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Viewing cable 07PANAMA54, PANAMA UNLIKELY TO ACCEPT MIGRANTS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07PANAMA54 2007-01-16 21:29 2011-05-31 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Panama 
VZCZCXYZ0014
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHZP #0054 0162129
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 162129Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY PANAMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9616
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE
 
C O N F I D E N T I A L PANAMA 000054 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR PRM AND WHA/CEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/15/2017 
TAGS: PREF PM
SUBJECT: PANAMA UNLIKELY TO ACCEPT MIGRANTS 
 
REF: STATE 3439 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR WILLIAM EATON FOR REASONS 1.4 B AND D 
 
ΒΆ1.  (C) Panama is highly unlikely to accept Caribbean 
migrants in the event of a mass migration, due to historical 
sensitivities to U.S. military presence as well as a general 
reluctance to accept displaced persons.  In addition, Panama 
lacks the institutional capacity to run a migrant camp.  Per 
reftel instructions, below is post's assessment of Panama's 
ability and willingness to house migrants in a mass migration 
contingency. 
 
a.  Panama would not be willing to establish a camp to house 
1,000 or more migrants.  Panama is extremely unlikely to host 
a U.S.-funded, built, or run camp.  Given the legacy of U.S. 
military presence in Panama, it would be too politically 
sensitive for the GOP to even consider such a measure. 
 
b.  Panama would not be willing to establish such a camp, 
whether or not the United States took on migrants at GTMO. 
Panama will expect the United States to bear the brunt of any 
outflow. 
 
c.  Panama is unlikely to take migrants from any countries. 
As far back as post can recall, Panama has turned down all 
USG requests to house migrants from any country. 
Furthermore, Panama already has issues dealing with the 
displaced persons from the Colombian conflict and would not 
be capable of dealing with additional migrants. 
 
d.  Willingness to accept Cuban migrants would not be greater 
in a post-Fidel environment.  Rather, Panama would likely see 
a less compelling case to take on migrants from a post-Fidel 
Cuba. 
 
e.  Post does not anticipate any negative impact on political 
or bilateral issues if we approached Panama. 
 
f.  Panama would be unwilling to establish any camp, 
regardless of size and which government paid for the camp. 
 
g.  Panama would not want any camp, not self run and 
certainly not U.S. run, with the sensitivities to U.S. 
military presence in Panama.  Given Panama's problems with 
prison overcrowding and harsh prison conditions, we cannot be 
confident that Panama can run additional facilities. 
 
h.  Panama would object to a U.S. built or run camp and would 
expect the United States to take any migrants. 
 
Eaton