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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 STATE 003592 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: MARR MOPS PGOV PREL IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQ: GUIDANCE ON PRESIDENT'S POLICY ADDRESS 
 
REF: STATE 1686 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1.  Department requests Ambassadors reinforce the 
President's January 10 announcement on Iraq policy with 
the highest levels in the host governments on Thursday 
January 11. 
 
OBJECTIVES 
---------- 
 
¶2.  Department instructs posts to pursue the following 
objectives: 
 
--Drawing on the background in para. 3, brief host 
governments on the President's new Iraq strategy (text of 
speech accessible at www.whitehouse.gov). 
 
--Where appropriate thank host country for its 
contributions to Iraq and encourage further engagement to 
assist Iraq in stabilizing the country, strengthening the 
economy, bolstering moderates, and achieving national 
reconciliation. 
 
 
BACKGROUND 
---------- 
 
¶3. The President addressed the nation on the evening of 
January 10th and announced a new strategy in Iraq, which he 
called "The New Way Forward." 
 
Strategic context: 
------------------ 
 
Much is at stake in Iraq.  We cannot let Iraq become a 
base for global terrorism, and we must preserve its 
independence and territorial integrity.  The change in our 
strategy reflects the changed situation in Iraq.  After 
the February bombing of the Golden Mosque in Samarra, al 
Qaeda finally succeeded in provoking sectarian violence to 
a level where it has has now replaced the Sunni insurgency 
as the main source of instability in Iraq.  But the 
fundamental distinction is not between Sunni and Shia.  It 
is between those who use violence to advance an extremist 
agenda, and those moderates who pursue their interests 
peacefully, politically, and under the rule of law. Under 
our new strategy, America will stand firmly with moderates 
while opposing extremists who resort to violence. 
 
Recognizing these new realities, we have engaged in long 
and substantive conversations with Prime Minister Maliki 
and other Iraqi leaders.  The President has told the Iraqi 
leadership we will support their good decisions.  But he 
has also made clear that America's patience is limited. In 
the end, Iraqis are responsible for the success of Iraq. 
We can support Iraq, but Iraqis must lead. 
 
Elements of the new strategy 
 
        1) The Government of Iraq in the lead. 
2) We will support the government of Iraq's plan to 
stabilize the country, bolster the economy, and achieve 
national reconciliation; 
3) We will decentralize our civilian presence and 
assistance to the Iraqi people; 
4) We will channel our support to moderates; and 
        5) We will engage in reinvigorated regional diplomacy. 
 
 
--  Three key assumptions of our new strategy: 
1) While political progress, economic gains, and 
security are intertwined, political and economic 
progress are unlikely absent a basic level of security. 
2) Success will be dependent on Iraqi resolve and 
action, especially to make good on the Prime Minister 
Maliki's pledge not to tolerate any act of violence 
from any community or group. 
3) We will adapt our strategy as circumstances on the 
ground warrant. 
 
 
Security 
 
STATE 00003592  002 OF 003 
 
 
(Note:  The size of a brigade is approximately 4,000 
troops) 
 
-- Iraqis will contribute three additional army brigades 
to Baghdad, for a total of 18 brigades, police and army 
combined.  We will increase our own forces to support 
Iraqi operations, with five additional brigades 
committed to Baghdad.  Our joint goals will be to 
improve security in Baghdad and restore the conditions 
necessary for economic activity to resume. 
 
-- We will increase U.S. forces available to support Iraqi 
operations in al-Anbar province to step up pressure on 
Al Qaida in Iraq. 
 
 
Political and Economic 
 
-- A main goal of our non-security support to Iraq must 
now be to bolster moderates, to strengthen their hand 
as they struggle to hold extremists at bay while 
building a new Iraq. 
 
-- As part of our efforts to decentralize assistance, we 
will nearly double the number of Provincial 
Reconstruction Teams in Iraq. We currently have seven 
U.S.-led and three-Coalition led PRTs. Our intent is to 
expand to at least 18 PRTs, many of which will be 
physically co-located with U.S. military units 
throughout the country. 
 
