VZCZCXRO7319
RR RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHNJ #0070/01 0241747
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 241747Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4833
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 NDJAMENA 000070 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE, SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PREL PREF CD SU
SUBJECT: SPECIAL ENVOY NATSIOS TO REBELS: TIME IS NOT 
ON YOUR SIDE 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  In his meeting with DPA non- 
signatory groups, Presidential Special Envoy Andrew 
Natsios delivered a clear message to rebel leaders 
gathered in eastern Chad that the only solution to the 
Darfur crisis was through negotiation.  He informed 
them that the USG supported an all-inclusive political 
negotiation process that would lead to a "just peace" 
based on amendments to the Darfur Peace Agreement 
(DPA).  Natsios emphasized U.S. support for the efforts 
of AU Special Envoy for Darfur, Salim Ahmed Salim and 
UN Special Envoy Jan Eliasson.  Rebel leaders welcomed 
the Special Envoy's visit, but reiterated familiar 
concerns about the failings of the DPA.   All 
participants agreed that disunity was hurting the 
movement; they were interested in a process to unify 
the movements, identify leadership and political aims, 
but some were either unable to articulate a clear way 
forward in that forum or had more inchoate views.   The 
meetings provided an opportunity to discuss the 
relationship between the violence in Darfur and its 
spillover effect into Chad.  END SUMMARY. 
 
------------------------ 
Meeting Participants 
------------------------ 
 
¶2. (SBU) Special Envoy Natsios met with Sudanese rebel 
leaders in Chad on January 19 (Abeche) and January 20 
(Ndjamena) accompanied by the Ambassador.  In 
attendance were Sudanese rebels affiliated with the 
National Redemption Front (NRF): Dr. Sharif Hariri, 
Sudanese Liberation Movement (SLM), Dr. Khalil Ibrahim, 
Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), and Khamis 
Abdullah (SLM).  Also seated at the main table were 
Ahmad Togoud (JEM) and Adam Shogar (SLM).  In side 
meetings on January 19 and 20, President Special Envoy 
met with SLM breakaway leader Ahmed Abdul Shafi and G- 
19 Field Commander Adam Bakhit.  DCM met with NMRD 
leader Hassam Hamis and Rizeygat Arab leader Abu Sullah 
Surah on January 19.  Ouddai Governor Touka Ramadan 
opened the meeting with the NRF and attended both the 
morning and afternoon session.  Approximately thirty 
political advisers and field commanders sat in on the 
meetings as well, listening intently (through 
translation) and asking questions at the end. 
 
-------------------------- 
USG Message to Rebels 
---------------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) In his introductory remarks, Special Envoy 
Natsios explained that the U.S. was committed to 
exploring ways to help the parties to make progress 
towards a resolution of the Darfur conflict.  Natsios 
noted that prior to his arrival in Chad he had made a 
commitment to Sudanese President Bashir to meet with 
the non-signatory Sudanese rebel groups in an effort to 
relaunch the peace process.  The Special Envoy stressed 
that there could be no military victory by the 
government against the rebels - or vice-versa: the only 
solution was negotiation.  However, time was on the 
side of the Khartoum government.  With the Sudanese 
economy growing briskly, the Government of National 
Unity (GNU) would have no problem financing a war in 
Darfur.  Mr. Natsios reminded the leaders that the 
international community was committed to supporting the 
UN and the African Union (AU) in mediating a political 
process leading to peace.  One thing in particular was 
very clear:  the international community would not 
support regime change by violent means.  The U.S. 
Government believed that the Sudanese people had the 
right to change their government - by elections.  If 
any group stated that it intended to overthrow the 
government, the United States would not work with them. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) The Special Envoy also cautioned that, 
although there was a powerful civil society coalition 
in the United States seeking to end the conflict and 
suffering in Darfur, the rebels should not assume that 
this coalition supported the rebels.  The rebels also 
needed to understand that neither the United States nor 
NATO would intervene militarily to assist the rebels in 
Darfur.  And finally, the Special Envoy enjoined them 
to work towards a single position.  Disunity was their 
most serious problem.  All of the groups - not just the 
NRF - needed to speak with one voice.  Mr. Natsios 
emphasized that the rebels needed to come up with 
something - in writing - that corrects the DPA 
weaknesses.  If an agreement is not in writing, the 
United States and other players cannot pressure the 
Sudanese Government to implement it. 
 
