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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 10 TOKYO 000030 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA 
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION; 
TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; 
SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN, 
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA 
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR; 
CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA. 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 01/05/07 
 
 
INDEX: 
 
(1) Editorial: Why is the DPJ avoiding contests? 
 
(2) Interview with DPJ Secretary General Yukio Hatoyama about the 
election year: Unity of the party would unravel if the party is 
defeated 
 
(3) Japan, US to review Korean Peninsula contingency concept plan; 
Shift from armchair theory to effectiveness 
 
(4) The light and darkness of Japan-US alliance unification (Part 1) 
-- Front line of Japan's defense: Eyes of Commander of US Forces 
Japan, Lt. Gen. Bruce Wright are cast on North Korea 
 
(5) With application of Anti-monopoly Law in mind, FTC investigates 
dozens of companies, including leading general construction 
contractors, over low-priced bidding 
 
(6) Opinion column -- Disputed Northern Territories: Compromise 
proposal to Russia will simply have an opposite effect 
 
ARTICLES: 
 
(1) Editorial: Why is the DPJ avoiding contests? 
 
ASAHI (Page 3) (Full) 
January 5, 2006 
 
This year is the year of elections with unified local elections 
taking place in the spring, followed by the Upper House election in 
the summer. And yet the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ or Minshuto) 
somehow lacks visibility right from the very start of such a year. 
 
Gubernatorial elections for Yamanashi, Ehime and Miyazaki 
Prefectures were officially announced yesterday, but the DPJ failed 
to field its own candidate in any of the three prefectures. 
 
The party abode by its major principle of not fielding joint 
candidates with the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) as advocated by 
party head Ozawa. Its official explanation may be that it was unable 
to find appropriate candidates. 
 
However, given situations in various prefectures, it is questionable 
to what extent the DPJ can proudly say that it has stuck to its 
policy of prohibiting the fielding of joint candidates. 
 
In Ehime Prefecture, the LDP, the New Komeito and the Social 
Democratic Party support the incumbent governor. The DPJ-affiliated 
group in the prefectural assembly also supports the same candidate. 
Failure to field an opposing candidate is in essence tantamount to 
joining an all-ruling party camp, excluding the Japanese Communist 
Party. In Yamanashi Prefecture, while the LDP has split into two 
camps, the DPJ's prefectural chapter has endorsed the incumbent 
independently of the party headquarters. 
 
In Miyazaki Prefecture, too, the DPJ's local chapter is supporting a 
new candidate also recommended by some members of the LDP. 
 
Wakayama Prefecture held a gubernatorial election late last year to 
make a clean start from a bid-rigging scandal similar to the one 
occurred in Miyazaki Prefecture. However, failing to field its own 
candidate, the DPJ lost the election by default. 
 
TOKYO 00000030  002 OF 010 
 
 
 
The Abe Cabinet is having a hard time with its support ratings 
plummeting over the reinstatement of postal rebels, followed by the 
resignations of the chair of the government's Tax Research 
Commission and the state minister for administrative reform. What is 
happening now can be taken as if the DPJ, the no. 1 opposition 
party, is helping out the Abe cabinet by fielding joint candidates 
or losing an election by default. 
 
Some DPJ members have voiced their real opinions, including that it 
would be disgraceful if they forced themselves to field candidates 
and their candidates were defeated and that they want to remain as a 
ruling party in prefectural governments, by fielding candidates 
jointly with the LDP, if possible. 
 
In the Fukushima gubernatorial election last November a candidate 
who ran on the DPJ's ticket for the first time defeated a candidate 
officially endorsed by the LDP and the New Komeito. Though the DPJ 
was defeated in the Okinawa gubernatorial election, it fought the 
election with a candidate jointly endorsed by opposition parties. 
Such results do not appear to be valid in districts where the DPJ's 
footing is weak. 
 
However, since the DPJ proclaims that it will aim at taking the 
reins of government, emerging from a permanent opposition, it should 
offer another option different from that offered by the LDP in each 
election. If it cannot do that, it should not be able to solidify 
its footing. Its stance of avoiding confrontation in gubernatorial 
elections is not challenging at all. 
 
The DPJ has placed a ban on fielding joint candidates with the LDP. 
So far so good. However, it appears that Ozawa is recently devoting 
much of his attention to finding candidates for the Upper House 
election and snatching block votes from the LDP. 
 
