VZCZCXRO0324
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0070/01 0171524
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 171524Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5810
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KHARTOUM 000070 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREF AU SU
SUBJECT: Darfur: Inauguration of Second Chamber of CFC, Clearing 
Backlog of Cases, Rebel Outreach 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary:  The AMIS Cease Fire Commission met January 8 and 
10 to clear out a backlog of cease fire violations, receive 
briefings on the Force Commander's outreach to non-signatory rebel 
factions (septel), and inaugurate the Second Chamber for 
non-signatories.  The First Chamber meeting on January 8 considered 
twelve cases; seven cases were disposed of with various 
recommendations, four referred to the Joint Commission, and one 
carried over to the Second Chamber.  On January 10, the First 
Chamber considered four cases, all of which were carried over to the 
next meeting. 
 
¶2. (SBU) The January 8 and 10 Second Chamber meetings constituted an 
opportunity to discuss the FC's outreach to rebel faction leaders 
and a useful reality check on who he is meeting.  When confronted 
with a violation, the JEM and SLA/NSF representatives in attendance 
insisted on the need to restore their faction CFC representatives at 
the Sector sub-CFC level, which the GOS continues to oppose.  They 
also insisted that the structure of the Second Chamber follow the 
Addis Agreement on the Modalities for the CFC (28 May 2004), and not 
the DPA, lest they be pulled into the DPA through the backdoor. 
Attendees discussed ejection of Civ/Pol from the station at 
Kabkabiya in Sector 4, as well as the ongoing problem of the 
disappearance of AMIS fuel at the airport, which brought the walkout 
of the GOS representative.  He later apologized to the Chairman and 
reported that eight soldiers and two civilians were arrested in the 
case.  End Summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
CEASE FIRE COMMISSION FIRST CHAMBER JANUARY 8 and 10 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶3. (U) African Union Force Commander MG LKF Aprezi chaired the CFC 
meetings of January 8 and 10.  Also in attendance were the DFC (1st 
Vice Chairman), AU Civ/Pol Commissioner, EU Rep (2d Vice Chairman), 
and observers from the EU, UN, and U.S. (El Fasher Liaison Officer). 
 Faction reps included COL Adam Ali War (SLM/A - M), LTC Gamal Arbab 
(SLM/Freewill), LTC Mustafa Dawood (JEM/Peace Wing), LTC Ali 
Mohammed Hamad (JEM/Peace Wing), and LTC A Bardawi from the GOS. 
 
------------------------------- 
FUEL THEFT AT EL FASHER AIRPORT 
------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) While not perhaps a strict cease fire violation, the Force 
Commander took advantage of the January 8 meeting to raise the issue 
that everyday fuel is being stolen from the AU at El Fasher airport. 
 He said he has raised it before, and the GOS always says it would 
investigate the matter, but never produces a report.  The GOS rep 
again asked for time to complete the investigation and the FC gave 
him until the next meeting on January 10.  At issue is the fact that 
the GOS will not allow the AU to post guards over its fuel site or 
aircraft because of what it considers the sensitivity of the 
airport; the AU is concerned with the cost of the lost fuel, but 
also with the danger to aircraft that are being drained of fuel by 
untrained individuals.  When the Force Commander forcibly raised the 
issue again on January 10, stating that two nights prior some 1,300 
liters were stolen, the GOS rep slammed his notebook shut and said 
if his government is going to be accused of theft, he will not 
participate in the meeting.  He left in a huff to a somewhat stunned 
audience.  The FC continued the meeting in his absence, stating that 
he could continue to "name and shame" with or without the GOS rep. 
He told Poloff later in the day, however, that the GOS rep had 
returned in the afternoon to apologize, and to inform him that the 
GOS had arrested eight soldiers and two civilians in the case; they 
apparently had been stealing the gas using 20 liter jerry cans, 
effectively an all night, every night, operation. 
 
----------------------- 
CFC SOP AND SECRETARIAT 
----------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) The FC said that the Cease Fire Commission SOP is almost 
complete and would be available for review by the parties in the 
next week or so.  Throughout the day there was considerable 
confusion about who had received which reports and a good deal of 
back and forth to the copier machine to get the right papers into 
the hands of participants.  The CFC Secretariat did seem to be a bit 
overwhelmed, and certain basic management tools -- e.g., a tracking 
spreadsheet for cases -- was missing.  The FC said at one point to 
his deputy that he hopes several of the incoming UN staff officers 
could be assigned to the CFC to make the secretariat run better. 
(Comment:  This would seem to be an essential element to making the 
CFC effective; the strict accounting and tracking of cases would be 
the only way to ensure that the parties are accountable, and the 
rapid dissemination of information is key; several cases that were 
considered during the day, for example, were dismissed because the 
information was stale.  End comment.) 
 