--      PRTs will bolster moderates by building and 
strengthening relationships with local Iraqi leaders 
who are committed to building a prosperous, peaceful, 
and democratic Iraq. We will support these Iraqis 
through targeted assistance to help them meet local 
needs. 
 
--      We are requesting from our Congress additional 
resources to enable our PRTs to more flexibly respond 
to local needs.  We also intend to expand our micro- 
credit programs administered through USAID that have 
already made a significant contribution to Iraq's 
development. 
 
-- We will continue to support Iraq's efforts to achieve 
national reconciliation which include: controlling 
sectarian violence, passing a law to share fairly 
Iraq's oil wealth, and taking steps to strengthen 
democratic institutions and economic development. 
 
International Engagement 
 
?       International engagement is a key part of the new way 
forward.  On the economic side, we will work to conclude 
the International Compact with Iraq, an iniative that 
has alreadly been favorably received by its partners in 
the international community.  The Compact lays out an 
aggressive agenda for economic reforms that will make 
Iraq economically self-sufficient within five years.  A 
central aim of the Compact, under Iraq's medium term 
fiscal framework, is to unlock tens of billions of 
dollars of Iraqi resources that Iraq can use to solve 
its own problems. 
 
?       Over the last six months we have supported significant 
progress in crafting an International Compact with Iraq- 
an agreement between Iraq and the international 
community on a set of economic reforms and political and 
security goals.  Iraq is working with the UN, the World 
Bank, regional institutions, its Gulf neighbors and 
other countries on a set of written commitments to take 
action on these issues. 
 
?       We hope there will be a high-level signing event in the 
coming weeks to finalize the Compact and underscore the 
international community's support for Iraq's commitment 
to transition to self-reliance within five years. 
 
-- International engagement is a key part of the new way 
forward.  Through the International Compact with Iraq, 
the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) + 2 (Egypt and 
Jordan), and our Special Envoy for Countering the PKK, 
our regional engagement involves all of Iraq's neighbors 
and other states and international organizations with a 
stake in Iraq's future. 
 
-- Iraq has asked to take the lead in raising concerns 
with Syria and Iran about their destabilizing behavior. 
 
STATE 00003592  003 OF 003 
 
 
-- Iran is already very aware of U.S. concerns with Iran's 
paramilitary interventions inside Iraq.  We will 
continue to work with Iraq to limit and counter the 
Iranian threat. 
 
-- Over the last six months we have supported significant 
progress by the GOI in crafting an International Compact 
with Iraq-an agreement between Iraq and the 
international community on a set of political, security, 
and economic targets.  Iraq is working with the UN, the 
World Bank, the EU and more than forty countries and has 
developed a set of written commitments to take action on 
political, security, and economic targets.  We hope 
there will be a high-level signing event in the coming 
weeks to finalize the Compact and underscore the 
international community's support for Iraq's commitment 
to transition to self-reliance within five years. 
 
Conclusion 
 
-- We are prepared to assist the Government of Iraq on all 
fronts: increased (decentralized) civilian presence in 
the provinces, increased financial resources for 
targeted programs, and increased troop levels-all to 
create the conditions that will allow Iraqis to take 
charge as rapidly as possible. 
 
-- Ultimately, our efforts will only be effective to the 
extent that the Iraqis commit the troops and resources 
required, make the critical political decisions 
necessary to promote a national reconciliation, and 
tackle the economic reforms needed to spur development 
and investment. 
 
-- We greatly appreciate the contributions made by members 
of the Coalition and NATO, participants in the 
International Compact with Iraq, and other countries 
that are contributing positively to Iraq's stability, 
democracy, independence and prosperity. 
 
-- We applaud the efforts of the international community 
on Iraq to date, and we will continue to work together 
to advance common goals to help Iraq's future. 
RICE