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Viewing cable 07SAOPAULO58, HELPING SAO PAULO AUTHORITIES RESPOND TO SECURITY THREATS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07SAOPAULO58 2007-01-24 09:32 2011-07-11 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Consulate Sao Paulo
VZCZCXRO6652
PP RUEHRG
DE RUEHSO #0058/01 0240932
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 240932Z JAN 07
FM AMCONSUL SAO PAULO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6309
INFO RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 7388
RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 2904
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 2602
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 2257
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ 3191
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 1966
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 3322
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 7727
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUEAWJC/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/TSA HQ WASHINGTON DC
RUEABND/DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN HQ WASHDC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 SAO PAULO 000058 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR WHA/BSC, INL 
STATE ALSO FOR DS/IP/WHA, DS/DSS/ITA, DS/DSS/OSAC 
NSC FOR FEARS 
DOJ FOR BRUCE SWARTZ 
TREASURY FOR OASIA, DAS LEE AND JHOEK 
DHS HQ FOR PLCY/OIA - KEVIN O'REILLY 
BUENOS AIRES FOR TSA/JOCHOA 
USAID FOR LAC/AA 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PGOV SNAR ASEC PREL BR
SUBJECT: HELPING SAO PAULO AUTHORITIES RESPOND TO SECURITY THREATS 
TO PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM 
 
REF: (A) SAO PAULO 36; (B) SAO PAULO 6 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED - PROTECT ACCORDINGLY 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1.  (SBU) Consul General met January 17 with Sao Paulo State 
Secretary of Metropolitan Transportation Jose Luiz Portella and his 
 
SIPDIS 
team to follow up on Governor Serra's request (ref A) for security 
assistance in the subway and train systems.  Portella described the 
challenges these systems face and outlined existing operating 
procedures. In response, DHS/ICE Attache asked a number of questions 
and offered to bring in an expert to provide an assessment.  TSA 
representative in Buenos Aires is scheduled to visit Sao Paulo 
January 24 as a first step in providing targeted technical 
assistance to state security officials.  End Summary. 
 
2.  (SBU) Consul General (CG), accompanied by DHS/ICE Country 
Attache, RSO, and poloff, met January 17 with Secretary of 
Metropolitan Transportation (STM) Jose Luiz Portella and numerous 
officials.  Portella was accompanied by Deputy Secretary of Public 
Security Lauro Malheiros Neto; Military Police Sub-commander Colonel 
Jose Roberto Martins Marques; STM Security Coordinator Colonel Marco 
Antonio Moyses; Conrado Grava de Souza, Director of Operations for 
the Sao Paulo Metropolitan Company (Metro); Jose Luiz Bastos, Chief 
of the Security Department of Metro; Atilio Nerilo, Director of 
Operations and Maintenance for the Sao Paulo Company of Metropolitan 
Trains (CPTM); Colonel Leopoldo Augusto Correa Filho, Director of 
Security for the CPTM; and others.  "Metro" refers to the subway 
system in Sao Paulo and environs, and CPTM is the more extensive 
commuter rail system. 
 
3.  (SBU) Secretary Portella, who, like most state government 
officials, is in his third week on the job, described the safety and 
security challenges his office faces.  On the afternoon of January 
12, there was a major cave-in on the construction site of a new 
subway line in the city; as of January 17, the bodies of two victims 
had been found, with at least five people still missing, and the 
unstable ground and fears of further landslides were impeding 
recovery efforts.  Four more bodies have been recovered since then, 
and rescue operations continue, plagued by rainfall and mud.  (Note: 
The "yellow line" Metro project was inaugurated amid great fanfare 
in December 2005 as Sao Paulo's first public-private partnership 
(PPP) project.  End Note.) 
 
4.  (SBU) More to the point, there have been a number of recent 
security incidents in the public transportation system as reported 
reftels.  On December 23, a device exploded near the Ana Rosa metro 
station in south-central Sao Paulo; nobody was injured.  Early in 
the morning of December 25, a bomb exploded on a CPTM train at the 
downtown Itapevi station, killing one person.  A second device was 
found on that train and was deactivated and taken to a Military 
Police explosive storage facility.  However, it was apparently not 
effectively deactivated, because on January 2, a police sergeant was 
killed when it exploded while he was tinkering with it (ref B).  In 
addition, there have been several bomb scares that turned out to be 
false alarms.  For these reasons, Governor Serra had asked the 
Ambassador for any available U.S. expertise and assistance, and the 
Secretariat for Metropolitan Transportation (STM) had submitted a 
 
SIPDIS 
list of operational questions for subway authorities in New York and 
Washington, DC.  DHS and other USG authorities are currently working 
on responses to those questions. 
 
