VZCZCXRO6285
PP RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHNH
DE RUEHHM #0080/01 0240238
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 240238Z JAN 07
FM AMCONSUL HO CHI MINH CITY
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2034
INFO RUEHHI/AMEMBASSY HANOI PRIORITY 1471
RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEHHM/AMCONSUL HO CHI MINH CITY 2199

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 HO CHI MINH CITY 000080 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY SAUERBREY 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OVIP PHUM PREF PGOV SOCI PREL KIRF VM
SUBJECT: CENTRAL HIGHLANDS SCENE SETTER FOR VISIT OF PRM ASSISTANT 
SECRETARY SAUERBREY 
 
SIPDIS 
 
HO CHI MIN 00000080  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) HCMC looks forward to welcoming you and your team 
to southern Vietnam and the Central Highlands. 
Humanitarian Resettlement Section (HRS) Chief Tim Swanson 
will present you with a comprehensive picture of HRS 
activities here, including the bilateral Humanitarian 
Resettlement process, VISAS-93 family reunification cases, 
Priority One visa cases and Amerasians.  We hope to use 
your lunch with our Vietnamese counterparts in the 
Humanitarian Resettlement process to strengthen further a 
good cooperative relationship. 
 
¶2. (SBU) To set the stage for your visit to the Central 
Highlands, this message provides background and information 
on conditions for ethnic minorities in the region.  This 
analysis is based on a dozen visits to the area by ConGen 
staff over the past two years, meetings with returnees from 
Cambodia, discussions with contacts based in the Central 
Highlands and hundreds of interviews with ethnic minority 
VISAS-93 beneficiaries conducted in private in HCMC. 
 
Who are the Montagnards? 
------------------------ 
¶3. (SBU) The term Montagnard (mountain people) is a 
carryover from the French colonial period in Vietnam.  In 
its broadest sense, the term refers to the 51 ethnic 
minority groups living in and along Vietnam's mountain 
backbone running from central Vietnam to the border with 
China.  The term is thus shorthand for ethnic minorities in 
Vietnam.  The hill tribes from Vietnam's five Central 
Highlands provinces (Gia Lai, Dak Lak, Dak Nong, Kontum and 
Lam Dong) are ethnically distinct from the Hmong and other 
hill tribes from northern Vietnam. Few, if any, ethnic 
minority individuals in Vietnam describe themselves as 
Montagnards. 
¶4. (SBU) Before 1975 the population of the Central 
Highlands was between 1 and 1.5 million, and was at least 
70 percent ethnic minority.  Since 1975, the population has 
grown to roughly 4.7 million, of whom about 1.3 to 1.5 
million are indigenous ethnic minority groups.  Of these, 
up to 475,000 are Protestant and 200,000 are Roman 
Catholic, significant increases from 1975.  Of the 
approximately 30 ethnic minority communities in the Central 
Highlands, the main groups are the Jarai (318,000), Ede 
(270,000), Bahnar (175,000), Sedang (127,000), Koho 
(129,000), Mnong (93,000), and Stieng (67,000). 
¶5. (SBU) The change in demographics in the Central 
Highlands since 1975 was the result of a heavy migration of 
ethnic Kinh Vietnamese from the poor and densely populated 
rural areas in northern Vietnam and the Mekong Delta.  In 
recent years, ethnic minority groups from the Northwest 
Highlands, such as the Hmong, the Sanchi and the Tay have 
moved to the Central Highlands for economic and religious 
freedom reasons.  This influx of outsiders, coupled with 
GVN efforts to develop cash-crop agriculture, accelerated 
displacement of indigenous groups from their traditional 
lands and undermined their traditional semi-nomadic, slash 
and burn agricultural system.  Poorly educated, the local 
minorities were unable to compete with migrants. 
Frustrations, principally over land and poverty, helped 
spark region-wide protests against the government in 2001 
and 2004. In the wake of these disturbances, the GVN 
severely limited in-migration to the area and banned the 
transfer of land rights from ethnic minorities to Kinh 
Vietnamese. 
 