We want Ozawa to reconfirm the reasons why fielding joint candidates 
is not good for elections for heads of local governments. The party 
convention to be held in the middle of this month should provide the 
best opportunity for that. 
 
The Tokyo gubernatorial election to be held in April is noteworthy 
of attention as a touchstone. 
 
For the first time, the LDP intends to support Shintaro Ishihara, 
who will aim for a third term. How is the DPJ going to deal with 
issues confronting the Ishihara administration, including his 
luxurious overseas trips and his spending of public money for his 
fourth son? If the DPJ cannot wage a contest on such an occasion, it 
will lose its reason for existing. 
 
(2) Interview with DPJ Secretary General Yukio Hatoyama about the 
election year: Unity of the party would unravel if the party is 
defeated 
 
NIHON KEIZAI (Page 2) (Full) 
January 5, 2007 
 
-- What do you think the Upper House election implies for your 
party, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ or Minshuto)? 
 
Hatoyama: "It is a survival game. I've braced myself for the 
election, having this acute awareness that losing this game would 
mean the party might cease to exist. By putting the toughest person 
 
TOKYO 00000030  003 OF 010 
 
 
conceivable in the top post, our party has now been able to bring 
unity of the party for the first time. Our minimum goal is to force 
the ruling parties to lose their majority, even by a margin of one 
seat. 
 
"In order to bring about a dissolution of the Lower House for a snap 
general election, I think, there is no choice but to win the Upper 
House election. If we fail, our party will lose its unity. This 
election in this sense will be a major political showdown." 
 
-- In order to force the ruling bloc to lose its majority, the 
opposition parties need to grab a total of at least 18 seats, in 
addition to the seats they have before the election. 
 
"If we have a similar battle as we had in the previous Upper House 
election in 2004, it will be sufficient for our party-authorized 
candidates to win nine seats in the 29 single-seat constituencies, 
but our party President Ichiro Ozawa has set the goal of winning 15 
seats." 
 
-- The single-seat constituencies are located mainly in rural areas 
where the Minshuto is less popular. 
 
"Prime Minister Shinzo Abe intends to inherit former Prime Minister 
Junichiro Koizumi's line of forsaking the rural areas. Our party, 
however, attaches importance to agriculture, forestry, and 
fisheries, and we have suggested introducing an individual 
income-security system for them. Ruling Liberal Democratic Party 
(LDP) Secretary General Nakagawa criticizes that system as 
pork-barrel politics. Supposedly, he fears our party's approach." 
 
-- In proportional representation blocs, the Minshuto plans to put 
up candidates chosen from organizations that previously supported 
the LDP. 
 
"This will have an impact on the LDP. It would make voters feel 
relieved that our party's policy is not necessarily wide apart from 
the LDP's. I think it important to offer an option to those who are 
unsatisfied with the current state of the LDP, which appears to be 
on the verge of being swallowed by the junior ruling coalition 
partner New Komeito." 
 
-- Do you have any concern that the policy differences between your 
party and the ruling parties will become blurred? 
 
"That's is an important point. President Ozawa has suggested working 
together with other opposition parties, even the Japanese Communist 
Party (JCP), but the view shared by a number of junior lawmakers in 
our party is that the Social Democratic Party (SDP) will be a 
borderline party the Minshuto can get along with. Given that, it's 
impossible to get along with the JCP. This point must be kept in 
mind; otherwise a serious mistake will be made. I take it 
seriously. 
 
"Our president emphasizes a bright side of joining hands (with the 
SDP and the JCP), but we must properly assess a negative effect of 
doing so in order to avoid trouble. I support offering as much 
cooperation as possible to the SDP and the People's New Party, but 
it's no good if our party is seen as easily making concessions in 
policy debates." 
 
-- It appears how you will face the ruling bloc in the ordinary Diet 
session will significantly affect the election. 
 
TOKYO 00000030  004 OF 010 
 
 
 
"We will seek to examine the problem involving former State Minister 
in Charge of Administrative Reform Genichiro Sata, who resigned from 
his post just recently, even though the Diet is in recess. This 
problem will be high on agenda even in the ordinary Diet session. We 
will pursue the prime minister's responsibility for his appointment, 
as well as his accountability. If that is not sufficient, we will 
seek to summon someone as a sworn witness. 
 