5.  (SBU) The Attache described the department of Homeland 
Security's (DHS) composition and his agency's and authority.  He 
 
SAO PAULO 00000058  002 OF 003 
 
 
further explained that in DHS, the Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA) is the subject matter expert in the area of 
security on airplanes, trains, and other modes of transportation and 
that TSA has a Regional Attache in Buenos Aires.  The Attache 
believes Sao Paulo transportation security officials would benefit 
from a visit to major cities in the U.S. to see how the job is done 
there, or, alternatively, DHS/TSA can arrange for the visit of an 
expert from the U.S. 
 
6.  (SBU) Portella and his team responded to a series of questions 
prepared by the ICE and DHS Attaches.  The system encompasses more 
than 3,000 kilometers of rail.  Metro has 54 stations and CPTM has 
88.  The only real difference between the two systems is that CPTM 
is almost entirely above ground.  Metro carries 3 million passengers 
per day, versus 1.6 million for CPTM.  Metro's red line carries 
75,000 passengers per hour in each direction during morning and late 
afternoon peak periods.  Trains are inspected thoroughly before 
beginning a day's service, and controls were strengthened after the 
December 23 Metro station bomb incident.  Authorities of both Metro 
and CPTM are finding an increasing number of unusual or suspicious 
packages, each one requiring an inspection and a determination. 
Many of them turn out not to be a threat, but "even an empty box can 
cause problems."  Even if it's just an empty laptop case, or a bag 
of bananas or dirty laundry, Metro and CPTM have to take precautions 
until they determine it is not lethal, which can be extremely 
disruptive.  Sometimes it's merely vandalism by youth gangs or by 
individuals or groups interested, for their own parochial reasons, 
in harming the rail system. 
 
7.  (SBU) Metro has about 1,000 security personnel, and CPTM has 
1,200.  In addition to these, there are contractors and police 
officers.  Metro has 650 video cameras and CPTM 866, but many of 
these cannot record.  Ultimately the companies would like to have 
24-hour camera coverage of all stations.  In the event of a security 
threat or incident, the appropriate company's security personnel 
respond, along with military police, civil police, and the Fire 
Department.  The military police have training in bomb detection and 
in explosive ordnance disposal.  Officials of other agencies have 
varying degrees of security training.  Portella's answer to the CG's 
question whether there was an inter-agency task force for dealing 
with security issues was unclear, but it appears that they do not. 
More than anything, officials would like an expert to review and 
diagnose the threats they face and the procedures they have in place 
to address them.  Training appropriate to their local situation 
could follow.  They would also like updated guides and manuals from 
USG security and law enforcement agencies. 
 
8.  (SBU) The device found December 23 in the Ana Rosa Metro station 
was a pipe bomb.  The bomb used in the December 25 CPTM train 
incident was an incendiary device.  The device that exploded January 
2 at a Military Police Battalion (ref B), killing a police sergeant, 
appeared to be made of sandy, greasy matter.  Authorities believe 
the organized crime gang First Capital Command (PCC) may be 
responsible for the recent spate of attacks and have arrested one 
PCC member, who was reportedly responsible for the murder of a judge 
in 2002. 
 
9.  (SBU) Bringing the meeting to a close, CG summed up the state of 
play.  DHS and RSO are seeking answers to the questions submitted by 
Secretary Portella's staff on January 10.  DHS/ICE Attache promised 
 
SIPDIS 
to arrange a visit by the Regional TSA Attache in Buenos Aires, who 
can obtain the guides and manuals requested by Portella's staff. 
(Note: This visit has been scheduled to take place January 23-26. 
End Note.)  The Secretariat should identify key employees to send 
for training in the U.S.  Portella designated Military Police 
Colonel Jose Roberto Martins and Metro Security Director Conrado 
Grava de Souza as POCs for follow-up with USG. 
 
SAO PAULO 00000058  003 OF 003 
 
 
 
10.  (SBU) Comment: The meeting was cordial and productive.  It 
helped define problems and identify practical measures to address 
them.  Per ref A, Governor Serra has indicated that money is not the 
problem, and that what the state government needs is equipment, 
training, and expertise.  Assisting Sao Paulo state deal with its 
security challenges could be a cost-effective way of generating good 
will.  End Comment. 
 
11.  (U) This cable was cleared by DHS/ICE Attache in Brasilia. 
 
 
MCMULLEN