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Viewing cable 07SEOUL98, PRESIDENT'S IRAQ POLICY ADDRESS: ROK REACTIONS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07SEOUL98 2007-01-11 08:43 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Seoul
VZCZCXRO5255
PP RUEHBC RUEHDA RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHUL #0098/01 0110843
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 110843Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2316
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J2 SEOUL KOR
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA SCJS SEOUL KOR
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 SEOUL 000098 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: MARR MOPS PGOV PREL IZ KS
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT'S IRAQ POLICY ADDRESS: ROK REACTIONS 
 
REF: STATE 3592 
 
1.  (U) Summary:  During a previously scheduled luncheon for 
new Vice Foreign Minister Cho Jung-pyo, the Ambassador 
reinforced the President's January 10 announcement on Iraq 
policy, emphasizing the President's appreciation for the 
contributions made by the ROK troops in Iraq.  VFM Cho said 
that President Roh Moo-hyun greatly appreciated the telephone 
call from the President which conveyed in advance the 
substance of the President's address.  President Roh fully 
supported the President's goal of transforming Iraq into a 
stable and prosperous democracy.  End Summary. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
Reinforcing the President's Policy Address 
------------------------------------------ 
 
2.  (U) In a January 11 luncheon meeting with Vice Foreign 
Minister Cho Jung-pyo, Deputy Foreign Minister Shim Yoon-joe 
and Director-General Cho Tae-yong, the Ambassador explained 
the background, objectives and the strategic context behind 
the President's January 10 announcement on Iraq policy 
(Reftel).  The Ambassador especially noted the significant 
contribution of the South Korean troops in Irbil.  The 
President greatly appreciated the contributions of the South 
Korean Zaytun Brigade in Iraq; they were playing a vital role 
in achieving national reconciliation and stabilization in 
Iraq.  Even with the projected reduction in their numbers, 
South Koreans were still the third largest contingent in the 
coalition, the Ambassador said. 
 
---------------- 
Bush-Roh Telecon 
---------------- 
 
3.  (SBU) VFM Cho said that he believed the President's 
address was timely and effective.  President Roh greatly 
appreciated the call from President Bush, which gave him an 
early opportunity to discuss Iraq policy challenges.  The 
conversation between the two President, the fourteenth since 
President Roh took office in 2003, was warm and friendly. 
President Roh made it clear that he fully supported President 
Bush's strategy in Iraq. 
 
4.  (SBU) The call also provided an opportunity for the two 
Presidents to discuss North Korea issues, VFM Cho said.  They 
agreed that the best way to resolve the North Korean nuclear 
problem was through diplomacy.  President Roh reaffirmed that 
South Korea's rice and fertilizer assistance to the North 
would remain suspended until tangible progress was made on 
denuclearization, Cho said. 
 
----------------------------- 
Safety of Zaytun, ROK Embassy 
----------------------------- 
 
5.  (SBU) DG Cho noted that late last year there had been 
considerable discussion in the ROKG and the National Assembly 
on the future of South Korean troops in Iraq.  The conclusion 
was that developments in Iraq would be closely followed 
during this year; thereafter, the ROKG would have to make a 
decision on Korea's future role in Iraq, taking into account 
the situation on the ground and the policies of other 
coalition members, especially the United States.  This 
strategy was quite consistent with President Bush's 
announcement, our MOFAT interlocutors noted.  Asked about 
South Korean public perception, DG Cho said that as long as 
casualties among the troops in Zaytun could be avoided, he 
saw no problems with their continued deployment in Iraq. 
 
6.  (SBU) The Koreans were, however, inerested in knowing 
whether the increased U.S. troops in Baghdad might lead to 
heightened clashes with insurgents that could affect the 
safety of ROK Embassy personnel.  The Ambassador suggested 
the ROK Embassy consult with U.S. authorities on the ground. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
7.  (SBU) South Koreans have always viewed their troop 
contribution to Iraq in the alliance context, similar to the 
ROK troops in Afghanistan (and in Vietnam three decades ago). 
 Still, it has never been an easy political decision, 
especially because the ruling Uri Party largely opposes 
having troops in Iraq.  On this issue, however, President Roh 
has been consistently supportive, because he knew 
instinctively the importance President Bush attaches to 
 
SEOUL 00000098  002 OF 002 
 
 
stability and democracy in Iraq. The President's advance call 
was undoubtedly a reaffirmation for President Roh that he had 
made the right decision. 
VERSHBOW