VZCZCXRO5890
RR RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHNJ #0062/01 0231633
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 231633Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4818
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000062 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
PARIS AND LONDON FOR AFRICA WATCHERS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF PHUM CD SU
SUBJECT: VISIT OF SPECIAL ENVOY NATSIOS TO CHAD: MEETINGS 
WITH PRESIDENT AND FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary:  In meetings with Chadian President Idriss Deby 
Itno and Foreign Minister Allam-mi on January 18 in N'djamena, 
Chad, Special Envoy for Sudan Andrew Natsios expressed thanks to 
Chad for receiving Darfur refugees and for its support for a UN 
force on the border.  He stressed that unless conflicts between 
Sudan and Chad were dealt with, there would be no end to the 
Darfur conflict.  President Deby thanked the United States for its 
efforts to bring peace to the region, expressed concern for the 
mounting IDP numbers in eastern Chad and argued that the Sudanese 
Government was attempting a population "exchange" whereby 
Darfurians of African origin would be expelled to Chad, and those 
Chadians of Arab origin would move to Darfur.  Both the Foreign 
Minister and the President acknowledged that Chad turned a blind 
eye to Sudanese rebel movements across the border, but denied that 
arms were flowing from the Chadian government to the Sudanese 
rebels.  End summary. 
 
 
FOREIGN MINISTER ALLAM-MI: CHAD A VICTIM OF KHARTOUM'S FAILED 
DARFUR POLICY 
--------------------------------------------- -------------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Special Envoy Andrew Natsios met with Chadian President 
Deby and Foreign Minister Allam-mi on January 18.  At the meeting 
with Allam-mi, the Foreign Minister said that the Bashir 
government was actively supporting Chadian rebels with the 
objective of removing President Deby.  In response to Mr. Natsios' 
points that intelligence sources indicated  Chadian support for 
Sudanese rebels, Allam-mi emphatically denied active Government of 
Chad (GOC) support to Sudanese rebels, but acknowledged that the 
GOC "closes its eyes to the activities of Sudanese rebels" in Chad 
and that Sudanese support for Chadian rebels had led to a dynamic 
of popular support for Sudanese rebels in eastern Chad.  Allam-mi 
alleged that Sudan used subterfuge and the scapegoating of Chad to 
mask its refusal to engage in meaningful negotiation with Sudanese 
rebels.  As the situation in Darfur becomes more and more 
unacceptable to the international community, Allam-mi warned, 
Sudan will seek to contrive other ways to frustrate the peace 
process and to divert attention from its responsibility for 
failure of that process.  By way of example, he suggested that 
ongoing rebel activity in Ade near the border with Sudan [note: 
the village of Ade was reportedly  briefly held by Chad rebels on 
January 18. End note] was staged to frustrate the Special Envoy's 
plans to travel to the east to meet with Sudanese rebel leaders. 
Allam-mi said that it is important for the international community 
-- and the United States  -- to push Sudan to bring peace and 
stability to Darfur and he welcomed the Special Envoy's initiative 
to hold talks with Darfur rebel leaders who have yet to sign the 
Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA). 
 
