VZCZCXRO8721
RR RUEHDBU RUEHIK RUEHYG
DE RUEHBUL #0236/01 0240714
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 240714Z JAN 07 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5660
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 3563
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 000236 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A 
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG 
NSC FOR HARRIMAN 
OSD FOR KIMMITT 
CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76 POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: MCAP MOPS PREL PGOV PTER PHUM AF
SUBJECT: PRT LASHKAR GAH: HELMAND GOVERNOR UNVEILS 
PROTOCOLS FOR DISTRICT SHURA APPROVAL 
 
REF: 06 KABUL 5638 
 
KABUL 00000236  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
¶1.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  Helmand Governor Wafa has commenced his 
outreach to tribal leaders through a series of meetings with 
district shuras.  In each meeting, Wafa has presented his 
"protocols," which are conditions the shura must accept 
before the Governor will give his approval and support.  The 
conditions generally require the shura to recognize central 
government authority, support government and coalition 
security forces, support reconstruction and development, and 
oppose anti-government forces.  Wafa has met with at least 
five shuras so far and reports favorable reactions, with the 
Naw Zad shura signing a copy of the protocols.  The effort to 
have a systematic approach with a core focus on asserting 
central GOA authority is one we support.  The Musa Qala shura 
denied the Governor's claim that it accepted the protocols 
but is giving the agreement further consideration. 
Intransigence by the Musa Qala shura could pose one of the 
first tests for the new Governor.  Nevertheless, Wafa's 
approach is cutting off the previous risk that the Musa Qala 
precedent would spread and create broad swaths of territory 
closed to ISAF and ANSF.  The trend is positive.  END SUMMARY 
 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Governor Wafa has commenced his tribal outreach in 
Helmand, for which he received mixed reviews during his 
tenures in Kunar and Paktia provinces.  Following a 
provincial jirga on January 10, during which he exhorted the 
hundreds assembled to reject foreign fighters and accept 
government authority, Wafa met separately with shuras from 
the districts of Naw Zad, Washir, Musa Qala, Garmsir and Nad 
Ali.  He plans to meet with shuras from all thirteen 
districts in Helmand. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) In each meeting, Wafa presented to the elders a 
list of requirements (see paragraph 8) and described the 
items listed as "protocols," rather than a proposed 
agreement.  He insisted that the list consists of conditions 
for the shuras to meet with no corresponding obligations 
imposed on the government.  Wafa does make one concession -- 
permitting the shura to appoint the district head -- though 
he retains the power to appoint a head if he deems the 
shura,s appointee unqualified.  Wafa expects, or rather, 
demands that the shura accept and abide by the list as a 
condition for enjoying his recognition and cooperation.  He 
feels that he has a mandate from Kabul to pursue these 
protocols. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) According to Wafa, the Naw Zad shura has accepted 
the conditions and signed a copy to demonstrate this.  The 
shuras of Washir and Nad Ali, Wafa claimed, reacted favorably 
but have not formally accepted.  He also claimed that the 
Sangin shura reacted positively, but he assessed the elders 
in attendance were lacking sufficient influence in the 
district to guarantee compliance, and he told them to return 
with a stronger shura. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Wafa asked the Musa Qala shura to consider the 
protocols and claimed that the shura later accepted them.  In 
a meeting with members of the PRT, the shura denied that they 
had accepted the protocols.  The shura head asserted that it 
already had an agreement with the government.  However, the 
shura agreed to raise the matter with others in the district. 
 
 
¶6.  (SBU) COMMENT:  The new Governor has wasted little time 
in reaching out to the tribal leaders and has staked out a 
strong position on the centrality of the government in 
provincial affairs.  He says this is non-negotiable.  The 
generally favorable reaction he reports is therefore a 
positive sign.  Expectations for full delivery on the 
protocols should be kept modest, however, as the ability of 
district shuras to adhere to or deliver on a number of 
provisions, at least in the short term, is limited.  It is 
not entirely clear why a shura would accept the protocols, 
given that nearly all obligations fall on the shura.  The 
 
KABUL 00000236  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
list might be attractive simply because the government is 
turning to the shura for guarantees, a move which could 
increase their influence and possibly access to resources. 
Being able to appoint a district head could make that office 
more answerable to the shura and more responsive to the 
community at large. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) COMMENT continued: Musa Qala-type agreements, which 
limit the government's influence and presence, no longer 
appears to be an option available to the districts.  Still 
unclear is the effect of the protocols on the Musa Qala 
agreement.  If acceptance of the protocols is not taken as 
negation of the Musa Qala agreement, then it could constitute 
an amendment that strengthens the government's position, 
something most shura members likely would not wantQalthough 
it remains to be seen what the district's "second shura" 
decides (REFTEL)).  The shura's intransigence could present 
one of the first real tests for the new Governor.  END 
COMMENT 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Protocols: The following list was transcribed 
during a meeting the Governor had with a PRT representative. 
The Governor has not provided the PRT with a formal, written 
copy of the requirements. 
 
-- The people have to work with each other under the GOA flag. 
-- Shura leaders are to obey and respect the law of the GOA 
and follow the constitution. 
-- The elders must give priority to security in the district. 
-- The elders must guarantee to defeat the operations of all 
Enemy Forces. 
-- The elders must help in supporting reconstruction and 
development work. 
-- The elders must remain in touch with the PRT and Gov. 
-- Taxes must be paid to central government. 
-- The elders will receive some operational funding from the 
Government. 
-- The elders must work with the GOA to provide education for 
people and promise not to destroy any schools. 
-- The elders must give a guarantee of safety for ANA, ANP, 
PRT and NGOs. 
-- The elders must guarantee that coalition forces can go 
anywhere without needing to ask for permission and without 
facing problems. 
-- The elders must promise not to provide a sanctuary for the 
TB within the district. 
-- There must be no alternative (read Taliban) administration 
or courts. 
-- The Ulema and elders must work to reconcile those who are 
against the GOA. 
-- No one will be allowed to carry weapons and if caught they 
will be arrested and charged. 
-- The elders must work with the refugees to return to their 
homeland. 
-- The Gov will appoint officials to work with the district 
Shura. 
-- The Chief of Police must be professional and chosen by the 
government. 
-- Those in government departments must follow the agenda of 
the central government. 
-- Volunteers for the ANP must be trained and must be from 
all the tribes in the district. 
-- The elders must obey all the conditions required by the 
GOA. 
-- Those working on development must have their security 
guaranteed. 
-- The Shura must be controlled by the central government 
(the Gov,s office). 
-- The District Chief, chosen by the Shura, must be educated; 
if not he will be appointed by the Governor. 
NEUMANN