 
NDJAMENA 00000070  002 OF 004 
 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Special Envoy Natsios informed the leaders 
that the United States told President Bashir to stop 
bombing commanders meetings.  He reported that 
President Bashir had agreed not to bomb the upcoming 
commanders meeting on or about January 20 and that the 
UN and AU would provide logistical support.   He noted 
that this conference was supposed to be a meeting to 
develop a unified political position - not a conference 
for military consolidation.  He underscored that the 
United States supported holding such a political 
conference, and urged full participation in the 
conference. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) The Special Envoy encouraged the leaders to 
remember that they needed to be realistic in what they 
asked for and prioritize their most important issues. 
He affirmed that if the rebels negotiated in good 
faith, the international community would support them. 
In fact, the United States would contribute its own 
funding to help re-build Darfur.  The Special Envoy 
underscored the point by telling the group that 
President Bush had asked him to tell them that the 
United States would be generous.  And finally, the 
Special Envoy told all rebel groups in no uncertain 
terms that attacks on humanitarian workers and vehicles 
needed to cease. 
 
---------------------- 
Reaction by the Rebels 
---------------------- 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Dr. Sharif Hariri spoke first and 
characterized the NRF as a serious attempt to create 
unity so as to better represent the Darfur people.  He 
shared the concerns of the Special Envoy about the need 
to speak with one voice.  Looking back, he argued that 
using the AU had been a tactical mistake - Darfurians 
has been used as "guinea pigs."  Therefore, they 
welcomed the involvement of the UN and the United 
States and pledged the NRF's cooperation to reach a 
comprehensive and just agreement.  Dr. Hariri asked for 
the UN to lead the Darfur negotiation process, as the 
AU lacked the capacity to fulfill its duties.  He 
suggested a "4 & 1" conference.  This conference would 
consist of:  non-signatory rebel groups and the 
countries bordering Sudan, including Chad, Libya, 
Central African Republic (CAR) Eritrea and Egypt. 
Natsios said he would mention this idea to Eliasson, 
but pointed out that a successful negotiation required 
a neutral party - and all of the countries named had 
interests in Darfur 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Dr. Hariri reported that the NRF was ready 
for serious political engagement and intended to meet 
with other groups in order to unite.  In fact, meetings 
had already begun in Abeche with field commanders.  He 
professed, however, to be unaware of the January 20 
meeting and of UN involvement in logistics assistance. 
The Special Envoy suggested to Hariri that the goals of 
the short term should be for the rebels to agree on 
priority actions and to come together politically, 
instead of creating a new mechanism outside the DPA. 
The Special Envoy also noted that it would be a step 
forward if the rebel movements would make a statement 
saying that they did not seek regime change by force. 
 
--------- 
DPA Views 
--------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) Natsios asked if the JEM, SLM and NRF leaders 
would agree to amendments to the DPA, with the ultimate 
aim of making sure there is a "just peace."  In a 
carefully prepared statement representing the agreed 
views of the participants, Adam Togoud recounted the 
NRF's view of why the DPA failed, i.e. not taking into 
account the historical marginalization of the people of 
Darfur, issues with power-sharing, wealth-sharing, and 
security arrangements.  He asserted that, based on 
population, the people of Darfur deserved proportional 
representation in the central government as well as a 
vice presidential position.  They would request 15% of 
Sudan's national revenues to be given to a regional 
government of Darfur as well as a share to assist in 
developing the region. He called for a significant 
increase in compensation, to $500 per person refugee or 
IDP, to help the displaced return to their homes in 
addition to a commission and special fund to pay them 
for damages they have suffered.  Per security, he said 
the NRF wants to be able to retain its forces during a 
transitional period to be agreed upon, after which they 
would be integrated into the national army.  They would 
 
