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Viewing cable 07MOSCOW256, EXTRANCHECK: POST-SHIPMENT VERIFICATION:

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07MOSCOW256 2007-01-23 08:15 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Moscow
VZCZCXYZ0001
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #0256 0230815
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 230815Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6683
RHMFIUU/US CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION WASHINGTON DC
UNCLAS MOSCOW 000256 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
USDOC FOR 532/OEA/MHAMES/DMUSLU 
USDOC FOR 3150/USFCS/OIO/CEENIS/MCOSTA 
USDOC FOR 532/OEE/MO'BRIEN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: BEXP ETRD ETTC RS
SUBJECT: EXTRANCHECK: POST-SHIPMENT VERIFICATION: 
RUSSIAN FEDERAL RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGICAL INSTITUTE 
OF BIOLOGICAL INDUSTRY, SCHELKOVSKY DIST, RUSSIA, 
LICENSE NO. D368202 
 
REFTEL: 1) 06 USDOC 05898, 2) 06 MOSCOW 008630 
 
1. Unauthorized disclosure of the information provided 
below is prohibited by Section 12C of the Export 
Administration Act. 
 
2. Reftel 1 requested a Post-shipment verification to 
determine the legitimacy and reliability of the end- 
user, Russian Federal Research and Technological 
Institute of Biological Industry (Russian abbreviation 
VNITIBP), Russia. The company is listed on BIS license 
application D358202 as the ultimate consignee of a 
mobile pilot plant fermenter. These items are 
controlled for chemical or biological warfare reasons 
under ECCN 2B352. The licensee is New Brunswick 
Scientific Co. Inc., 44 Talmadge Road, Edison, NJ 
08818. 
 
3. VNITIBP was the subject of a pre-license check for 
D368202 reported in reftel 2.  On August 3, 2006, 
Export Control Attache Donald Pearce and FSN Natalya 
Shipitsina met with Eugene Ruban, Deputy Director of 
VNITIBP at his office at the Kashintsevo facility. 
Mr. Ruban stated that VNITIBP would utilize the 
fermenter for the development and production of 
vaccines and biological materials.  Mr. Ruban stated 
that he was familiar with U.S. export controls and 
with the license conditions.  Mr. Ruban was informed 
of the possibility of a post shipment verification, 
and agreed to allow the team access to the fermenter 
in the future should it be necessary. 
 
4. Initial attempts to contact Mr. Ruban were 
unsuccessful.  FSN Shipitsina called the contact 
numbers provided by Mr. Ruban, which included both his 
office and mobile telephone numbers, neither of which 
were answered initially.  Another employee answered 
the line, and stated that Mr. Ruban was not in the 
office.  Initially, the employee would not pass a 
message to Mr. Ruban.  During a follow-up phone call, 
the employee advised FSN Shipitsina that Mr. Ruban had 
been hospitalized. 
 
5. On January 10, FSN Shipitsina contacted Mr. Ruban 
via his mobile telephone.  Mr. Ruban refused to meet 
with the team, stating that end-use verification was 
not in the terms of the sales contract.  Mr. Ruban 
referred any future contacts to the General Director, 
and provided a telephone number. 
 
6. On January 10, and several times thereafter, FSN 
Shipitsina called the number provided by Mr. Ruban. 
The line was not answered. 
 
7. Recommendations: Post cannot repeat cannot verify 
that the fermenter is being used in accordance with 
the Export Administration Regulations.  Post does not 
repeat not consider the Russian Federal Research and 
Technological Institute of Biological Industry 
(VNITIBP) as a reliable recipient of sensitive U.S. 
technology. 
 
(FCS MOSCOW/SBOZEK/DPEARCE) 
BURNS