"Our focus in policy debate will be on how to remove social 
disparities. We will come up with counterproposals for, for 
instance, labor legislation and reform of the pension programs." 
 
-- Do you think there is any possibility that double elections (for 
both the houses of the Diet) will occur? 
 
"Such a possibility is slim, though our party by July will determine 
all candidates to run in the next Lower House election. The prime 
minister cannot go that far." 
 
(3) Japan, US to review Korean Peninsula contingency concept plan; 
Shift from armchair theory to effectiveness 
 
YOMIURI (Page 3) (Abridged slightly) 
January 5, 2007 
 
Tokyo and Washington have begun drawing up a specific plan for 
evacuating Japanese and American civilians from South Korea in time 
of a contingency on the Korean Peninsula. Along with a revision of 
Concept Plan 5055, the two countries' effort to map out effective 
plans to deal with a contingency on the peninsula has now been set 
in motion. Concept Plan 5055 has been regarded as a plan filled with 
loopholes due to the lack of involvement of relevant government 
agencies. There is a possibility, however, that Japan-US talks and 
coordination with concerned government agencies and local 
governments will run into difficulties. 
 
Progress 
 
On Dec. 4, 2006, senior defense officials from Japan and the United 
States met in Tokyo. In the session, the Defense Agency reported: 
"Concerned ministries and agencies held a meeting in late November 
at the Prime Minister's Official Residence (Kantei) for revising 
Concept Plan 5055." This elicited praise from US Deputy Defense 
Under Secretary Richard Lawless who said: "That's great progress. We 
would like to see further progress in our meeting next year." 
 
Plan 5055, which was drawn up by the Defense Agency Joint Staff 
Council (currently the Joint Staff Office) and US Forces Japan, is 
linked to US-ROK Joint Operational Plan 5027 envisioning the North's 
advance to the South and Plan 5029 envisaging a collapse and 
destabilization of North Korea by a coup d'etat or other factors. 
 
As Japan's assistance to the US, Plan 5055 lists, among other items, 
allowing US aircraft and vessels transporting supplies to the Korean 
Peninsula to use private airports and seaports in Japan and 
providing medical treatment to wounded US servicemen. 
 
But the plan is impractical because key players, such as the Land 
and Transport Ministry and the Health and Welfare Ministry, were not 
involved in the process of producing it. The plan, which is devoid 
of specificity about which airports and seaports to use and the 
types and quantities of supplies to be transported, is nothing more 
 
TOKYO 00000030  005 OF 010 
 
 
than a pipe dream. 
 
Kickoff 
 
A Japan-US director general-level meeting held in September 2006 
reached an agreement to finish revising the plan in about a year. In 
the wake of North Korea's missile launches in July, the two 
countries decided to speedily finish up work that used to take two 
years, according to a government source. The plan to revise 5055 
gathered further momentum with North Korea's nuclear test in 
October. 
 
Allowing the US military to use airports and seaports in Japan on a 
priority basis is a key factor in revising the plan. "In the event 
of a contingency on the Korean Peninsula, Japan would have to serve 
as a supply base for the US military from a geopolitical 
perspective," a Foreign Ministry official explained. 
 
In principle, fighters and bombers would use US military bases in 
Japan and Self-Defense Force bases, and US-chartered civilian planes 
and vessels for transporting supplies would use commercial airports 
and seaports. 
 
Late last year, the government received a US list of some 30 
specific airports and seaports in Japan for use by the US military, 
while citing the need to confirm their unloading, refueling, and 
storing capability, plus firefighting and guard systems and parking 
spaces. 
 
Based on the introduction of a missile defense (MD) system in Japan 
and the US, a revised plan would specify ways to deal with a 
"compound contingency" involving a missile attack on Japan and a 
terrorist attack by North Korean agents in the country. 
 
Tough challenge 
 
The work's toughest challenge would be making arrangements with the 
US, concerned government offices, and local governments. 
 
Putting high priority on facilities, the US is hoping to use major 
Japanese airports, such as Narita, Haneda, Kansai, New Chitose, and 
Fukuoka airports. Major airports are also in high demand by civilian 
planes. The government intends to secure parts of large airports for 
civilian use by utilizing mid-size airports with low operating 
rates. 
 
