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PP RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMA RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV
DE RUCNDT #0018/01 0121508
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 121508Z JAN 07
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1117
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZO/OAU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY 1079
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM PRIORITY 0503
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA PRIORITY 0218
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000018 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: CD PGOV PHUM PREF PREL SU UNSC KPKO
SUBJECT: DPKO SAYS NO PEACEKEEPING OPERATION IN CHAD/CAR 
CAN SUBSTITUTE FOR POLITICAL PROCESS 
 
USUN NEW Y 00000018  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY. After unusually testy exchanges with some 
Security Council Members at January 10 consultations over 
accusations that the United Nations was dragging its feet on 
deployment of forces to eastern Chad and northeastern Central 
African Republic (CAR), the UN Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations (DPKO) declared that it could not dispatch a 
peacekeeping operation in the absence of credible political 
processes in both countries.  Despite the heated exchanges, 
middle ground was ultimately found when the Council and DPKO 
agreed to reinvigorate the work of the UN Technical 
Assessment Mission (TAM), which had been curtailed due to 
November instability in Chad; the TAM will return to Chad 
during the week of January 15.  The Council also agreed to a 
DPKO suggestion to quickly dispatch an advance team to 
N'Djamena to begin laying the political groundwork for the 
eventual deployment of a peacekeeping mission to Chad and 
CAR. END SUMMARY. 
 
SECURITY SITUATION WORRISOME 
---------------------------- 
¶2. (SBU) DPKO Assistant Secretary-General (SYG) Hedi Annabi, 
who had led the TAM to Chad and CAR in November/December 
2006, reported to the Council at January 10 consultations 
that the security situation in both countries showed 
"significant deterioration."  He noted that during the week 
of January 1, Chadian national forces (ANT) had moved from 
Abeche to Adre to battle rebel forces coming from El Geneina. 
 He expressed concern over escalating violence between ANT 
and anti-government forces in Chad.  He cited clashes between 
the ANT and rebels of the UFDD and RAFD in mid-December, 
during which the ANT exercised their 'right to pursuit' in 
following the rebels into Sudanese territory.  Annabi was not 
optimistic about the prospects for inclusion of other rebels 
groups into the December 24 agreement signed between the GOC 
and the FUC rebel group, pointing out that the coalition of 
the rebel groups UFDD, the RAFD and the SCUD had dismissed 
the reconciliation as 'propaganda.'  Annabi added that this 
coalition of rebel forces, with a combined strength of 6000 
troops and 500 vehicles, posed a viable threat to the GOC. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Annabi reported that recent cross-border attacks 
near Borota and renewed inter-ethnic fighting in Goz Beida in 
eastern Chad had led to at least 20,000 new displacements, 
forcing the total number of internally displaced persons 
(IDPs) there close to 100,000 over the past two months. 
Annabi was equally concerned about the plight of the 232,000 
refugees in Chad and the 20,000 refugees in CAR. 
 
UN CONCERNS OVER PKO DEPLOYMENT 
------------------------------- 
¶4. (SBU) Notwithstanding the deployment options outlined in 
the December 22 SYG Report (S/2006/1019; forwarded to IO and 
AF), Annabi argued that the time was not right for a UN 
peacekeeping operation to Chad and CAR, given the lack of 
genuine dialogue and reconciliation among senior Chadian and 
CAR leadership to address the political dimensions of the 
crises in those countries.  Annabi reiterated the wording of 
the SYG Report by declaring that "unless and until all 
parties agree to a ceasefire and to dialogue, a peacekeeping 
mission would have no political process to support and no 
exit strategy."  No troop-contributing country would commit 
to an operation under such circumstances, Annabi contended, 
adding that DPKO had "cast a wide net" for contributors but 
had not received even enough offers for one single battalion. 
 
 
¶5. (SBU) Annabi also outlined the logistical constraints 
confronting a UN deployment, including poor infrastructure, 
absence of airfields, vast travel distances and severe 
weather conditions.  He warned that Members must be ready to 
make the necessary military and police resources available in 
light of these challenges.  Annabi also made mention of the 
absence of genuine consent from the GOC to a UN deployment in 
Chad, noting that Chad President Deby had agreed in principle 
only and had not engaged in their December discussion on a 
technical level about the arrival of UN forces.  Summing up 
his view of deployment options, Annabi said, "If consent of 
the parties, a political process and access are still basic 
principles, conditions for a successful peacekeeping 
operation are not in place.  It breaks our heart because 
there is a real humanitarian crisis . . . but the Secretariat 
needs to tell the Security Council what it needs to know, not 
what it wants to hear." 
 
