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Viewing cable 07KHARTOUM54, UN ENVOY ELIASSON VISITS SUDAN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07KHARTOUM54 2007-01-13 11:13 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO7639
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0054 0131113
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 131113Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5787
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS KHARTOUM 000054 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL AU SU UN
SUBJECT: UN ENVOY ELIASSON VISITS SUDAN 
 
 
1. (SBU) In his first trip to Sudan as the UN Secretary General's 
(UNSYG) Special Envoy for Darfur, Jan Eliasson underscored the UN's 
commitment to advancing the political process in Darfur.  He called 
for a visible reduction in violence between the Sudanese Government 
and Darfur rebel groups, which would prove to be a 
confidence-building measure for constructive political dialogue. 
Eliasson said that such a reduction of violence would be a 
demonstration of the parties' political will to further the peace 
process, which he hoped would bear fruit prior to the one-year 
anniversary of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) in May. 
 
2. (SBU) During a January 11 press conference and a January 12 
briefing for chiefs of mission, Eliasson characterized his 
conversations with Sudanese officials -- including President Bashir, 
Foreign Minister Lam Akol, Intelligence Chief Salah Gosh, 
Presidential Advisor Mustafa Osman Ismail, Presidential Assistant 
Nafie Ali Nafie, and Senior Assistant to the President Minni Minawi 
-- as "fruitful, substantive, and positive."  He noted that a 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs' statement regarding his visit said the 
November 16 Addis Ababa and November 30 Abuja agreements would form 
the basis of the peace process in Darfur.  The statement also 
indicated the Sudanese Government's willingness to hold talks with 
DPA non-signatories at any time.  Eliasson said that Sudanese 
officials had told him that military force would only be used in 
self-defense. 
 
3. (SBU) Eliasson emphasized that he would collaborate with African 
Union (AU) Envoy Salim Ahmed Salim to advance the political process 
in a joint AU-UN effort.  "There has to be a peace to keep," said 
Eliasson, "and it is a great step forward for the AU and UN to work 
on the political process."  He said that Sudanese officials and 
rebel leaders' concurrence that there was no military solution to 
the Darfur crisis could be the starting point for the political 
process. 
 
4. (SBU) At the chiefs of mission briefing, CDA Hume applauded the 
UN and the AU's strong engagement, noting that an attempt to advance 
the political process would require "a firm hand on the tiller."  He 
outlined a series of issues that continue to be the basis of 
disagreement, including compensation, and said that Janjaweed 
disarmament should be a priority.  He called on Eliasson to effect 
implementation of the DPA, rather than revisiting the agreement, and 
highlighted the importance of institutional shifts, such as the 
establishment of the Transitional Darfur Regional Authority. 
Eliasson said that he would attempt to strike a "delicate balance" 
to implement the DPA and to address legitimate grievances of the 
non-signatories. 
 
5. (SBU) Eliasson indicated that he would develop a plan for 
engaging non-signatories in preparation for UNSYG Ban Ki-Moon's 
attendance at the AU summit in Addis Ababa on January 29.  He 
expressed his hope that the proliferation of initiatives to engage 
non-signatories could be rationalized. 
 
6. (SBU) Comment: We need the UN to take the lead on advancing the 
political process in Darfur.  At present, the UN has no qualified 
political officers in the field.  While providing support when 
possible -- both in Sudan and in New York -- the USG should 
encourage the UN to increase its capacity to engage non-signatory 
groups in an effort to hold a conference of rebel commanders in the 
near future.  Such a conference would lay the groundwork for broader 
political dialogue in support of peace. 
 
HUME