NDJAMENA 00000070  003 OF 004 
 
 
also request disarmament of the janjaweed and 
withdrawal of the Sudanese forces to the garrisons held 
before hostilities started. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Natsios responded that, the United States 
believed the DPA offered the best opportunity to 
achieve that goal; it was not realistic to think that 
the international community would support negotiation 
of a totally new agreement.   Adam Shogar (SLA) stated 
that they were ready to negotiate on the basis of the 
principles laid out by Togoud, but amending the DPA 
"would not work." Dr. Hariri was more emphatic, stating 
that the "DPA cannot be the basis for negotiation." 
JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim offered a more nuanced 
position, stating that if the demands could be 
addressed within the DPA, it didn't matter what it was 
called.  However, he believed that the amendments 
sought by the NRF were incompatible with the DPA. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
Hybrid Force: Don't Put the Cart Before the Horse 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶11.  (SBU) Natsios noted that under the DPA and the 
Addis Ababa agreement, the message was clear: Sudan 
must accept the three stages of the UN Proposal, 
including accepting a hybrid AU-UN force in Darfur.  He 
reiterated that the international community supports 
the AU/UN taking the lead in forging a peace for Darfur 
and formed an international coalition (consisting of 
the Arab league, Egypt, China and others) to push the 
Sudanese towards a negotiated settlement.  Thus far, 
Natsios said, the USG has been relatively successful - 
including getting AU to put 7,000 troops on the ground 
in Darfur and convincing Bashir to agree to the first 
phase of the Addis Ababa framework.  Meanwhile, 
however, it seemed that the non-signatory rebel groups 
have done virtually nothing to improve relations with 
each other to ensure a better future for their people. 
JEM's Dr. Ibrahim Khalil responded that the arrival of 
the hybrid force would need to be well-prepared.  He 
asked what kind of peace the hybrid force was coming to 
enforce, and called it putting the cart before the 
horse.  In the chaos of Darfur, he warned, no one would 
know which side the UN soldiers were on - the 
government's side?  The janjaweed's side?  The Special 
Envoy explained to Ibrahim that the role of the UN 
troops was quite clear:  to protect IDPs, non- 
combatants and humanitarian workers.  As the political 
process evolved, the UN's mandate could evolve as well 
to cover whatever was agreed with the government. 
 
------------------------ 
Meeting with Abdul Shafi 
------------------------ 
 
¶12.   (SBU) In a separate meeting with SLM "Interim 
Chairman" Ahmed Abdul Shafi (arranged because Abdul 
Shafi was not considered part of the NRF), Abdul Shafi 
informed the Special Envoy that the situation in Darfur 
was getting worse.  As movements, they were "helpless" 
because of internal dissension.  His group had a 
proposal to unify all SLM factions and this process 
needed to finish.  Abdul Shafi stated that a meeting of 
SLM field commanders was underway.  The AU was supposed 
to be cooperating with certain logistics but ultimately 
did not send helicopters as the Government of Sudan 
would not guarantee security.  After the SLM field 
commanders meeting, an SLM political conference 
(including refugees and civil society) would need to be 
held.  These meeting would decide on leadership, 
minimum requirements for peace and whether to join the 
NRF or not.  Asked whether he could work with the DPA, 
Abdul Shafi stated that the DPA had been a step 
forward.  They were supportive of the initial 
Declaration of Principles, but not with the agreement 
finally negotiated in Abuja.  There could be no lasting 
peace unless the root causes were addressed.  As SLM, 
they saw two important phases:  a development and 
security phase in Darfur, and a political and 
governance phase concerning the region's relationship 
to Khartoum. 
 