------------------------------- 
CIV/POL EJECTION FROM KABKABIYA 
 
KHARTOUM 00000070  002 OF 004 
 
 
------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) The Civ/Pol Commissioner then reviewed the case of the 
effective ejection of Civ/Pol from Kabkabiya in Sector Four. 
According to the report, which was filed as a violation of the DPA, 
if not a strict CFC violation, the GOS police commissioner called in 
his Civ/Pol counterpart and told him that the Civ/Pol station would 
have to close.  He cited four "violations":  1) they did not have a 
land permit for the station; 2) they have been violating local 
tradition by urging women to go to a medical clinic after they have 
been raped; 3) they are undercutting the authority of the local 
police; and 4) they are getting involved in things outside their 
mandate, such as meeting with people and taking testimony, as 
opposed to simple observation.  The Civ/Pol Commissioner met with 
the GOS Police Commissioner to press the issue, but he did not 
yield.  The Civ/Pol chief said he believes the matter now needs to 
go to Khartoum for resolution at a political level.  He further 
reported on January 10 that Civ/Pol was forced to abandon the 
station, which was subsequently looted.  He said he would again push 
the issue next week, and the FC suggested to the GOS rep that the 
standard answer that "there would be a report" on issues in the 
future was unacceptable.  The SLA/M rep urged the AU to push the 
government hard on this issue. 
 
------------------------------- 
INVESTIGATIVE REPORTS JANUARY 8 
------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) The group then reviewed twelve reports on a wide variety of 
violations, of which seven were dismissed, four were referred to the 
Joint Commission, and one moved to the Second Chamber: 
 
-- Attack on NGOs in Gereida (18 December 2006):  The FC came down 
strongly on the SLA/MM rep in this case, as did Poloff, who 
suggested that because of the impact this has had on the ability of 
the international community to deliver humanitarian aid, the U.S. 
considers this one of the most important of the violations and it 
has received widespread attention in capitals.  The weakness of the 
CFC was on display at this point, when the SLA/MM rep clearly had no 
information on the case, and was somewhat surprised it was being 
raised.  He was given until January 10 to have the names of the 
perpetrators, which the FC insisted was the responsibility of the 
faction even if the individuals had left their organization.  He 
stressed that there needs to be some accountability in the field by 
those who profess to control an area, and that individuals cannot 
have impunity merely by leaving a group and freelancing.  When the 
SLA/MM rep did not have any more information on January 10, and 
complained that it was simply too difficult to pin down, the FC 
suggested that the case be moved to the Joint Commission. 
 
--  Janjaweed and SAF attack on Deim Bishara (8 December 2006):  GOS 
questioned whether it really happened.  Referred to Joint 
Commission. 
 
--  Attack by Arab Militia (FC said no more use of that term, call 
them Janjaweed instead) at Abushakeen, (2 December 2006):  There was 
a problem with how long it took to investigate and the evidence 
being stale.  FC suggested that since Janjaweed will only be 
represented in the JC, it would be difficult to handle this here. 
The case will not move to the JC, but the issue of Janjaweed control 
and disarmament will. 
 
--  Attack by GOS on Nina Market (19 October 2006):  GOS says no 
connection to Janjaweed.  Goes to JC. 
 
--  Attack on Abu Shakeen Village (15 October 2006):  Livestock 
taken and several people killed.  GOS does not accept connection to 
Janjaweed.  Raises larger issue of Janjaweed disarmament.  Dismissed 
because of timing. 
 
--  Hijacked GOAL Vehicle (8 October 2006): Has been recovered, case 
dismissed. 
 
--  Arab Militia Attack on Dolol Village (1 October 2006): Sketchy 
information, dismissed. 
 
--  Attack on AMIS escort convoy to Kutum (2 September 2006): Minor 
injuries, dismissed. 
 
--  Shooting of AMIS NCO near Kutum (13 September 2006): Dismissed 
for lack of good information on perpetrators. 
 
--  Alleged abduction and shooting of women by armed militia near 
Kassab IDP Camp:  Allegations not proven, dismissed. 
 
--  Theft of camels and one killing by JEM rebels near Wadi Sunut 
(19, 30 June 2006):  Determined to be banditry, dismissed. 
 
--  Shooting of AMIS Patrol by SLA/S near Tui village (2 December 
2006):  Need confidence building measures between AMIS and rebels. 
 
KHARTOUM 00000070  003 OF 004 
 
 
The incident was shifted to the Second Chamber to facilitate 
discussion with JEM. 
 
--  The SLA/MM Rep also informed the group that one of his 
commanders called to inform him that an armed militia operating 
somewhere in Sector 1 area of responsibility and possibly supported 
by the GOS had ambushed his forces.  He was advised to make a formal 
complaint in writing to the CFC. 
 