The public facilities usage law enacted in 2004 allows the 
government to forcibly use airports and seaports in time of a 
contingency in the country. But in time of a contingency in areas 
surrounding Japan, the government is allowed only to request their 
use. Airport and seaport administrators might reject requests for 
use by the US military. 
 
Additionally, small and mid-sized facilities in local areas have 
only a few customs, immigration, and quarantine officials. The 
Finance Ministry, the Justice Ministry, and the Agriculture, 
Forestry, and Fisheries Ministry will study a support system and 
other factors for smooth procedures. 
 
Maintaining confidentiality will also be a challenge. 
 
Designating the plan's contents as defense secret under the 
Self-Defense Forces (SDF) Law Article 96-2, the Defense Agency has 
 
TOKYO 00000030  006 OF 010 
 
 
imposed strict security obligations on officials in charge and SDF 
personnel. Violators face up to five years in prison, which is 
heavier than up to one year in prison for leaking secrets under the 
National Civil Service Law. 
 
A senior Foreign Ministry official ascribed the delay in fleshing 
out the plan to growing difficulty to keep secrets with an increase 
in the number of persons concerned. The government plans to punish 
government officials who leak secrets as severely as SDF personnel. 
 
A need will also arise to discuss in advance with local governments, 
private medical institutions, and transport companies such factors 
as the number of hospital beds available for wounded or sick troops, 
how much water and food can be procured and how they should be 
transported as part of Japan's logistical support for the US 
military. 
 
Plan for evacuating Japanese nationals from South Korea 
 
Drawing up a plan for evacuating Japanese nationals from South Korea 
has been an issue over the last 10 years since the Guidelines for 
Japan-US Defense Cooperation were formulated in September 1997. In 
evacuating Japanese nationals, use of US military aircraft and 
vessels will be essential. The US will also need Japan's cooperation 
as a temporary refuge for Americans evacuated form South Korea. 
Japan and the US are in a relationship of mutual complementation. 
 
Japan-US talks have been suspended since 2003. There has been a 
large gap between US requests for using Japan's airports and 
seaports and medical assistance and the contents of Japan's 
cooperation, according to a Foreign Ministry source. 
 
Bilateral talks reopened last December largely because Tokyo has 
established a government-wide system to tackle the challenge of 
revising Plan 5055. 
 
Coordination with South Korea will be indispensable in evacuating 
Japanese citizens, an issue which has been left unaddressed. Many 
observers think that holding talks with South Korea on a possible 
contingency on the Korean Peninsula would be difficult as long as 
President Roh Moo Hyun, who maintains a reconciliatory North Korea 
policy, remains in office. 
 
(4) The light and darkness of Japan-US alliance unification (Part 1) 
-- Front line of Japan's defense: Eyes of Commander of US Forces 
Japan, Lt. Gen. Bruce Wright are cast on North Korea 
 
NIHON KEIZAI (Page 6) (Abridged) 
Eve., January 4, 2007 
 
It happened just before dawn on July 5, 2006. Seven flashes of light 
raced across the Sea of Japan, just at the time when all across the 
United States, people were celebrating Independence Day. The lights 
were ballistic missiles launched by North Korea's Kim Jong Il 
regime. 
 
The ballistic missiles were pointed south in waters off the coast of 
Russia. Two "eyes" were quietly shining in the sea to the north: the 
flagship Blue Ridge of the US Seventh Fleet and the Navy carrier 
Kitty Hawk. The Blue Ridge had entered the port of Vladivostok, 
located in Russia's Far East, nominally for "confidence building." 
The Kitty Hawk had made a call after a six-year hiatus at the port 
of Otaru in Hokkaido. 
 
TOKYO 00000030  007 OF 010 
 
 
 
Was it just coincidence that two Navy vessels regularly home-ported 
at Yokosuka in Kanagawa Prefecture happened to be deployed to the 
northern sea on the same day?  Or was it deliberate? 
 
On this point, a source connected to Japan-US military relations 
confided: "Both the Blue Ridge and the Kitty Hawk were fully loaded 
with ammunition for strike use, so they should have been well 
prepared in case of an emergency." 
 
Two months earlier, at US Pacific Command (PACOM) in Hawaii, 
Commander of the US Forces Japan Lt. Gen. Bruce Wright met secretly 
with PACOM Commander Admiral William J. Fallon. Wright had already 
picked up signs of missile launches at two sites in North Korea, a 
launch testing sight on the Japan Sea and another one at the 
southeast part. 
 