PRESIDENT DEBY: SCORCHED EARTH POLICY AND NEW IDPS 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶3. (SBU) In a meeting the same day. Special Envoy Natsios 
explained to President Idriss Deby Itno that he was in Chad to 
talk about the issues between Chad and Sudan and to meet with 
Darfur rebel groups -- the latter at the request of Sudanese 
President Bashir.  He intended to ask the rebel groups to develop 
a unified position, and to work for a political - not a military - 
solution.   SE Natsios underscored that Jan Eliasson of the United 
Nations (UN) and Salim Salim of the African Union (AU) were the 
lead negotiators.  The U.S. job was to support the UN and the AU. 
The DPA should be the basis for negotiations over possible 
amendments.  By way of example, the Special Envoy noted that the 
Sudanese government had said privately that it was willing to 
increase the compensation fund from $30 million to $200 million, 
if that would enable the non-signatories to come to agreement. In 
this context, Special Envoy Natsios stressed the importance of 
allowing the rebels -- political leaders and field commanders -- 
to meet to develop a unified position.  Recently President Bashir 
had agreed to allow rebels to meet in Darfur.  This meeting had 
the potential to be significant, but there was always concern that 
the GOC would bomb the meetings (as it had the last two meetings 
organized by Sudanese rebels). 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Special Envoy Natsios explained that he wanted to 
explore with President Deby any steps the United States could take 
to mitigate conflicts in Chad, Sudan and the Central African 
Republic (CAR) through peaceful negotiations.  He stressed that 
unless conflicts between countries such as Sudan and Chad were 
dealt with, there would be no end to the Darfur conflict. Special 
Envoy Natsios concluded by warmly thanking President Deby for the 
support Chad has extended to Darfur refugees and its cooperation 
with the United Nations on the question of having a blue-hatted 
force along the border. 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  President Deby welcomed the visit of the Special Envoy 
and his efforts to bring peace.  He stated that the Special Envoy 
 
NDJAMENA 00000062  002 OF 002 
 
 
could count on the support of Chad for any effort which would stop 
or contain the Darfur conflict.  He stressed that Chad -- more 
than any other country -- desired to see an end to the conflict. 
Not only was Chad suffering from the impact of the refugees, but 
the GOS -- under the pretext that Chad was supporting Sudanese 
rebels -- had organized a group of mercenaries which have been 
working to destabilize Chad since December 18, 2005.  President 
Deby explained that while Chad allowed Sudanese rebels to go back 
and forth across the border to visit their families who lived in 
Chad, they did not have arms to give them and were not doing so. 
President Deby noted that Chad had demonstrated its will to the 
GOS to resolve conflicts peacefully.  The first Darfur cease-fire 
was negotiated in Ndjamena; despite change of venue, the GOC has 
continued to play a positive role.  Furthermore, the February 2006 
accord signed in Tripoli between Chad and Sudan had been violated 
many times (by Sudan). President Deby emphasized that Chad 
supported any initiatives aimed at resolving the conflict, and 
would help the U.S. delegation meet with Chadian rebels. That 
being said, he commented that "neither the Sudanese rebels nor the 
Sudanese government are interested in resolving the conflict." 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Looking to the roots of the Darfur conflict, President 
Deby stated that Sudan had a policy of "exchange of populations" 
whereby all Darfurians of African origin would be pushed into 
Chad, and those Chadians of Arab origin would move to Darfur. 
Calling it a global strategy, he explained that Darfur villages 
were being burned to allow for more pasturage.  The President 
explained that he had just returned from a 12-day visit to the 
border where he had seen first-hand the scorched earth policy that 
Sudan was implementing as far as Chad, including signs proclaiming 
"the new Sudan" in burned-out Chadian towns.  Some 100,000 Chadian 
Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) were living near the border 
without any means of support and he had asked the Chadian Council 
of Ministers to approve approximately USD 8 million for IDPs. 
President Deby mentioned how much he appreciated the work of the 
humanitarian community in Goz Beida and Guereda. He made a plea to 
the international community to avoid putting the IDPs in camps, 
but to allow them to return to their villages and to rebuild the 
wells, schools and medical centers that they needed to resettle in 
their localities.  He mentioned that during his stay some 11,000 
Chadians had been assisted in returning to their own villages, 
but many tens of thousands remained homeless.  Special Envoy 
Natsios informed President Deby that a USAID team was in the 
region and was looking at ways to assist Chadian IDPs. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) President Deby warned the Special Envoy that Sudan had 
armed a large force which was marching on Chad.  The targets could 
be Abeche, Goz Beida or Adre  He mentioned that he was speaking on 
behalf of CAR President Bozize as well, who also feared an 
imminent attack from Sudan. Asked by Special Envoy Natsios whether 
these forces endangered the refugee camps, President Deby said 
that he thought not -- these were more in danger of attacks from 
janjaweed. 
 
¶8.  (U) This cable was not cleared by Special Envoy Natsios. 
 
¶9.  (U) Tripoli minimize considered. 
 
WALL