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Lucia A Keegan  01/23/2007 05:07:15 PM  From  DB/Inbox:  Lucia A Keegan

Cable 
Text:                                                                      
                                                                           
      
UNCLAS    SENSITIVE     PARIS 00261

SIPDIS
cxparis:
    ACTION: DCM
    INFO:   TSA POL ECON AMB

DISSEMINATION: DCMX
CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: ECON:TJWHITE
DRAFTED: ECON:MEMOTLEY
CLEARED: TSA: NLARBI

VZCZCFRI683
RR RUEHC RUCNMEM RHMFIUU
DE RUEHFR #0261/01 0231142
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 231142Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4379
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 000261 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR EUR/WE, EB/TRA, S/CT; DHS FOR TSA AND CBP 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAIR PTER FR
SUBJECT: FRANCE: TSA BRIEFS DATA PRIVACY AUTHORITY ON 
AVIATION SECURITY ARRANGMENTS 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: TSA provided an extensive briefing on U.S. 
aviation security arrangements to the French Data Privacy 
Authority (CNIL) in a meeting January 12.  Because of the 
current risk that the CNIL may wish to review all U.S. 
airlines' aviation security practices regarding 
implementation of the no-fly and selectee watch lists for 
conformity with French data privacy law, the briefing was an 
excellent opportunity to respond to concerns that go beyond 
the specific case being considered by the CNIL. 
 
¶2. (SBU) TSA Assistant Chief Counsel for International Law 
Anthony Giovanniello briefed the CNIL in connection with 
their investigation of Continental Airlines' (CA) actions 
relating to the transportation of Vincent Flecheux, a French 
National who was refused entry to the U.S. by CBP in Houston 
August 13, and who in a complaint filed with the CNIL claimed 
that CA personnel had told him this was in connection with 
his presence on the No-Fly list.  In previous meetings, CA 
had found it impossible to answer many of the CNIL's 
questions due to their inclusion of Sensitive Security 
Information (SSI), which they are prevented from disclosing 
to parties without a need to know. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Explaining the definition and reasoning behind SSI, 
Giovanniello stated that he had specifically obtained 
permission to discuss a number of aspects of the aviation 
passener pre-sceening process with the CNIL in the hopes that 
it would clarify issues raised by the case, and put to rest 
suspicions that it was somehow related to No-Fly or Selectee 
screening, rather than the obligation of CBP to refuse entry 
to travelers it determined were ineligible for admission to 
the U.S.  He emphasized that he would be unable to provide 
further details about the specific case, as it was TSA policy 
neither to confirm or deny subject's inclusion on watchlists. 
 He could affirm however that CBP's decision was not related 
to aviation security: border protection was a separate legal 
and law enforcement issue. CBP maintained its own immigration 
watch lists, which contained names with no relation to 
aviation security--e.g. child abduction suspects.  CNIL 
Commissioner de la Loyere indicated that he clearly 
understood the distinction between border control and 
aviation security. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Giovanniello began by describing the architecture of 
the aviation security arrangements created after 2003. TSA 
administered the No Fly and Selectee lists, which were 
created by the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) working with 
various nominating agencies.  It determined who met the 
criteria for inclusion, broadly speaking either representing 
a threat to aviation or a threat of terrorism. No-Fly listees 
could not board U.S.-bound aircraft, while selectees required 
additional screening before continuing their travel.  These 
lists were furnished to airlines, which were required to 
notify the USG of exact or close matches, which were then 
evaluated by TSC and double-checked through consultation with 
the originating agency if the match was positive.  In 
response to a question about No-Fly diversions, Giovanniello 
explained that these decisions were made at a very high level 
in DHS, and only after thorough review led to a conclusion 
that a threat existed, in accordance with our rights under 
the Chicago Convention. 
 
¶5. (SBU) The CNIL was interested in how CA applied some of 
these directives, and asked in particular about an orange 
sticker the security contractor applied to the passenger's 
passport, and any requirements for eventual notification of 
the French authorities in case of a positive match. 
Giovanniello replied that neither of these was required by 
U.S. security directives; CA counsel confirmed that its 
security contractor used the sticker as an aid to flag 
candidates for additional security screening, either because 
they were Selectees or had been chosen at random to meet 
French selectee screening requirements.  CA notified the 
French border police immediately of any security risks 
encountered in screening. 
 
¶6. (SBU) The CNIL also inquired about security measures taken 
to protect the lists from piracy during transmission; they 
had heard these did not include encryption.  TSA confirmed 
that lists were not only protected by encryption in both 
directions, but by background checks and legal sanctions over 
divulging SSI among personnel with access to them. 
Giovanniello said that under the APIS Quick Query (AQQ) and 
Secure Flight initiatives TSA would at some point be expected 
to entirely take over the responsibility for matching names, 
making transmission of the lists unnecessary.  In response to 
another question, TSA noted that airlines were required to 
maintain lists and records of hits for only 60 days, in case 
follow-up investigation was needed. According to CA, no list 
of secondary screenees was maintained by their security 
contractor. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Commissioner de la Loyere noted that the CNIL was 
particularly concerned about watchlists' inclusion of 
innocent passengers. How did passengers who were wrongly 
listed get off our watchlists?  TSA explained the redress 
process, which the CNIL was familiar with from a letter 
Flecheux had received from the TSA ombudsman clearing him for 
travel. TSA also explained how travel is facilitated by 
adding a "cleared" entry to watchlists to prevent legitimate 
travelers with exact or close name matches to watchlist 
entries from being mistakenly identified with them.  TSA 
described an upcoming modification of the redress process 
(DHS Traveler Redress Inquiry System), by which it would 
serve as a one-stop shop for watchlist redress requests, 
coordinating across the various agencies of DHS and 
facilitating the travel of legitimate passengers. 
 
¶8. (SBU) The CNIL concluded by indicating it would be 
continuing its enquiries into the Flecheux case, as it still 
had not received responses from some French government 
agencies. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Participants for the CNIL included Commissioner 
Georges de la Loyere, General Secretary Yann Padova, Sophie 
Vuillet-Tavernier, Director of Legal Affairs, and Pascale 
Raulin-Serrier of the European and International Affairs 
Division. Continental Airlines was represented by Amy Bried, 
Senior Attorney, and Isabelle Gavadon, Partner in the Paris 
law firm FIDAL.  USG attendees were Anthony Giovanniello, TSA 
Assistant Chief Counsel for International Law, Embassy Paris 
TSA Representative, and Econoff. Assistant Chief Counsel 
 
SIPDIS 
Giovanniello cleared this cable. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Comment: This meeting proved to be a good 
opportunity to address a number of concerns raised by the 
CNIL.  USG participation was much appreciated by Continental 
Airlines, and we hope the forthright description of our 
aviation security practices--including processes for 
protection of data, review of listings and redress in case of 
error--will encourage the CNIL to await implementation of AQQ 
and Secure Flight before undertaking any extensive review of 
airlines security screening practices, if at that point they 
still deem it necessary. 
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm 
 
STAPLETON