VZCZCXRO3716
OO RUEHDBU RUEHIK RUEHYG
DE RUEHBUL #0313/01 0311249
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 311249Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5787
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUMICEA/JICCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFIUU/COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 3584
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 3427

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 000313 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, S/CT, EUR/RPM 
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG 
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN 
OSD FOR KIMMITT 
CENTCOM FOR CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: MARR SNAR PGOV PTER AF
SUBJECT: POLICE RANK REFORM: MOI DECIDES TO MOVE AHEAD WITH 
PHASE FOUR ASSIGNMENTS, UNAMA VETTING WILL FOLLOW 
 
REF: KABUL 115 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary:  The Ministry of Interior has decided to 
move forward 
immediately with assignments of police company grade officers 
(captains and 
lieutenants) to rank reform positions.  At a January 30 
meeting of the 
International Police Board Coordinating Action Group (IPCAG, 
a monthly 
meeting hosted by the German Police Program Office), German 
Ambassador 
for Police Affairs Helmut Frick reported that in a meeting 
earlier that day, 
attended by UNAMA and CSTC-A, the Minister of Interior 
decided to move 
forward immediately with Phase IV police rank reform 
assignments without 
waiting for international vetting to be completed.  This 
position was supported 
by UNAMA,s representative at the MOI meeting, Eckert 
Schiewek, who said 
that UNAMA vetting of the nearly 6,000 officers would take 
too long and 
significantly hold back the rank reform process.  Scheiwek, 
who also attended 
the IPCAG meeting, said that UNAMA recognizes to move forward 
quickly 
with rank reform because of the critical security situation 
throughout the 
country.   UNAMA has therefore decided to that it will vet 
these junior 
officers but after they have been assigned to their new 
positions.   It appears 
from the meeting report that the Ministry is ready, for now, 
to wait for vetting 
to be completed on Phase III candidates, as long as it is 
done expeditiously. 
End summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU)  Schiewek made the following points to explain 
UNAMA,s 
decision: 
 
1) UNAMA is already devoting significant resources to vetting 
and is unable 
to move any quicker than it is now.  It estimates that it can 
vet approximately 
20 candidates a day.  At that rate it would take nearly a 
year ) 285 working 
days - to complete vetting the Phase IV candidates.  (Note: 
1,140 Captains, 
1,710 First Lieutenants, and 2,836 Second Lieutenants.  End 
note.) 
 
2)  The international community has received strong 
assurances from the 
Government of Afghanistan that if in subsequent vetting any 
candidate is 
found to be unsuitable, his employment will immediately be 
terminated. 
(Note: Evidence leading to UNAMA disqualification would 
include, in 
addition to human rights violations, any credible indication 
of corruption or 
other administrative malfeasance.) 
 
3) UNAMA expects that it will uncover very few cases of 
disqualifying 
evidence for individuals at the rank of Captain or below. 
These individuals 
are mostly young and - given the tendency among Afghan senior 
 
KABUL 00000313  002 OF 003 
 
 
officers not 
to delegate authority - have generally not been in positions 
that could lead to 
abuse of power. 
 
4) The large majority of the officers in Phase IV reform will 
not be selected 
for new positions.  Instead, the reform process will allow 
them to stay in their 
present jobs with a somewhat higher salary.  (Note: 
Pre-reform salaries for 
these officers range from USD 66/mo to USD 78/mo; after 
reform they will 
receive between USD 180/mo and USD 250/mo.  End note.) 
Allowing them 
to receive this higher salary, which they were promised would 
take effect 
several months ago, would significantly assist in ANP 
retention efforts. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Ambassador Frick, who has been a strong advocate of 
thorough 
police vetting, said that the MOI decision made sense and he 
supported it. 
The rank reform effort needs to move forward quickly, he 
said, and he found 
compelling the Minister,s argument that international 
vetting has made it 
difficult to put the right people in key positions in a 
timely manner.  Noting in 
particular that the very large number of individuals to be 
vetted, together with 
the small number of cases that would likely be uncovered 
through the vetting 
process, he agreed that the international community should be 
prepared to go 
back to the GOA and demand dismissal when required, rather 
than holding up 
the vast majority of individuals from receiving the higher 
level of pay to 
which they are entitled. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Comment:  The MOI meeting was called at the last 
minute, and the 
lack of invitation to the U.S. Embassy was likely an 
unintended oversight. 
However CSTC-A Deputy Commanding General Young, who attended 
the 
meeting, was able to represent U.S. interests and has 
confirmed the contents 
of the discussion.   The good news is that UNAMA, which 
recently said it 
would not vet Phase IV police candidates because it was 
unlikely to find many 
cases of abuse, has now said that it will do vetting, 
although at a pace that can 
be handled by its already overworked staff.   Post has 
consistently advocated 
the need to place vetted, competent candidates in police 
leadership positions. 
The Ministor of Interior is acting both on President 
Karzai,s directive to move 
ahead quickly with police assignments (reftel) as well as his 
own cognizance 
of the security situation.  His willingness thus far to wait 
until vetting is 
complete before placing candidates has been due to his desire 
to work 
cooperatively with the international community, rather than 
to any legal 
constraint, since the GOA has unilateral decision-making 
power over 
 
KABUL 00000313  003 OF 003 
 
 
selections and assignments.  He appears to still be willing 
to do this for more 
senior officers, who are in positions of greater authority. 
However he has now 
considered the security imperative, including the need to pay 
a decent wage to 
officers who are risking their lives for their country, and 
has decided to move 
ahead with Phase IV postings. 
NORLAND