----------------------------------- 
Chad & Sudan: One Optic Lens 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶13.  (SBU) While the meetings on 19 and 20 January 
focused on Darfur, in his meetings Natsios also stated 
that a dangerous development had taken place: Chadian 
aid to Sudanese rebel groups and Sudanese aid to 
Chadian rebel groups was exacerbating the situation and 
 
NDJAMENA 00000070  004 OF 004 
 
 
contributing to the escalation in violence in Darfur 
and eastern Chad.  The most immediate consequence of 
this instability has been the rising number of 
internally displaced persons in eastern Chad.  (Note: A 
USG humanitarian assessment team is currently 
investigating the IDP situation in eastern Chad.  The 
mission will last two weeks.  End note.) 
 
-------------------- 
NMRD and Arab Leader 
-------------------- 
 
¶14.  (SBU) DCM and other members of the Natsios 
delegation met with NMRD representative Hassam Hamis 
and southern Darfur Rizeygat Arab leader Abu Sullah 
Surah on January 20.   Their message to the Special 
Envoy was that Khartoum was the problem, the movements 
needed assistance to unify, and that the smaller 
movements needed to be present at the table and have 
their voices heard.  Surah argued that the problem with 
the NRF was that other factions were unwilling to 
become part of it so long as JEM - with its islamist, 
"Turabist" orientation, and unwillingness to separate 
politics from religion - was at the head.  NMRD 
representative Hamis claimed that NMRD held the area in 
Darfur near Jebel Moon, and commanded 3,000 fighters 
(not all of whom were mobilized) and some 40-45 
vehicles.  He stated that his weapons were bought from 
Chad or CAR or stolen from the Sudanese government and 
that the NMRD was not receiving support from any 
foreign government. 
 
------------------------ 
Meeting with Adam Bakhit 
------------------------ 
 
¶15.  (SBU) In a meeting January 20 in N'djamena with G- 
19 field commander Adam Bakhit, Bakhit echoed that 
peace would come if Darfurians could unite, and it was 
the goal of the rebels to unite both politically and 
militarily.  Bakhit was evasive on the question of his 
participation in a commander's conference and was 
unwilling to provide a date or location because of 
security concerns. (He allowed that there was concern 
that the Government of Sudan would bomb the site).   He 
did state however that the meeting would have a 
military and political side.   Asked if he would join 
JEM, he explained that there was ambivalence concerning 
JEM -- recognition that if "some leaders" were left 
behind, that they would cause problems. 
 
¶16.  (SBU) According to Bakhit, the NRF was growing: 
Abdulshafi was preparing to join the NRF and some of 
his troops were with Bahkit (as were part of 
Abdelwahid's).  Furthermore, according to Bakhit, Mini 
Minnawi - now commanding only 27 vehicles -- would be 
joining as well. The goal in uniting was to speak with 
one voice, with all commanders represented. He left the 
impression that he was trying to unite all of the 
groups under his leadership.  When asked, he stated 
that violent regime change was not their plan or 
objective.  Concerning future political negotiations 
with the Sudanese Government, Bakhit stated that a new 
DPA was needed, not just amendments to the existing 
DPA; it was impossible to work on something that had 
been signed by President Bashir and Minni Minawi.   He 
supported President Deby's argument that the Sudanese 
were attempting a "population exchange" in Darfur. When 
asked if this included the large Fur population, Bakhit 
responded that 1) the Fur occupy a mountainous area 
that makes it hard to displace them and 2) the 
mountainous terrain is not appealing to the Arab 
population. 
 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶17.  (SBU) While much of the rhetoric was familiar, the 
gathering of non-signatories with the Special Envoy 
clearly was viewed by them as an important step 
forward.  They told us they understood his message of 
moderating their expectations and also promised to 
issue a statement renouncing regime change as a 
political goal. 
 
¶18.  (U) This cable was cleared by SE Natsios' 
 
¶19.  (U) Tripoli minimize considered.  Wall