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UNCLAS BOGOTA 000449 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KJUS PGOV PINR PREL PTER CO
SUBJECT: SALVATORE MANCUSO BEGINS TO REVEAL CRIMES; VERSION 
LIBRE TO BE TELEVISED 
 
REF: A. BOGOTA 269 
     ¶B. BOGOTA 408 
     ¶C. 06 BOGOTA 10976 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1.  (U) Ex-AUC leader Salvatore Mancuso admitted to 
committing or ordering 336 murders from the early 1990s to 
2003 in his January 15-16 voluntary confession, or version 
libre, in Medellin.  He discussed paramilitary infiltration 
of government institutions and paramilitary interference in 
local and national elections, and handed over the July 2001 
"Ralito Agreement" signed by paramilitary leaders and some 30 
political figures.  Mancuso is scheduled to resume his 
version libre on January 25, but delays could result 
following Prosecutor General Mario Iguaran's January 18 
announcement that the version libre process would now be 
televised.  End summary. 
 
------------------------------ 
First Day Details of Round Two 
------------------------------ 
 
¶2.  (U) Mancuso described 90 operations in which he 
personally killed or ordered killed a total of 336 people 
from the early 1990s to 2003.  He mentioned 30 
"confrontations" with the guerillas from 1992-1997.  Mancuso 
said he served as a "guide" for the military before joining 
the AUC in 1995.  After entering the AUC, Mancuso said that 
he or Castano was provided "intelligence," usually by the 
military or police, on guerillas or their sympathizers.  When 
the AUC captured guerillas or sympathizers, they "talked" to 
them to convince them to work with the AUC and then 
"disposed" of these persons.  He named some victims, but for 
many of the operations he did not have names. 
 
¶3.  (U) Of the 30 "confrontations," Mancuso described two 
notorious massacres, El Aro and Mapiripan, as standard 
military operations against the guerrillas.  He said Castano 
ordered him to participate in the massacre at El Aro (1997), 
in which 15 people were killed.  Mancuso claimed to have 
assisted the operations, supplying ammunition via helicopter 
and then evacuating wounded paramilitary combatants.  He did 
not mention any additional personal involvement, describing 
the massacre as a military operation carried out with the 
assistance of now deceased General Alfonso Monosalva, 
commander of Colombian Army Fourth Brigade.  Mancuso referred 
to Mapiripan (July 1997), in which some 30 people were 
killed, but provided few details.  He said only that he had 
received collaboration from Colonel Lino Sanchez, who has 
been sentenced for his involvement.  Mancuso promised more 
information on Mapiripan. 
 
¶4.  (U) Turning to the AUC as an organization, he said Carlos 
Castano created it to negotiate with the GOC, and the 
commanders of the blocs had autonomy.  Still, when pressed, 
Mancuso said Castano was his commander and that he (Mancuso) 
led a number of blocs.  He said the blocs were set up like 
any other military unit: the AUC had regulations, "like any 
business would have."  AUC commanders attended six-month 
training schools, at which active duty Colombian military 
personnel served as trainers.  In addition, they had 
strategies for carrying out operations and collecting 
intelligence.  Mancuso asserted the FARC had infiltrated the 
government, the police, the fiscalia, NGOs, and civil 
society, and therefore the AUC decided to do the same. 
 
¶5.  (U) Mancuso said he demobilized with Catatumbo Bloc, 
instead of the Cordoba Bloc to which he devoted most of his 
time, to be one of the first commanders to demobilize and to 
encourage others to do the same.  He claimed he was the 
"State" in Cordoba, Norte de Santander, and Magdalena 
departments from 1995 until his demobilization in 2004.  He 
claimed he administered justice, affected economic and 
political relationships, and even influenced religion. 
 
Mancuso stated he had politicians visit him to determine if 
they merited his support. 
 
¶6.  (U) Mancuso told prosecutors the 1998 presidential 
election was the only time when the AUC "at gunpoint" told 
voters how to vote -) for Liberal Horacio Serpa in the first 
round and for successful Conservative Andres Pastrana in the 
second.  He affirmed several times, however, that in the case 
of President Uribe, what they had done had been to 
"recommend" that people vote for him.  He also denied any 
financial backing or use of coercion in favor of any 
particular candidate for the congressional elections of 2002. 
 Mancuso also revealed the list of political figures who met 
with the AUC in July 2001; Senator Miguel de La Espriella was 
the first to disclose the contents of this meeting in late 
November 2006, but neither the document nor the list of 
signatories had been known (refs B and C). 
 
¶7.  (U) At the end of the session, the representative of the 
Inspector General's Office (Procuraduria), who has been 
present throughout the version libre, gave Mancuso a list of 
the disappeared, presented by the Madres de la Candelaria (a 
victims group that has gathered outside the courthouse for 
each of the version libre sessions) and requested that he 
provide information on these individuals.  He was also 
provided a series of questions collected from the victims who 
had attended the version libre (roughly 50, viewing via close 
circuit TV in the same building but on a separate floor). 
 
