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Viewing cable 07TELAVIV219, REPORT ON BLUE LANTERN LEVEL 3 END-USE CHECK ON

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07TELAVIV219 2007-01-19 10:12 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Tel Aviv
VZCZCXYZ0003
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTV #0219/01 0191012
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 191012Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8905
UNCLAS TEL AVIV 000219 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR PM/DTCC - BLUE LANTERN COORDINATOR 
STATE FOR NEA/IPA (MAHER) 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ETTC KOMC IS
SUBJECT: REPORT ON BLUE LANTERN LEVEL 3 END-USE CHECK ON 
LICENSE DA-1643-00 
 
REF: 2006 STATE 130060 
 
1. (SBU) On November 15, 2006, Blue Lantern Officer and 
Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) employee conducted 
a site visit to the former Israel Military Industries 
Aircraft System Division (IMIASD) facility and met with Danny 
Inbal, Corporate Security Director; Israel Zigerson, 
Purchasing Manager; Avi Goldberg, Purchasing Control Manager; 
Ruth Lipkin, Deputy Legal Advisor at IMI; and Yaron Arad, 
Deputy Security Director for Information Security.  Inbal, 
who acknowledged upon questioning that he is an employee of 
MALMAB/DSDE -- the Israeli MOD's security division -- led the 
Israeli team during discussions that lasted over two hours, 
and the tour of the facilities that followed. 
 
A. In response to the Blue Lantern Officer's question, Inbal 
confirmed that the facility is operating under authority 
granted in DA-1643-00.  Inbal and his team provided the 
following information during the visit: 
 
B. Description of IMIASD and the Tirat Hacarmel facility: 
IMIASD is no longer a part of IMI.  It used to manufacture 
and assemble parts for weapons pylons and fuel tanks for the 
F-15 and F-16.  IMIASD had 4,000 employees at the height of 
its operations.  Its aviation in Tirat Hacarmel plant was 
sold to Cyclone. 
 
C. Description of Security at the IMIASD facility:  As a 
result of the loss of the 24 controlled items, IMI has 
revised its security procedures and thoroughly reviewed the 
briefing that it gives its employees.  Inbal noted that the 
Israeli Security Agency (a.k.a. the Shin Bet -- the 
equivalent of the U.S. FBI) conducts a background check on 
every employee and subcontractor.  Visitors to the facility 
are escorted.  The facility's perimeter is monitored by an 
alarm system, and there is a control room a the main gate. 
Spot checks are conducted on vehicles entering and exiting 
the facility.  All of the facility's security personnel are 
trained in counterterrorism and receive periodic refresher 
training from MALMAB/DSDE.  WDA and DSP-5 parts are stored 
separately. 
 
D. Question:  What articles licensed under DA-1643-00 (or any 
other Department license) were transferred to Cyclone? 
 
Answer:  According to Inbal and his team, none under the WDA. 
 Under the DSP-5, all items needed to assemble pylons.  Inbal 
said that Cyclone knows that it cannot own parts until the 
re-transfer is authorized.  Until then, Cyclone can only 
operate as a subcontractor for IMI.  To date, Cyclone only 
assembles parts as a subcontractor to IMI.  Inbal claims that 
no WDA parts were ever passed into the hands of Cyclone, and 
that no controlled items part have been transferred to 
Cyclone for assembly under the WDA.  Inbal said that some 
DSP-5 parts and production line equipment were provided to 
Cyclone in its capacity as a subcontractor.  Inbal said that 
no WDA items have been sold to Cyclone. 
 
E. Question:  Have any other licensed operations/articles 
been transferred from IMI, Israel to Cyclone? 
 
Answer:  No.  Ownership of items subject to licenses has not 
been transferred. 
 
F. Question:  What were the provisions of the asset transfer 
agreement between IMI, Israel and Cyclone? 
 
Answer:  IMI and Cyclone's legal understanding is that the 
supply of parts to Cyclone in its position as subcontractor 
is not re-transfer.  IMI sells and receives payments for 
finished products.  IMI is seeking the re-transfer of its 
license to Cyclone.  According to Inbal, a request for 
approval was sent to Susan Clark in DTC Licensing.  IMI and 
Cyclone are now following the "Luks plan" named after a 
former employee of PM/DDTC, Harold Luks, who now also works 
for Elbit.  IMI's legal department is consulting with Luks 
and a U.S. lawyer on these steps.  On December 31, 2003, a 
conditional agreement with Cyclone was signed, wherein 
certain conditions had to be fulfilled by dates certain to 
affect the transfer.  The agreement has not been completely 
fulfilled.  On March 20, 2005, Cyclone and IMIASD signed a 
second amendment to this conditional agreement.  This 
amendment noted adjustments to the original agreement, and 
the intent of the parties to conclude a re-transfer 
agreement.  The agreement is to be executed by Cyclone's 
subsidiary, MATLAM Mechanics Karmiel, Limited.  Article 5 of 
the agreement identifies the various actions that have to be 
carried out.  In Chapter 6, in refers to the fulfillment of 
State Department licenses and permits according to the Luks 
 
 
plan.  Annex B specifies all the required activities.  This 
annex was attached to the closing documents  It was signed on 
March 27, 2005. 
 