-------------------------------- 
INVESTIGATIVE REPORTS JANUARY 10 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) In the January 10 session, the CFC catalogued an additional 
four cases: 
 
--  Fighting between GOS and SLA/MM at the Mawasha Animal Market (3 
December 2006) leading to looting of shops by Janjaweed and 
demonstrations in El Fasher on 6 December.  The incidents led to the 
deaths of three GOS soldiers and five SLA/MM fighters.  The report 
recommends:  1) There should be better public education on the tasks 
and obligations of AMIS; 2) FC should initiate training and meetings 
on conflict resolution; 3) Perpetrators of the fighting should be 
arrested and prosecuted; and 4) All GOS soldiers should be removed 
from El Fasher.  The discussion will carry over to the next CFC 
meeting after the parties have had time to review it. 
 
--  Alleged killing and wounding of pupils at Tagadum Basic School 
by Janjaweed (5 December 2006):  The investigators found that in 
fact one student had been killed and another wounded, but it was not 
clear that it was done by Janjaweed.  Discussion will carry over to 
the next week. 
 
--  Theft of vehicles from World Vision Guest House in Khor Abeche 
leading to the evacuation of WV (6 December 2006):  The attack was 
carried out by 40 armed men arriving in 13 vehicles, suspected to be 
from the NRF.  Investigators suspect it is to gather vehicles for a 
future offensive.  Carry over to next week. 
 
--  GOS aerial attack on Deim Bishara (24 December 2006): According 
to the report the GOS carried out 12 aerial bombardments of the 
village of Deim Bishara which claimed the lives of 6 JEM fighters, 3 
civilians, and "some" GOS soldiers.  There was also reported to be a 
ground attack by Janjaweed following the aerial attack.  The 
investigators recommend that the GOS be sanctioned over the attack. 
The report will be discussed in the next week when the GOS is in 
attendance at the CFC. 
 
---------------- 
PRESS STATEMENTS 
---------------- 
 
¶9. (U) The CFC has issued a number of press statements over the past 
several weeks: 
 
--  On December 20 it condemned the attacks on ACF and Oxfam in 
Geraida, and called on the SLM/MM to assist AMIS in tracking down 
the perpetrators and recovering the looted items. 
 
--  On January 7 it "observed with disappointment" reports of air 
bombardment of Bamina and Gadir on 5 January by the GOS, noting that 
the GOS claimed the NRF was massing weapons and fighters in Bamina 
near the Sudan/Chad border. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
SECOND CHAMBER MEETINGS JANUARY 8 AND 10 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) The Chairman inaugurated the Second Chamber on January 8, 
with General Mohammed Bashir and Major Abdessalam Kitir representing 
JEM, and Colonel Abdou Abdalla Ismail representing the SLA/NSF.  The 
Chairman highlighted the importance of the Second Chamber, but noted 
that unless it extends down to the sub-sector level it would not be 
effective.  To date, he said the GOS only had agreed to allow the 
Second Chamber to go forward at the CFC level.  He noted that the 
members were welcome to file violations against any party that 
violated the ceasefire.  The Chairman also briefed the participants 
in great detail about his efforts to reach out to non-signatories in 
the field and his intention to help facilitate a commander's 
conference which would help them to better organize to support the 
peace process (septel). 
 
¶11. (SBU) Both non-signatories agreed with the urgent need to get 
the GOS to allow their representatives back out in the field at the 
Sector Sub-CFC level.  Without this, they said, they would not able 
to respond to complaints, (which they demonstrated later on by 
dismissing a case because they have no one who could gather 
information on it), and would not be in a position to file 
complaints.  They also insisted that this was the only way they 
could actively participate in the investigations, making the point 
 
KHARTOUM 00000070  004 OF 004 
 
 
that none of their people had signed the report.  The Chairman 
promised to continue to press the GOS on this. 
 
¶12. (SBU) The second issue which they pressed was symbolic, but 
extremely important to them.  At one point in the second meeting on 
January 10, the FC mentioned that he would be away starting over the 
weekend.  When he announced that the Deputy Force Commander would 
chair the CFC they took issue, and said that according to the 
N'Djamena Humanitarian Ceasefire, the EU rep should take over in the 
absence of the Chairman.  (Note:  The "Agreement with the Sudanese 
Parties on the Modalities for the Establishment of the Ceasefire 
Commissions and the Deployment of Observers in the Darfur" (Addis 
Ababa, 28 May 2004) states that the Deputy Chair should be from the 
EU, while Article 240 of the DPA states that "the AMIS Deputy Force 
Commander shall be the first vice chair."  End note.)  Bashir and 
Ismail made it clear that they had signed up for N'Djamena and the 
accompanying protocols, not the DPA, and were not going to allow the 
Chairman to bring them into the DPA through the back door.  He later 
held a closed door session with them in which he suggested they not 
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