------------------------------- 
Second Day Details of Round Two 
------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (U) On day two, Mancuso began the session stating he had 
reviewed the list of 200 disappeared persons and only three 
had disappeared in zones under his control.  He said he had 
shared the list with the other ex-paramilitaries at Itagui 
for their review.  Mancuso then continued listing his 
"military anti-subversive" activities, at times naming 
victims.  He always claimed his operations had Carlos 
Castano's "blessings" and were based on "military 
intelligence."  Most of the persons he said had participated 
in operations were dead or missing, although he mentioned the 
involvement of paramilitary leader Rodrigo Tovar Pupo, (AKA 
"Jorge 40") on numerous occasions, in addition to other 
commanders under his control. 
 
¶9.  (U) Mancuso told how the AUC became concerned about ties 
between the guerrillas and indigenous groups and university 
professors.  Terrorists had recruited some indigenous groups 
to help them communicate by using their dialect to prevent 
the AUC from intercepting communications.  In response, the 
AUC developed its own group of indigenous sympathizers. 
Regarding universities, he claimed the University of Cordoba 
was "infested" with guerilla activity and described the 
killings of university professors.  He said he had played a 
critical role in removing the president of the university, 
replaced with a more "friendly" candidate. 
 
¶10.  (U) Mancuso said that when the AUC received information 
that prosecutors and other GOC officials were sympathetic to 
the guerrillas, he would have them killed.  Mancuso described 
an AUC operation in the guerrilla-controlled area of La 
Gabarra (1999-2000), Norte de Santander department, in which 
95 persons reportedly were killed.  He said the guerrillas 
blended into the population and that civilians may have been 
killed in the crossfire "but such things happened in an 
irregular war."  To gather more information on the 
guerrillas, Mancuso said the AUC in the north of the 
department wired 1 billion pesos (approximately USD 450,000) 
per month to the police, army, DAS, Fiscalia and other 
government institutions.  He cited section prosecutor chief 
for Cucuta Ana Maria Florez, who is currently a fugitive, as 
an AUC informant who provided information on prosecutors who 
were FARC and ELN sympathizers. 
 
¶11.  (U) Mancuso's revelations were less detailed as he 
 
approached 2004.  He mentioned a 15-day operation in the 
Montes de Maria in 2000, in which the AUC "had no choice" but 
to attack the civilian population to get to the guerillas. 
In reference to the El Salado (2000) and Chengue massacres 
(2001) "if anything happened in these areas, Marine General 
Rodrigo Quinonez was their contact."  (Note:  Quinonez was 
investigated and absolved for his participation in these 
massacres by former Prosecutor General Luis Camilo Osorio. 
Osorio has repeatedly been accused of ties to the 
paramilitaries.)  Mancuso admitted to ordering the 2001 
killing of Hector Acosta, the Mayor of Tierralta, Cordoba 
department, because he had allegedly diverted public funds to 
the guerrillas.  He also mentioned having a candidate for 
Mayor of Cucuta killed in 2003.  Prior to the peace talks 
with the GOC, Mancuso said the AUC had grown at a rapid rate, 
undermining internal controls and leading to the excessive 
use of force by some members.  He said he reprimanded 
subordinates after particularly violent operations.  It was 
the AUC's "exponential" growth and lack of control which led 
him and other commanders to decide to turnover their guns and 
negotiate peace with the GOC. 
 
¶12.  (U) Once Mancuso finished his presentation, the 
prosecutor called for the version libre to be suspended until 
January 25 to prepare for the next topic, in which Mancuso 
would have to address narcotrafficking, assets, and 
paramilitary finances.  It will not be until after he 
addresses his and the AUC's finances that the ex-paramilitary 
would have to address specific questions on the 90 
incidents/crimes he confessed to in the previous round.  The 
Fiscalia would also have to properly inform the victims and 
arrange for their participation in the process.  Neither the 
victims nor the general public are aware of the different 
stages of the version libre, which is creating confusion and 
unrealistic expectations. 
 
---------------------------- 
Press and Victims' Reactions 
---------------------------- 
 
¶13.  (SBU) The press has been reporting how chilling it was 
to hear the matter of fact manner in which Mancuso confessed 
about torturing and execution of people, as if he were a 
corporate executive reporting on his business.  In addition, 
Mancuso's revelation of the names of political figures who 
had signed the July 2001 "Ralito Agreement" has received 
extensive press coverage.  Moreover, several victims groups 
have rejected Mancuso's version libre because they feel he is 
not telling the whole truth.  One victim, for example, told a 
reporter that Mancuso "seemed proud of what they'd done, not 
remorseful."  Medellin's Reparation and Reconciliation 
Commission's coordinator Gerardo Vega told us on January 17 
that the "unknown" of this process was still the "dealings" 
with victims.  He has had to fight with some NGOs that have 
been discouraging victims to participate in the Justice and 
Peace process and instead encouraging them to take their 
cases to the International Court of Justice. 
 
----------------------------- 
Version Libre to be Televised 
----------------------------- 
 
¶14.  (SBU) As a result of a Constitutional Court ruling and 
significant pressure from victims, NGOs, media and some GOC 
officials, Prosecutor General Mario Iguaran, with the support 
of the Ministry of Interior and Justice and the Supreme 
Court, announced on January 18 that version libres would be 
broadcast on national television and radio.  Arrangements 
were in place for victims' families to view via closed 
circuit television, but some NGOs complained they were not 
allowed access to the feed.  While a transparent measure, 
live public broadcasting could expose victims or witnesses 
who wish to remain anonymous, and thereby complicate the 
Fiscalia's ability to build cases. 
WOOD