What is the Dega Movement? 
--------------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) The Central Highlands traditionally have been 
difficult to govern; local indigenous peoples have long 
held national aspirations.  Ethnic minorities clashed with 
the Republic of Vietnam in the 1950's and early 1960's as a 
result of conscription into the military and programs to 
encourage ethnic Vietnamese migration.  Some ethnic 
minority leaders joined the ranks of the Viet Cong, while 
others launched an armed and political movement for an 
independent ethnic minority -- Dega -- state.  The United 
Front for the Liberation of Oppressed Races, known as FULRO 
(by its French initials) was the military arm of the Dega 
separatist movement.  After the war, FULRO continued its 
anti-GVN guerilla activities until 1992.  Former FULRO 
leader Kok Ksor heads the "Montagnard Foundation," a South 
Carolina-based NGO that calls itself the "true voice of the 
Montagnard people." 
 
¶7. (SBU) Although FULRO's armed resistance never threatened 
Vietnamese control of the Central Highlands, the resistance 
 
HO CHI MIN 00000080  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
complicated reconstruction and helped cement distrust and 
suspicion by Communist leaders towards the ethnic minority 
communities that dominated FULRO, principally the Ede and 
Jarai.  Despite the end of the FULRO insurgency, the idea 
of ethnic minority, "Dega" nationalism continues to 
resonate among some in the ethnic Ede, Jarai and Mnong 
communities in the Central Highlands.  Meanwhile, Vietnam's 
development efforts have resulted in some progress on the 
economic front.  Compared to other ethnic minority groups 
elsewhere in Vietnam, the ethnic communities in the Central 
Highlands are more prosperous and appear to receive more 
government assistance.  For example, many Visas-93 
beneficiaries tell us that their villages are connected to 
the power grid, have potable water and see some government 
efforts to develop their villages.  Beyond promoting the 
general goal of improving the economy, these efforts also 
serve to weaken support for separatists. 
 
Impact of the Dega Movement 
--------------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) Our contacts in the Central Highlands support GVN 
claims that Kok Ksor and other Dega leaders continue to 
agitate for the creation of an independent ethnic minority 
state.  The Dega movement played at least some role in 
organizing and fomenting the 2001 and 2004 protests in the 
Central Highlands, taking advantage of ethnic minority 
feelings of disenfranchisement and dislocation.  The Dega 
movement also reportedly helps facilitate the cross-border 
movement of ethnic minorities to Cambodia. 
 
¶9. (SBU) As part of this strategy, the Dega movement sought 
to create a "Dega Protestant Church," to reach a large 
number of ethnic minority members and to create another 
avenue to promote the idea of ethnic minority exclusivity. 
The presence of Dega nationalists in Protestant religious 
organizations in the Central Highlands -- including the 
GVN-recognized Southern Evangelical Church of Vietnam -- 
has complicated and slowed the process of registration and 
recognition of churches and congregations.  Over the past 
two years, however, Protestant religious organizations 
operating in the Central Highlands that do not have a 
nationalist/separatist overlay have been given far more 
leeway to operate.  The province of Gia Lai has been a 
pace-setter in this regard. 
 
Security Conditions in the Central Highlands 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) Security conditions in the Central Highlands tend 
to be tighter than other areas in HCMC's consular district, 
principally in response to security concerns over 
separatism.  The government also has tightened considerably 
controls along the border to try and stem illegal cross- 
border migration to Cambodia.  We have documented some 
incidents of abuse as well as the arrests of cross border 
"facilitators" and those the government suspects are part 
of the Dega movement.  However, we have seen no evidence to 
support allegations of systematic oppression of Central 
Highlands ethnic minority communities. 
 
Cross-Border Migration to Cambodia 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) Our interviews with returnees from Cambodia and 
our private meetings with Visas-93 beneficiaries indicate 
that lack of land and the search for economic opportunity 
are the most important factors driving cross border 
migration to Cambodia.  Our Visas-93 beneficiary interviews 
also appear to show that some ethnic minority individuals 
in Cambodia have exaggerated or distorted their 
circumstances in Vietnam to make the best possible case for 
refugee status.  The demographics of the border crossers 
also highlight economics as a driver of migration:  many 
migrants are young, male, single and uneducated; they have 
little or no land; and, their economic future in Vietnam is 
marginal at best.  With a handful of exceptions, all the 
cross-border migrants were born after the Vietnam War.  In 
only a few instances did the families of these migrants 
serve alongside U.S. forces during the Vietnam War. 
 