"I would like USFJ and PACOM to closely coordinate," Wright 
proposed. Fallon immediately agreed. According to a source connected 
with Japan-US military relations, usually when the Blue Ridge, Kitty 
Hawk or other ship leaves the home port of Yokosuka, the vessel is 
not alone but is accompanied by a number of escort vessels, such as 
cruisers and submarines, deployed to the rear. There are many such 
cases. In other words, the two ships had sent a message to North 
Korea, "In the event that anything unusual should happen toward 
Japan, it would not be taken lightly," as one Defense Agency source 
put it. 
 
Three months after the missile launches, North Korea committed 
another outrage by an underground nuclear-weapons test. At that 
time, too, Wright from early morning took up his position at his 
office at the USFJ command at Yokota Air Base in Tokyo, swiftly 
issuing orders. 
 
With the North Korean crisis as the occasion, Wright last fall 
launched a Japan-US joint commanders' meeting, in which for the 
first time since the bilateral alliance started, top brass from the 
Japan and US uniformed services met to exchange views. 
 
From the US side, starting with Wright, the top brass from the US 
Navy, Army, and Air Force in Japan attended. From the Japanese side, 
Admiral Takashi Saito, Chief of Staff, Joint Staff Office of Japan's 
Self-Defense Forces (SDF) attended along with the top brass of the 
ground, maritime and air defense forces. Wright said, "I would like 
to hold this US-Japan joint commanders' meeting at a twice-a-year 
pace." 
 
Wright, who has pushed ahead with the idea of "institutionalizing" 
the Japan-US alliance, has gone beyond his dual role of being the 
commander of the 5th Air Force and of the US forces in Japan. He is 
standing at the front line of the defense of Japan from a position 
of being the overall representative of the Pentagon in Japan. 
 
(Editorial staff writer Tsuyoshi Sunohara) 
 
(5) With application of Anti-monopoly Law in mind, FTC investigates 
dozens of companies, including leading general construction 
contractors, over low-priced bidding 
 
YOMIURI (Page 1) (Full) 
January 5, 2007 
 
Concerning a succession of extremely low-priced tenders for 
 
TOKYO 00000030  008 OF 010 
 
 
government-sponsored public projects, it was learned that the Fair 
Trade Commission (FTC) has started investigations into dozens of 
companies, including leading general construction contractors, with 
the possibility of applying the Anti-Monopoly Law. The FTC spread 
the scope of the investigations to cover projects sponsored by 
prefectures and government ordinance and collected information on 
projects that were made the targets of its investigation into bids 
tendered at prices lower than standard levels that were worked out 
based on estimated prices. It intends to take such actions as 
retraction orders, an administrative punishment, against companies 
that carried out unscrupulous dumping practices, such as barring 
access by many other competitors with contract prices below project 
costs. 
 
According to the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport 
(MLIT), among the projects it sponsored (excluding projects related 
to ports, harbors and airports), the number of those that became the 
targets of the investigation almost doubled in 2005 over the 
previous year's level. Projects contracted at prices lower than 
standard prices are also found among projects sponsored by local 
governments. 
 
For this reason, the FTC late last year ordered dozens of companies, 
such as leading and mid-ranking general construction contractors, 
and major local construction companies that have influence on the 
market, to report on contracted prices and cost prices of projects 
for which they received orders from the state, prefectures and 
government ordinance cities. 
 
Generally speaking, contracted prices mean project costs added with 
general administrative costs, such as operating expenses. The FTC 
noted that it would determine whether the contracted prices infringe 
upon the Anti-monopoly Law or not, taking into account the number of 
competitors that were unable to win bids due to low-priced bidding. 
In doing so, one standard for reaching a judgment is whether 
contracted prices were below project costs or not. 
 
(6) Opinion column -- Disputed Northern Territories: Compromise 
proposal to Russia will simply have an opposite effect 
 
YOMIURI (Page 12) (Full) 
January 5, 2007 
 
Shigeki Hakamada, professor at Aoyama Gakuin University 
 
A half-century has passed since Japan and Russia normalized 
diplomatic relations with the signing a joint declaration. As the 
New Year starts, I would like to consider the problems that 
Japan-Russia relations face today, and also ponder what approach 
Japan should take. 
 
