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Viewing cable 07QUITO200, CONGRESS TO DECIDE ON ASSEMBLY REFERENDUM

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07QUITO200 2007-01-24 21:18 2011-05-02 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Quito
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHQT #0200/01 0242118
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 242118Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY QUITO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6162
INFO RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA PRIORITY 6380
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 2319
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ JAN 0368
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA PRIORITY 1343
RUEHGL/AMCONSUL GUAYAQUIL PRIORITY 1766
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
UNCLAS QUITO 000200 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL EC
SUBJECT: CONGRESS TO DECIDE ON ASSEMBLY REFERENDUM 
 
1.  (SBU) Summary:  Amid small but invasive pro-Assembly 
protests, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) on January 23 
declined to act on President Correa's decree ordering a 
referendum be held on March 18 on whether to convoke a 
National Constituent Assembly, choosing instead to refer the 
matter to Congress for its approval.  Correa immediately 
objected to the decision, considering congressional approval 
unnecessary and hinting the government might bypass the TSE 
if does not act to convoke the referendum by the end of 
January.  At the same time, Correa sent a revised version of 
the rules on how the Assembly would be selected and operate 
to Congress, "for its information only."   While the PRIAN, 
PSC and UDC still oppose the Assembly idea and hope to pass 
their own constitutional reforms in Congress, a 
pro-referendum majority including ex-president Lucio 
Gutierrez' party is nevertheless expected to debate and 
approve the referendum, despite Correa's repeated personal 
attacks on Gutierrez.  Protesters were expected to regroup 
outside Congress on January 24 to maintain popular pressure 
in favor of the referendum.  End Summary. 
 
TSE Punts to Congress 
 
SIPDIS 
--------------------- 
 
2.  (SBU) Forced to relocate their meeting to a local hotel 
to avoid violent pro-Assembly protesters who broke into the 
TSE building, the TSE board voted four to three on January 23 
 
SIPDIS 
to refer the President's decree calling for a March 18 
Assembly to Congress for its approval.  Voting in favor of 
seeking congressional approval were the PRIAN, PSP, PSC and 
UDC representatives; PRE, RED-ID, and Pachakutik 
representatives voted against. 
 
3.  (SBU) On January 23 the protesters numbered around 300, 
according to press reports; 40 protesters managed to evade 
police controls by breaking windows and interrupt the TSE 
session.  Protesters reportedly included members of the 
far-left Popular Democracy Movement (MPD) party and Correa's 
Alianza PAIS movement.  The protesters called for TSE 
approval of the referendum and the rejection of reinstating 
ex-president Lucio Gutierrez' right to run for office. 
 
Correa Alters Assembly Statute 
------------------------------ 
 
4.  (SBU) Correa immediately criticized the TSE action to 
refer the matter to Congress as unnecessary, claiming that 
the TSE should simply implement the presidential decree.  If 
the TSE did not convoke the referendum by January 31, he 
said, the government would interpret inaction as 
"administrative silence" signifying approval and take 
"appropriate action." 
 
5.  (SBU) Belying his defiant statements, Correa also showed 
some flexibility by simultaneously sending Congress a revised 
Assembly statute.  (The referendum question would ask voters 
to vote yes or no to the questions "Do you approve the 
convocation of a national constituent Assembly to rewrite the 
constitution under the rules described in the attached 
statute?")  The new statute incorporates five changes: 
 
-- Assembly candidates from registered political parties and 
movements must collect signatures of support from 1% of the 
electoral roll, just like anyone else; 
 
-- the number of Assembly members would be increased from 87 
to 130.  Of those, 24 would be elected nationally, six would 
represent Ecuadorians living abroad, and 100 would be elected 
by province; 
 
-- the Assembly would take decisions by an absolute majority 
(i.e. 66 votes); 
 
-- the Assembly would exist for 180 days, with the 
possibility of a 60-day extension; 
 
-- the minimum age for Assembly candidates would be reduced 
from 25 to 20 years. 
 
Presidency Minister Vinicio Alvarado told the Ambassador on 
January 22 that the government intended to televise all 
proceedings of the Assembly to maximize transparency. 
 
Gutierrez in Driver's Seat 
-------------------------- 
6.  (SBU) Ex-president Gutierrez has said he would run for 
the Assembly himself and seek to become its president, should 
the TSE restore his right to do so.  The TSE majority which 
voted to refer the referendum decree to Congress is expected 
to do just that. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
7.  (SBU) Contrary to Correa's contention that congressional 
approval is unnecessary, a majority in Congress and many 
(although not all) independent constitutional experts believe 
congressional approval is required for the referendum to take 
place within the bounds of the constitution.  Correa's 
objections to the TSE decision appear intended to put 
pressure on Congress to act quickly on the matter.  With 
powerful PSC leader Jaime Nebot adding his support publicly 
for an Assembly blessed by Congress, and with public support 
for the referendum reportedly at 78%, a simple majority in 
Congress is expected to qualify the referendum as a matter of 
national urgency before sending it back to the TSE to 
implement. 
 
8.  (SBU) Correa is clearly leery of possible attempts by the 
PRIAN/PSC/UDC anti-Assembly coalition in Congress (all of 
whom voted to refer the matter to Congress) to block or delay 
the referendum and pass constitutional reforms in Congress. 
Gutierrez' PSP is the key member of the pro-Assembly 
coalition, adding an element of uncertainty and compromise 
which Correa would clearly have preferred to avoid.  The 
importance of PSP votes clearly favors the eventual 
restoration of Gutierrez' political rights by the TSE.  For 
his part, Correa has added to the uncertainty over whether 
Congress will approve the referendum by repeatedly and 
publicly insulting Gutierrez, calling him a "traitor" and a 
"snake" during inaugural events and most recently saying 
"Gutierrez can be bought for a plate of lentils." 
 
9.  (SBU) Correa's revisions to the Assembly statute are 
being interpreted here as concessions showing both the new 
government's flexibility and its surprising incompetence 
elaborating its core initiative.  The change in numbers of 
Assembly members responds to criticism from powerful coastal 
provinces (including from Guayaquil's mayor Nebot) that the 
former formula would have short-changed representation of 
coast provinces in comparison to the highlands, which has a 
larger number of smaller provinces, which had boosted 
highland representation in a smaller Assembly.  The new 
signature requirement for political parties concedes to 
popular outcry (including from Correa's base) that political 
parties not be granted privileged access to the Assembly. 
BROWN