Treatment of Returnees and Visas-93 Beneficiaries 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶12. (SBU) Numerous interviews with returnees from Cambodia 
-- including some in private -- indicate that local 
authorities in the Central Highlands are abiding by 
 
HO CHI MIN 00000080  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
Vietnam's commitment under the UNHCR Tripartite Agreement 
to reintegrate peacefully returnees into their communities, 
so long as the returnees do not violate Vietnamese law. 
Local authorities appear to be under instruction to 
tolerate a higher level of "misbehavior" on the part of 
returnees than they would under other circumstances. 
Voluntary and involuntary returnees are treated equally. 
With the exception of isolated cases in Kontum Province, we 
have not confirmed any cases of abuse of returnees.  One 
returnee in Gia Lai was arrested in September 2005 for 
attempting to organize a new cross border flight to 
Cambodia.  He was sentenced to four years in prison.  UNHCR 
was able to visit him in prison during a visit to Gia Lai. 
 
¶13. (SBU) We have seen no evidence to support allegations 
that the authorities in the Central Highlands are 
retaliating against the families of Visas-93 petitioners. 
The few cases of detentions or harassment of Visas-93 
beneficiaries appear to have been in response to actions by 
those beneficiaries themselves.  These include attempting 
to follow the spouse to Cambodia or providing clandestine 
support for family members sought by police.  Over 70 
percent of our current Visas-93 caseload has been 
interviewed and processed in HCMC, with over half having 
already departed for the United States.  There are 
indications that some beneficiary families do not wish to 
leave the Central Highlands.  As with issues of religious 
freedom, Gia Lai Province has been most proactive in 
facilitating the Visas-93 process. 
 
¶14.  (SBU) For the foreseeable future, there will be some 
who will take the risk of traveling to Cambodia in hopes of 
finding a door to a better life.  Even if more are sent 
back, the lure of a possible ticket to America or Europe 
will remain very tempting.  Small numbers of those who are 
returned (voluntarily or not) will find it very difficult 
to reintegrate into their home villages.  Embassy believes 
that such individuals may be legitimate candidates for the 
Mission's P-1 program or some other future in-country 
program. 
 
Building a Stable Future for Ethnic Minorities 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶15. (SBU) Vietnam's international integration and USG 
engagement -- in Hanoi and in the Central Highlands -- has 
led to improved conditions for ethnic minorities in the 
Central Highlands over the past few years.  Particularly 
after the 2004 protests, the GVN intensified its efforts to 
deal with complicated ethnic minority issues and has worked 
positively to give more space to ethnic minority 
Protestants.  We are taking our first steps to assist the 
GVN in its efforts to integrate its ethnic minority 
communities -- and to prod the government to expand access 
to the Central Highlands -- by providing two million 
dollars to support NGO projects focusing on education and 
agricultural development. 
 
¶16. (SBU) Development assistance administered directly by 
NGOs on site is critical to carving out a better future for 
the ethnic minorities.  The GVN has a plethora of programs 
targeted at minorities.  "Hard infrastructure," such as 
roads and electrification, appear relatively well- 
administered.  The GVN seems to have less success is in 
developing "soft infrastructure," such as education, micro- 
credit and agricultural extension. 
 
¶17. (SBU) Closing the education gap between the local 
ethnic minorities and their Vietnamese counterparts is the 
key to long-term stability in the Central Highlands and 
reduced cross-border flight to Cambodia.  The vast majority 
of ethnic minority members whom we have met spoke only 
limited Vietnamese at best and were not competitive for 
anything but the most basic (and worst paid) factory and 
plantation jobs.  In contrast, ethnic Vietnamese migrants 
have better educational skills.  In agriculture few 
minorities engage in cash crop production.  Most are 
subsistence farmers and provide labor for state-owned 
plantations and their Kinh neighbors.  This creates a 
vicious cycle in which the ethnic Vietnamese, out-earning 
the minorities, use their profits to buy land from them. 
Over the long-term, this phenomenon exacerbates the ethnic 
minority sense of dispossession. 
¶18. (SBU) International aid and advocacy on behalf of the 
ethnic minorities is important to moderate the worst 
tendencies of Vietnamese security forces and to achieve 
continued progress in the Central Highlands.  However, 
 
HO CHI MIN 00000080  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
groups in the United States or elsewhere that continue to 
challenge Vietnam's sovereignty over the Central Highlands 
or encourage cross-border flight to Cambodia, are putting 
ethnic minority communities in the Central Highlands at 
great risk.  Such activities also undermine the willingness 
of provincial leaders to open up the Central Highlands. 
WINNICK