According to a Yomiuri Shimbun poll released on last Oct. 18, 85% or 
so of the Japanese people surveyed thought that the Northern 
Territories issue stood in the way of relations between Japan and 
Russia further developing, and 70% of the people had a bad 
impression of Russia. The results of the poll have made it clear 
that Japan and Russia need to resolve the controversial Northern 
Territories issue and sign a peace treaty in order to normalize and 
improve bilateral ties. Restoring national sovereignty that has been 
violated is a matter of national principle and dignity and should 
come first before improving relations. 
 
In this regard, I can say Russia in recent years has increasingly 
 
TOKYO 00000030  009 OF 010 
 
 
hardened its attitude toward the territorial issue. In fact, the 
view of refusing to return even two of the disputed four islands, 
let alone the four islands, is gaining momentum in Russia. The first 
move of Russia in this context came in the way of disregarding the 
Tokyo Declaration (issued in 1993) stating that the issue of the 
attribution of the four islands shall be discussed in bilateral 
talks. Russia also shifted its previous position so as to admit only 
the Japan-Soviet Union Declaration, in which the two countries 
agreed that the two islands -- Habomai and Shikotan -- would be 
handed over to Japan after the signing of a peace treaty. Moreover, 
Russia has emphasized that the term "hand over" is not the same as 
the term "return." President Putin, as well, made this ambiguous 
remark in a dialogue with domestic and foreign experts in last 
September: "The Japan-Soviet Union Joint Declaration does not 
mention under what conditions the islands will be handed over." 
Combining all these things to such remarks by Russian officials as 
the four islands fall under Russia's sovereignty as a result of the 
war and that is recognized by international law, I think what Russia 
has in mind is clear. Russia has assumed a hard-line posture like 
this in tune with its policy of favoring the Great Powers, perhaps 
bolstered by the oil-money boom and against the backdrop of growing 
nationalism. Perhaps Japan's one-time approach of placing emphasis 
on the Japan-Soviet Union Joint Declaration would have helped such a 
Russia. 
 
I have concern about the current situation surrounding the two 
countries. I am talking about our country's foreign minister, 
politicians, and experts coming up with "new proposals" one after 
another in the hope that the territorial issue might be resolved 
while Putin is in office. For instance, during a meeting on Dec. 13 
of the Lower House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Foreign Minister 
Aso came out with the notion of dividing the Northern Territories in 
two in terms of acreage, adding that idea is his personal view. In 
the past, as well, the foreign minister mentioned the idea of the 
return of three islands or the concept of joint development of the 
disputed islands. Every time the foreign minister referred to those 
ideas, the Foreign Ministry denied it. In last October, the 
Democratic Party of Japan's (DPJ or Minshuto) Secretary General 
Hatoyama and his party members hosted a commemorative meeting 
marking the 50th anniversary of the signing of the Japan-Soviet 
Union Joint Declaration in Moscow. On that occasion, some Japanese 
politicians and experts offered a similar "new proposal." 
 
I can understand their intention to somehow break the stalemate in 
the territorial issue, but they have made three fundamental 
mistakes. First, Russia, seeing these moves of Japan, may conclude 
that its recent tough posture toward Japan was correct and may 
further toughen its posture toward Japan in order to press Tokyo to 
make even more concessions. Second, "new proposals" shown by the 
Japanese side, for instance, the partition proposal or the proposal 
for the return of three islands, are all over-optimistic in that 
they ignore Russia's intention, namely that Moscow has no intention 
at present to negotiate the territorial issue with Japan. Third, 
even though a political decision may be necessary eventually, it is 
stupid to show a bottom line in public before the start of 
negotiations. Price reduction will start from that point. 
 
What Japan should do now is to avoid hastily showing compromise 
proposals in succession. The start of negotiations on the issue of 
the sovereignty of the four islands was basically agreed on in the 
Tokyo Declaration. Japan should resolutely call for the start of the 
negotiations on that issue. How the issue will be finalized will be 
found in the process of the negotiations. The negotiations should be 
 
TOKYO 00000030  010 OF 010 
 
 
held between officials concerned of the two countries who have built 
a trust relationship. A political decision, if any, will come after 
that. Doing all this seems difficult, but Japan should steel itself 
to address the issue under a far-sighted policy. 
 
DONOVAN