G. Question:  Does IMI, Israel continue to operate the 
warehouse in Tirat Hacarmel, Haifa? 
 
Answer:  Yes. 
 
H. Question:  Has IMI, Israel continued to investigate the 
missing articles listed in its disclosure? 
 
Answer:  Inbal said that while the investigation has been 
closed, awareness regarding the importance of protecting 
controlled items among employees has increased, and 
procedures have been revised to minimize or prevent future 
losses.  Inbal noted that there are 350 pieces in a pylon. 
Only 24 parts for pylons went missing.  No parts for fuel 
tanks disappeared.  The 24 parts consist of 4 types of parts, 
including fuel system parts.  Inbal gave emboffs a list of 
the missing parts with their part numbers.  Inbal said that 
the disappearance of the parts was reported in voluntary 
disclosures sent to the State Department's Office of Defense 
Trade Controls Licensing; and Office of Defense Trade 
Controls Compliance.  IMI's president signed the disclosures. 
 Inbal said that there were there were 950 parts that were 
supposed to be in the WDA warehouse when, during an inventory 
in October 2005, IMI discovered that 24 of the parts were 
missing.  Inbal clarified that the closing of the division is 
what prompted the inventory.  Upon discovery that parts were 
missing, a fact-finding team was set up to locate the missing 
parts.  The team did not find the parts, but concluded that 
the parts were not re-transferred or sold.  (NOTE:  While 
touring the facility, Inbal told Blue Lantern Officer he 
believes that the parts might have been damaged in assembly 
training exercises, and thrown out by employees who did not 
understand that you cannot simply throw away such items.) 
 
I. Question:  Has IMI, Israel informed IMITRADING, U.S. of 
the missing articles? 
 
Answer:  Inbal answered affirmatively, but said that he 
cannot find the specific document proving this.  He claimed 
that all questions posed by DDTC were also addressed to 
IMITRADING, U.S. 
 
2. (SBU) On November 21, Blue Lantern Officer and DCMA 
Employee made a site visit to Cyclone's facilities in Karmiel 
and met with Eitan Igra, Cyclone's Vice President for 
Programs and Sales; Adar Dotan, Head of Security at Cyclone; 
and Milstein Marcel, Cyclone's Warehouse Manager.  Igra said 
that he has overseen the movement of IMI programs to Cyclone. 
 Igra and his team provided the following information during 
the visit: 
 
A. Description of Cyclone:  Cyclone is a subsidiary of Elbit 
Systems Group, the largest private defense company in Israel. 
 It is owned 100 percent by Elbit.  It reports to the 
Airborne and Helmet Systems.  Cyclone has been owned by Elbit 
since 1999.  Previously, it was a public company. 
Ninety-five percent of Cyclone's operations are in Karmiel, 
where its headquarters is located.  It has 50 persons at an 
Israeli Air Force (IAF) base in the south.  Among other 
things, it produces the access door for the Boeing 747.  It 
subcontracts to Vought in the U.S. 
 
Seventy-five percent of Cyclone's operations  concern design 
and production.  Cyclone conducts overhauls and repairs on 
IAF helicopters and aircraft.  It performs this service for 
local and outside customers.  Cyclone designs and produces 
fuel tanks and pylons that it is acquiring from IMI.  Cyclone 
also manufactures the Elbit Group's Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 
(UAVs), including the Hermes 450 and 1500.  Cyclone works as 
a subcontractor on helicopters for many Israeli primes. 
Lockheed and SIBAT have representatives located at Cyclone's 
facilities in Karmiel.  They conduct quality control audits 
all the time. 
 
Boeing's military side has been Cyclone's main customer since 
1978.  Next in line are General Dynamics/Lockheed Martin, 
with the F-16.  Cyclone also supplies spare parts to the U.S. 
Air Force -- its third largest customer.  Cyclone produces 
many parts for the F-16 including the 600 gallon fuel tank 
and pylons.  The pylons and fuel tanks are brought to Cyclone 
from IMI.  They are not in production yet, because there are 
no orders or customers at this time.  Cyclone is a single 
source producer for the Lockheed Martin production line.  It 
also produces the centerline pylon, which was formerly done 
at IMI Haifa. 
 
 
Most of its sales are to military customers.  Next year 
(2007), its commercial side will expand due to anticipated 
work on the Boeing 757.  In the past, it produced  330 gallon 
external fuel tanks for the F/A-18 Block C/D.  It bought from 
IMI the rights to produce the F-15 fuel tanks and pylons. 
 
Cyclone is also working on the fan cowl doors for the Russian 
Regional Jet (RRJ) program in Russia.  Cyclone added Far 
Eastern air forces and NATO air forces as its customers due 
to its purchase of IMIASD 
 
Cyclone performed work on the MD-11 engine.  It is a sole 
source provider of the MD-11's doors and pylons.  It also 
produces elevators for the Airbus 310, the tail skid faring 
for the Boeing 767, the nose landing gear doors for the 
Boeing 787, and the wheel well doors for the Boeing 737. 
 
