need to take into account the possible CPC and 
the GA roles reviewing logical frameworks and the impact of 
these reviews on mandates created by Security Council 
resolutions. 
 
GUIDANCE REQUEST 
---------------- 
 
¶13.  USUN requests guidance as to how to approach these 
issues in the upcoming Fifth Committee discussions in March. 
 
 
WOLFF