USUN NEW Y 00000018  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
 
¶6. (SBU) Referring to Paragraph 88 of the SYG Report, Annabi 
suggested the Council dispatch an advance team that would 
establish a permanent presence in N'Djamena to begin laying 
the political groundwork for the eventual deployment of a 
peacekeeping mission to Chad and CAR by "exploring the 
possibilities for a political agreement between the 
Governments concerned in the region, and between the 
Governments and their respective opposition groups" (NOTE: 
DPKO corrected privately that Annabi re-named the team an 
"advance mission" after his briefing.  END NOTE).  Annabi 
referred to a January 5 letter from UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees Gutierres which endorsed the immediate deployment of 
such a team.  The advance team, like UNAMIS in Sudan and 
UNAMIC in Cambodia, would be the precursor to an eventual 
multidimensional peacekeeping operation charged with 
liaising, monitoring and protecting (Option B in SYG Report). 
 
MEMBERS DEEM DPKO RESPONSE 'UNACCEPTABLE' 
---------------------------------------- 
¶7. (SBU) The majority of Members expressed frustration with 
what they considered further stall tactics by DPKO to deploy 
a force to eastern Chad and CAR.  UK PermRep Jones Parry was 
the most vocal, launching into a series of vitriolic attacks 
against Annabi, calling his briefing "mealy-mouthed" and an 
"unacceptable response" to the Council, given the plight of 
the civilians on the ground in the region (NOTE: UKUN Sudan 
Expert told Poloff privately that Jones Parry's outburst was 
unscripted and presumably came as a result of his 
'impassioned' stance on Chad.  DPKO, however, speculated that 
the diatribe was directed personally at Annabi.  END NOTE). 
 
¶8. (SBU) Members, including Ambassador Sanders, called for 
the TAM to return to the region as soon as possible to resume 
its work.  Annabi conceded that this would be possible, given 
that no new Council authorization would be required for its 
departure.  DPKO told Poloff after consultations that the 
team planned to return to Chad on January 17 or 18. 
 
ADVANCE TEAM SEEN AS MIDDLE GROUND 
---------------------------------- 
¶9. (SBU) There was widespread Council support for the SYG's 
recommendation to dispatch an advance team to N'Djamena.  The 
French delegation offered to begin work on an initial draft 
Presidential Statement that, according to Annabi, would be 
required for planning to begin.  NOTE: Poloff raised the 
issue of President Deby's consent for this mission separately 
with DPKO, which agreed that Deby must be engaged in and in 
support of the process of ultimately deploying UN forces in 
his territory.  END NOTE. 
 
CALL FOR MORE DARFUR MOMENTUM BEFORE AU SUMMIT 
--------------------------------------------- - 
¶10. (SBU) Members were universally frustrated with the pace 
of progress on addressing the Darfur crisis, in particular 
with Sudan President Bashir's prevarication regarding the 
eventual hybrid UN-African Union (AU) peacekeeping force. 
Congolese PermRep Ikouebe suggested that the issue be 
highlighted at the upcoming AU Summit on January 30, adding 
the Summit might be the appropriate forum to create a "clear 
text" laying out the specifics of the three-phase deployment. 
 Ikouebe also recommended that Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon, 
who will attend the Summit, take an active role in 
approaching African states there to support such a message. 
Such momentum was necessary, Ikouebe declared, since, the AU 
Mission in Sudan (AMIS) would withdraw from Darfur come June. 
 Annabi added that funding from traditional partners would be 
needed for AMIS until that time. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Most Members expressed support for the appointment 
of Jan Eliasson as UN Envoy to Sudan; Annabi confirmed that 
Eliasson would meet with President Bashir in the next 24 
hours.  Annabi lauded the success New Mexico Governor Bill 
Richardson had enjoyed in brokering a ceasefire among parties 
in Darfur. 
WOLFF