B. Description of Security at Cyclone:  Cyclone works of a 
system called the BAAN System.  Controlled items are managed 
by a computer system.  Procurement, inventory and production 
are all monitored on the computer system.  It is a closed 
system.  Items can be traced by purchase order, license 
number, received items, inventory management.  Parts are also 
tied to programs.  Only the security manager can override 
this aspect.  A security officer signs on all applications. 
 
Cyclone is implementing a new labeling process to replace the 
existing one.  The new labels include more data on them. 
Elmec in the U.S. asks for licenses for Elbit Group.  Also 
controls shipment to Israel.  Purchase orders from Cyclone go 
to Elmec. 
 
Security features at the warehouse include physical ones 
(e.g., fence surrounding complex, alarm systems).  No 
controlled items have ever gone missing. 
 
C. Question:  What were the details of the acquisition of 
IMIASD by Cyclone? 
 
Answer:  Cyclone bought some of IMIASD's parts, but not all 
of the parts in IMIASD's warehouses containing controlled 
items.  These include the WDA agreement parts and parts 
subject to DSP-5 licenses.  Uncontrolled parts have been 
physically transferred to Cyclone.  Cyclone is not actively 
working with controlled items subject to the WDA agreement. 
They remain at the IMIASD facility in a separate warehouse. 
In theory, Cyclone has bought this warehouse from IMIASD. 
Igra said that Cyclone has not started any kind of physical 
re-transfer of the parts, and IMI continues to manage the 
warehouse.  Igra corroborated what the IMIASD team stated: 
that there has been no activity at the WDA warehouse for some 
time as there are no orders from customers.  Cyclone started 
the process to re-transfer licenses for the DSP-5 parts. 
Igra confirmed that IMI had submitted the request for 
re-transfer, and that it has not yet been approved.  Igra 
stressed that all controlled inventory remains in the 
warehouse managed by IMIASD, and that Cyclone -- in effect -- 
owns a "virtual warehouse." 
 
D. Question:  Has Cyclone distributed U.S. defense articles 
obtained from the acquisition of IMIASD?  If so, to what 
parties were sales/transfers made? 
 
Answer:  No.  All sales and/or transfers were made under IMI. 
 Cyclone does not sell parts as they are controlled items, 
and purchase orders are directed to IMI, for which Cyclone 
performs subcontract work.  Cyclone merely finishes assembly. 
 IMI then sells the parts, receives payment for the parts, 
and then transfers the payment to Cyclone.  When Cyclone 
assembles anything, it is sold through IMI. 
 
E. Question:  Does Cyclone understand the restrictions on 
USML articles, particularly regarding re-exporting (i.e. no 
re-export without USG authorization)? 
 
Answer:  Yes. 
 
F. Question:  Has Cyclone continued W&AD operations under the 
authority of DA-1643-00?  If so, what articles have been 
procured by Cyclone, and from what sources?  Where are 
licensed articles warehoused by Cyclone?  What security and 
inventory procedures are in place for these articles? 
 
G. Answer:  No.  IMI is still managing Cyclone's warehouse. 
There is some thought about canceling the agreement. 
 
H. Question:  Has Cyclone conducted investigations into the 
whereabouts of the 24 missing items listed in IMI, Israel's 
 
disclosure?  If so, has it discovered pertinent information? 
 
I. Answer:  IMI informed Cyclone that the parts were missing. 
 IMI searched Cyclone's facilities and did not find anything. 
 Cyclone cooperated with the investigation into the missing 
parts.  No pertinent information was discovered. 
 
3. (SBU) IMIASD provided the following documents to emboffs. 
They have been FAXed to Compliance Specialist Michael Romero 
at PM/DTCC, FAX number:  202-261-8198: 
 
A. March 30, 2006 letter to David Trimble, Director, PM/DTCC, 
concerning voluntary disclosure of 24 missing controlled 
items (1 page). 
 
B. June 27, 2006 letter to Susan Clark, Acting Director, 
Office of Defense Trade Controls, Licensing, requesting 
approval for re-transfer; and attachments (53 pages). 
 
C. August 16, 2006 letter to Haim Guz, President of 
IMITRADING, U.S., from Patricia Slygh, Chief, Enforcement 
Division (2 pages). 
 
D. September 14, 2006 letter to Jae Shin, a compliance 
specialist in PM/DDTC, regarding the above-mentioned letter 
from Slygh to IMITRADING, U.S. (4 pages). 
 
E. October 18, 2006 e-mail from Harold Luks to Eitan Igra re: 
updating on the re-transfer request (3 pages). 
 
F. November 13, 2006 letter to Jae Shin of PM/DDTC and Blue 
Lantern Officer Michael Keays re: responses to questions 
posed to IMIASD (2 pages). 
 
G. November 13, 2006 letter to Haim Guz, President, 
IMITRADING, U.S., from Avraham Goldberg, IMIASD Sales Manager 
(4 pages). 
 
I. Power Point Presentation on Cyclone Aviation Products, 
Ltd. (26 pages). 
 
********************************************* ******************** 
Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv 
 
You can also access this site through the State Department's 
Classified SIPRNET website. 
********************************************* ******************** 
JONES