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Viewing cable 07KHARTOUM56, Southern Sudan: More Ambushes Near Juba

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07KHARTOUM56 2007-01-14 08:49 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO7809
RR RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0056 0140849
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 140849Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5790
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS KHARTOUM 000056 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PGOV EAID ASEC MOPS PHUM SOCI SU
SUBJECT:  Southern Sudan:  More Ambushes Near Juba 
 
REF:  a) 06 Khartoum 02916, b) 06 Khartoum 02667, c) Khartoum 00053 
 
1.  Summary:  A series of armed attacks east and southeast of Juba 
on January 7 and 10 claimed three lives, injured 13, and left two 
missing.  There is still no concrete evidence as to the identity of 
the assailants, but suspicion centers on the Lord's Resistance Army 
(LRA).  End summary. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
Ambushes Disrupt Major Trade Route to Uganda 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
2.  On the early afternoon of January 7, a group of unidentified 
armed gunmen ambushed a truck traveling from Juba to Nimule, on the 
Ugandan border, continuing a string of ambushes in the area (Refs A 
and B).  The route is a key commerce and transportation link for 
Juba and much of southern Sudan.  According to UN sources, the 
28-year old driver of the vehicle received a gunshot would to his 
right hand during the attack; his four passengers escaped injury. 
 
3.  Later that afternoon on the same road, unknown gunmen ambushed 
four Ugandan trucks bearing trade goods, resulting in two dead and 
ten injured.  The attack occurred less than 20 kilometers from Juba. 
 Local police did not respond to the attack when notified, according 
to UN sources.  The names of the deceased are not known; one of the 
two was an SPLA soldier and the other was a Ugandan driver. 
Witnesses said the attackers wore military fatigues, according to a 
newspaper report.  Although the assailants burned some of the 
vehicles in the convoy were burned, it is not clear whether they 
were looted. 
 
4.  Other vehicles in the convoy managed to stop and reverse 
direction, avoiding the attack.  Among the vehicles that escaped the 
ambush were two large passenger buses loaded with people and goods. 
It is not known whether SPLA and Uganda People's Defence Force 
(UPDF) units conducting joint patrols along the Juba-Nimule road 
accompanied the convoy.  Security officials in Juba from the SPLA 
and the UN (both UNMIS military and UN police) state that while the 
identity of the attackers in the recent incidents has not been 
definitively established, LRA movements in the area and other 
evidence suggests that the Ugandan rebel group has been involved in 
at least some of the recent activities. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
GTZ Vehicle Ambushed January 10, WFP Employee Killed 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
5.  A World Food Program (WFP) employee traveling died January 10 in 
another ambush along the Juba-Torit road, the main road 
transportation link between Juba and the Kenyan border (Ref C).  The 
WFP employee, 28-year old Emmanual Chaku Joseph, rode in a truck 
operated by the German development organization GTZ en route to a 
GTZ worksite where he worked on secondment from WFP.  At aout 10:00 
a.m., a pickup truck departed Juba bearing Joseph, three GTZ 
employees, and several armed SPLA soldiers as escorts.  The well 
coordinated attack occurred about 90 minutes later, about 40 
kilometers southeast of Juba.  A reported 10-15 persons in military 
uniforms attacked the vehicle using AK-47 rifles.  Joseph died 
instantly; two of the five SPLA soldiers and one of the three GTZ 
employees received injuries.  Two of the SPLA soldiers fled the 
scene but were subsequently apprehended by the attackers.  The 
attackers stole their uniforms and released the two soldiers, 
according to UN sources. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
Region Remains UN Phase 3 Security Area 
--------------------------------------- 
 
6.  The region east of Juba is classified currently as a Phase 3 
security area under the United Nations' local security system.  Only 
essential movement along the Juba-Torit road is permitted.  Travel 
must occur between 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m., in convoys with a 
"robust" armed escort consisting of two vehicles each (one at the 
head of the convoy and one trailing the convoy) with one squad of 
armed escorts.  These restrictions apply to all UN agencies (except 
UNMIS military personnel) and implementing partners. 
 
HUME