VZCZCXRO2537
PP RUEHGR
DE RUEHGE #0117/01 0301446
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 301446Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4724
RUCNCOM/EC CARICOM COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM J2 MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM J5 MIAMI FL PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 GEORGETOWN 000117 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
CA/FPP - LARA HARRIS 
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PBTS SMIG CVIS ASEC KFRD KHLS GY
SUBJECT: Guyana Immigration CWC Training Reveals Security 
Weaknesses 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: At GoG request, U.S. Embassy Consular officers 
participated as trainers in a recent Cricket World Cup Border 
Security Training Course for Guyanese Immigration and Customs 
Officers.  The training made it clear that while some senior 
officers have basic knowledge of APIS and the Caricom Special Visa, 
Guyana Customs and Immigration lack the basic tools and knowledge to 
enforce border security during the CWC.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Guyana Immigration presented the CWC Border Security Course 
to approximately ten customs officers and ten immigration officers, 
mostly mid-level supervisors, the week of January 22-26. This 
represents only a fraction of the approximately forty immigration 
officers who are assigned to the international airport and two 
hundred customs officers.  The line officers responsible for 
actually processing incoming and outgoing visitors at the airport 
were not trained.  Training modules were presented by supervisory 
level Guyanese immigration and customs officers and by Embassy 
conoffs. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Noting the Embassy's reputation for expertise in detecting 
fraudulent Guyanese documentation, Guyana Immigration invited the US 
Embassy to present modules during the CWC Border Security Course on 
detecting imposters and on analyzing Guyanese civil documents for 
fraud.  Although the training was well-received, immigration 
officers expressed frustration that they did not have the 
"technology" necessary to analyze travel documents - namely, UV 
lights and magnifying loops. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Deputy Immigration Director Vyphuis presented sessions on 
the Caricom Special Visa and APIS. One of the major areas of 
discussion was that the visa could be issued at port of entry and 
adjudication of the visa and collection of US$100 cash fee would be 
left up to individual immigration officers. (COMMENT: Nowhere on the 
Special Visa website does it state that visas can be obtained at 
port of entry. END COMMENT.) Giving authority to local officers to 
adjudicate visas and accept cash fees opens up a huge venue for 
corruption. The potential for corruption was a major focus of the 
Deputy's presentation, culminating with his statement, "He who needs 
a lash, gets a lash," apparently referring to his discipline of 
corrupt officers. When asked what system immigration would have in 
place to account for money collected and visas issued at the 
airport, Vyphuis could not answer, although the visa regime is due 
to go into effect on February 1. Vyphuis also stated that the length 
of time that each visitor would be given to remain in Guyana would 
be at the sole discretion of the immigration officer. He stated that 
anyone overstaying their permitted time in Guyana would be 
identified and deported, although there is no procedure in place for 
identifying or deporting those who overstay. 
 
 
¶5. (SBU) Vyphuis went on to describe plans for separating 
international and domestic/Caricom passengers at the airport 
throughout the immigration, customs, and departure/arrival process. 
Passengers arriving in Guyana will be separated into domestic and 
international as they leave the plane, routing through separate 
immigration, baggage and customs procedures. Although Guyana has 
only one semi-functional conveyor belt for baggage, this scheme 
would require two belts. Departing passengers will be separated as 
well, with domestic passengers being routed out of the airport 
building after screening to wait in an undetermined area, bypassing 
the routine final security and document screening in the 
international departure lounge. As of February 1, if Guyana receives 
supplies, all passengers will fill out a special CARICOM 
arrival/departure.  Vyphuis also alluded to a complex wristband 
scheme for domestic/CARICOM passengers, stating that the wristbands 
would be as good as a passport for domestic passengers. 
 
¶6. (SBU) While briefing on APIS, Vyphius stated that passengers 
should be allowed to travel uninterrupted and if adverse information 
is garnered, the immigration officers should notify the next port of 
entry rather than stopping the passenger. Currently, Guyana's only 
lookout system is based on paper lists of no-fly passengers. During 
discussion on the use of APIS, immigration officers were advised 
that they will not have time to consult Guyana's paper-based no-fly 
lists while processing passengers and that the information on 
Guyana's lists would be input into APIS. However, Vyphuis was unable 
to answer how or when this data sharing would take place. 
 
¶7. (SBU) COMMENT: While DHS and some of the other CARICOM countries 
are focused on APIS implementation and enforcing border security 
throughout the region, Guyana lacks even basic fraud detection tools 
and training. Guyana's CWC border security plan does not appear to 
be realistic, given the timeframe and infrastructure available and 
the potential for corruption is high. The Guyana Immigration Office 
is notoriously corrupt. The last Director of Immigration was 
suspended last spring after 100 blank Guyanese passports went 
 
GEORGETOWN 00000117  002 OF 002 
 
 
missing and her suspension was merely the latest in a string of 
Immigration Office scandals. Putting adjudicating and fee collection 
authority in the hands of immigration officers who only earn only 
two or three hundred dollars a month will surely result in only more 
corruption.  End Comment. 
 
ROBINSON